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Preface
Two decades of overwhelming concern for the pressing problems of accounting principles have rather effectively obscured the fact that such concern
is but a natural concomitant of the basic professional responsibility of auditing:
adding credibility to financial information. In a very real sense, auditing is the
parent and accounting principles but the child (and an adopted one at that!),
whose needs and demands have grossly overshadowed those of the parent.
For the evidence that this is actually the state of affairs, one need but consider the spartan attention and support devoted to the Committee on Auditing
Procedure in contrast to that lavished on the Financial Accounting Standards
Board and its predecessors, the Accounting Principles Board and before that the
Committee on Accounting Procedure. An obvious cause for this disparity is the
fact that auditing standards are largely an internal matter, whereas the public
interest and concern for accounting principles has placed the workers in that
particular vineyard under time pressures to hurry the work along, while at the
same time being forced to work in the constant glare of the public spotlight.
The original proposal to Touche Ross Foundation to sponsor a symposium
on auditing problems was presented as a means to help restore some semblance
of balance and proportion between auditing and accounting. The plan, reflected
in the following pages, was to obtain a series of papers on matters of current concern in auditing, with a roughly equal distribution between practitioners and
educators invited to prepare the papers. A member of the alternate group was
then invited to serve as formal discussant of the paper, thereby leading into a
general discussion of the paper by all who were present for the symposium.
More than forty persons participated in the symposium, again about equally
divided between practitioners and educators, and with representatives included
from the AICPA Committee on Auditing Procedure and the A A A Committee
on Basic Auditing Concepts. The papers and discussants' remarks are arranged
in these Proceedings in the order in which they were presented, with the exception that Marvin L. Stone's remarks in Chapter 8 were delivered at the
dinner held at the close of the first day of the two-day event.
The papers and discussants' remarks generated lively but penetrating discussions, sometimes with practitioners and educators holding different views,
but most frequently with relative agreement between the two groups that was
perhaps unanticipated by many. There has been no attempt to summarize the
discussions, but both the preparers of the papers and the formal discussants have
had an opportunity to modify their papers and remarks as originally presented
to reflect matters that arose during the discussion periods.
As chairman of the symposium, I take full responsibility for the selection
of the topics for the invited papers, but the views expressed in the papers are
those of the preparers, and, of course, not necessarily those of the organizations
with which they are affiliated. Although there was no chosen theme for the
symposium as a whole, it is of more than passing interest to note the frequency
with which references to auditor independence occur throughout the papers.

The references generally involve questions of preserving and strengthening
independence or of the influence of independence as a factor to be considered
with respect to a given problem or decision. The fact that these references evolved
naturally in the development of the various topics suggests the mature consideration that those associated with the auditing profession give to the unique obligation of independence that the profession has assumed.
The Touche Ross Foundation sponsorship of the symposium has likewise
made possible the printing of this volume, thereby affording wider distribution to
the significant ideas and views generated in the course of the symposium. I especially wish to acknowledge the unstinting efforts of Donald J. Bevis in helping to
bring to fruition the proposal that such a symposium be held.
HOWARD F. STETTLER

June, 1972
University of Kansas
Lawrence
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1
Some Historical Auditing Milestones; An Epistemology of an
Inexact Art
R. Gene Brown
Syntex Corporation (formerly of Stanford University)
and

Roger H. Salquist
Zoecon Corporation
To accept an assignment to write of history is in many ways more foolish
than to attempt to be a soothsayer. When one forecasts, the reasonableness of his
assertions can be debated but only substantiated by the passage of time, at which
point one can blow the dust off the forecasts (if they proved reasonably accurate)
and point with pride to such clairvoyance. If the forecasts missed the mark, one
can let the earlier assertions rest forgotten unless reminded thereof, at which point
a cloudy crystal ball can be argued to have been expected given the vagaries of
such a changing, dynamic environment.
On the other hand, a cloudy crystal ball is difficult to explain when one
examines events of years past, for there are records, memories, and earlier
expressed opinions as to history. It is not possible to wait for the passage of
time hoping to receive plaudits for reasonable assertions, or brick-bats, if observations are different than those subject to historical "verification" or at variance
from those of the reader's perceptions.
The historian hopes to make his contribution in one of three ways. Of
greatest reward is the uncovering of some new artifact or information which
will not only add to the store of knowledge, but help in explaining some facet
of our heritage which heretofore had remained unknown and as frustrating as
a missing piece from a jigsaw puzzle. A lesser, but nonetheless satisfying endeavor, is to start with the known historical body of knowledge and successfully
structure some new theory permitting a greater understanding of one's heritage
or present behavior. Of least satisfaction is to attempt to order given knowledge
in a fashion in which it has not previously been ordered, hoping to enhance the
understanding of the past and permit greater perspective of today's moment in
history, and hopefully, a better basis for speculations as to the future. It is this
latter contribution that we hope to make in this paper, an epistemological approach, that is, the study of the nature and substance of audit history with the
objective of better understanding the evolutionary process which shaped the
present state of the art and may influence future occurrences.
1

Difficulties with an Epistemological Approach to Auditing History
Three identifiable steps must occur to successfully carry out an epistemological study: first, the important, influential events must be identified and segregated
from trivial events. This first step is critical, yet difficult, for it is easy to make
an error of commission and include some event which in others' judgment should
not be considered, or to make an error of omission and fail to include in one's
consideration some important influential factor of history.
The second step to perform is to order the identified important historical
variables in some manner which can lead to the necessary third step, an interpretation of the events and their ordering. This second step is also difficult,
for the historian is plagued with uncertainties as to the cause or motivation underlying the occurrence of a specific event, the actual importance of the event at
the time it occurred, as well as the true influence of the event on the evolution
of the art. It must also be recognized that the ordering process itself structures
the analysis and interpretation of historical events. These difficulties are not
unique to the study of auditing history, but plague the student of the history of
any art or science. Certain other difficulties seem more uniquely associated with
the study of auditing history, especially in viewing the so-called auditing
"milestones."
We first encountered the milestone in France (milleborne), where it is used
as in other principally European countries to mark orderly, measurable steps to
a predetermined goal (mileage traveled from a given city and remaining to another specified city). It stretches our imagination to argue that there have been
orderly and measurable happenstances in audit history which can be stated to
have occurred with some specific goal in mind. Auditing evolution has been
irregular, responding to pressures from within the profession and the environment, with no specific goal or goals which have been historically consistent or
even well articulated, and with a distinct lack of specified hurdles against which
progress can be measured. Perhaps this is understandable, since auditing is truly
a service function, responding to demands for its service by adjusting its "theory"
and tools of practice as needed to satisfy the changing needs of its customers.
The service nature of auditing and the audit process are what encourage us to
describe the practice of auditing as an "inexact art."
Art has been defined as a skill in performance acquired by experience, study,
or observation. It is also defined in Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary as (a) an occupation requiring knowledge or skill, (b) a system of rules
or methods of performing certain actions, and (c) systematic application of
knowledge or skill in effecting a desired result. Certainly, these definitions
describe the auditing process even though the auditor may use the scientific
method of reasoning from an hypothesis and collecting and interpreting data
in order to affirm, deny, or modify the hypothesis. The use of such a "scientific"
tool as probability sampling does not change the fundamental nature of the
auditing process; a process which cannot but be described as an art, and an
inexact one, at that. This inexact nature of the audit process, the evolution of
the art in response to internal and external influences, and the lack of a consistent and articulated set of goals, render difficult any epistemological study.
Nonetheless, the major factors influencing audit evolution and the important
2

events that could be identified made possible some structure and ordering of
auditing "milestones."
Choosing a Structure for Ordering Historical Audit Events
One possible approach, and the one which we first attempted, was to make
an extensive review of the literature and prepare a chronological inventory of
important events in the history of auditing. Since the purpose of this paper is
to make some observations about the milestones in the development of the profession in the United States, and since earlier audit history is reasonably well
chronicled, we began our survey with the literature which could be reasonably
argued to be representative of, or contributory to, the profession in this country.
Once completed, however, we found that a sequential inventory of important
publications and events was less than satisfactory, not only because of the
uncertainties arising from fears of possible errors of omission and commission,
but because of the lack of any apparent order or logic to the listing. A second
problem is that any such list ignores cause and effect relationship, tending to
concentrate on the "effect" side of the equation, while the "cause" is the most
interesting if one is seeking to rationalize the occurrence of events or to use
history in a predictive fashion.
A more exciting approach to ordering audit history would be to focus on
the giants of the profession and their contributions. This has partially been
accomplished in the form of several publications devoted to the lives of both
academicians and practitioners. It is much more interesting to study people than
events, but such an approach can only result in a disjointed survey since many
of the important factors which shaped the profession were unrelated to individuals,
being of economic, social and technological origin.
An interesting "macro" approach is to attempt to identify the major socioecono-technological environmental influences on the evolution of the auditing
profession along with the identification of the response of the profession to those
influences. Such an approach is quite a chore, for two reasons: first, cause and
effect relationships such as these are difficult to establish in an ex-paste manner,
especially when one realizes that these relationships were often not understood
or documented at the time, much less decades later, and second, because there is
not always a clear cause which can be associated within a given time period
with an important event which occurred.
Another method of ordering historical milestones is through a characterization of the profession by looking at the major "eras" through which it passed in
its development. Such an era classification is also difficult, since many events
are not subject to placement into neat little boxes of time or character, in the
sense that they are evolutionary in nature. A significant lead-lag problem also
exists, since certain environmental influences do not make their presence known
in the professional literature or practice until long after the cause for the evolutionary change has vanished or diminished in importance.
In reviewing the chronological inventory of events which we prepared, and
in stepping back to reason therefrom, we decided that the last two approaches
mentioned above would be most interesting and most useful in attempting to
generalize about our professional heritage. The next two sections of the paper
present these two orderings of auditing milestones, with the era classification
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provided first and the socio-econo-technological environmental (in a cause and
effect relationship) presented second. In a sense, this provides two different ways
of viewing the same history. Since any ordering is a matter of choice, the use
of two alternative methods of classification permits us to test how important the
choice itself is in making generalizations of relevance as to the current status of
the profession and/or assertions as to the future.
Auditing Milestones Classified by Era
Since we are dealing with the epistemology of a profession, it makes sense
to view its evolution in terms of the major periods of professional change or
growth. We have selected the following five classifications as being a useful
description of the eras of auditing evolution: "Emergence," "Consolidation,"
"Technology," "Professionalism," and "Conflict and Uncertainty."
The various eras can be described generally as follows:
Emergence
Consolidation
Technology
Professionalism
Conflict and
Uncertainty

The birth and early development of the auditing profession in
the United States.
The move toward combination, uniformity and strength.
The interest in and sometimes preoccupation with audit tools
and techniques, especially the so-called "scientific" tools.
The assumption of responsibility for shaping the destiny of the
profession rather than responding to outside pressures for
change; organizing and bonding together for influence.
Serious questions about the nature and scope of audit content
and responsibility create internal conflict within the profession.

The specific important audit milestones which we would attribute to each
of thefiveeras which we isolated are shown in the table following.
AUDIT MILESTONES CLASSIFIED BY ERA
Era
Emergence:
Late 19th Century
to 1920

Audit Milestones
• The expansion of business enterprises and the great influx
of foreign capital into the United States in the late 1800's
created the need for a body of trained accountants.
• The American Association of Public Accountants was
formed in 1887.
• The State of New York passed the first public accounting
law in the United States in 1896.
• Mounting credit problems in the early 1900's caused
bankers to pressure corporations to have their balance
sheets "certified."
• The literature of auditing began to mature. The Journal
of Accountancy commenced publication in 1905. In 1914
Robert Montgomery published the first United States
auditing textbook, an adaptation of Dicksee's 1892
English text.
• In 1916 the American Association of Public Accountants
was re-organized and became the American Institute of
Accountants. The change reflected the movement of the
4

Era

Audit Milestones
profession from a very regionalized apparatus to a truly
national organization, promoting uniform goals and
standards.
The adoption of the Corporate Income Tax in 1917-1918
caused the demand for accountants' services to soar.
The growth of external pressures caused by the growing
number of business failures and the extreme lack of
uniformity offinancialstatements led to the publication of
"Uniform Accounting: A Tentative Proposal Submitted
by the Federal Reserve Board" in 1917.

Consolidation:
1929 to Early
1940's

In 1929 a special committee of the AIA undertook a major
revision of the 1917 Federal Reserve Board audit guidelines to reflect the growing importance of profit and loss
statements, include evaluation of internal control as an
integral part of the audit, and remove many of the inconsistencies in recommended audit procedure.
Public reaction to the stock market crash and the depression led to expanded governmental and other regulatory
control over securities transactions andfinancialreporting.
The SEC became a powerful entity with the passage of
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. The New York Stock Exchange required audits
for all listed companies in 1933.
In 1930 the AIA appointed the first committee on cooperation with the stock exchange.
In 1931 the Ultramares case established the limited liability
of auditors to third parties not "in privity."
The McKesson-Robbins scandal in 1939 revealed the inadequacies of accepted methods of auditing inventories
and receivables, and led to the formation of the special
AIA committee on auditing procedure, which published
"Extensions of Auditing Procedure" in May of that year.
The committee was made a standing committee, and it
soon commenced regular promulgation of the "Statements on Auditing Procedure."

Technology:
1950's

This era was primarily occupied with the development of
more sophisticated tools by which the audit process could
be improved:
—The introduction of computers and the steady conversion of business data management to Electronic Data
Processing modes led to the development of specialized
methods for auditing the computer and using the computer to increase audit efficiency.
—The refinement of statistical techniques led to increasing usage of statistical sampling.
—Formal, quantitative evaluation of internal control was
proposed as a means of determining the extent of detailed testing that was required.
The recognition of the applicability of the specialized
abilities of accounting professionals to all areas of business
management led to the emergence of management services.
5

Era

Audit Milestones
• The Committee on Auditing Procedure continued to gain
influence by further clarifying the auditor's responsibilities and the scope of his examination.

Professionalism:
1960's

• The profession assumed increasing responsibility for shaping its own destiny by interacting with external professional and regulatory agencies in attempting to improve
the uniformity and information potential of "generally
accepted accounting principles."
• The Accounting Principles Board emerged as a powerful
policy body.
• The concepts of management auditing were developed.
• The techniques of analytic review and of continuous auditing were refined and put to increased use.

Conflict and
Uncertainty:
1970's

• Public criticism of accounting principles and of the
limited extent of disclosure in certain instances is made
effective through class action suits and stockholder pressure for expanded board representation and greater public
disclosure.
• The judicial concepts of legal liability expand and the
auditor's responsibility for fraud and deception becomes
cloudy.
• The further development, standardization, and uniformity
of techniques leads to questions re: "professionalism," in
the sense that professionalism equals the ability to set one's
own parameters for audit plans, procedures, and tests.
• Increased interest in the issuance of financial forecasts and
the growing importance of interim reports raise questions
about the need to assure the accuracy of those reports,
thereby creating new responsibilities for the profession.
• The need to develop new audit techniques arises as the
trend toward reporting current values develops.

Socio-Econo-Technological Influences on Auditing Evolution
Generalization of development by era is less than a totally satisfactory
approach to history since it tends to obscure important cause-effect relationships.
We can identify important events but we cannot say why the events occurred or
measure their relative significance. By identifying the relevant social, economic
and technological movements that have occurred during the last century it is
possible to hypothesize a cause-effect relationship for these past developments and
to improve our acumen at predicting future developments.
The Industrial Revolution. Certainly a dominant socio-economic movement
in the last 200 years was the industrial revolution. The discovery of various
means to create and harness mechanical power and the recognition of
efficiencies possible from specialization of labor and consolidation of effort led
to the modern industrial state. The revolution resulted in successively larger
corporate entities and increasingly complex organizational structural forms, culminating in the existence of multi-national giants such as General Motors and
6

ITT, whose annual sales exceed the gross national product of all but a few of
the larger nations of the world.
The aspect of the industrial revolution which had the greatest impact on
the accounting profession was the growth in size of the business entity. Expanding corporations relied heavily on external credit, creating a vital need for
expert independent professional attestation as to their financial condition. Expanding size meant also that all operations could not be under the direct control
of a single manager, creating the need for a system of internal controls. Professional review of the adequacy of the controls fell to the independent auditor.
Finally, as growth in size continued, the practical bounds of detailed checking
were reached, and sampling procedures became the only realistic method of
audit examination. The very genesis of the auditing profession and the source
of two of the major audit "tools" (review of internal control and sampling) can
be traced to the industrial revolution.
Public Ownership. A major consequence of the growth in size of companies
was widespread public ownership of corporations. Expanding public investment
in business in the early 1900's resulted in the separation of ownership and management and created the need for means of measuring the stewardship of management and providing large numbers of potential investors with information upon
which investment decisions could be rationally based. The lack of uniformity
and consistency in reporting methods and the need for independent certification
of management's representations became a pressing issue as the large base of
investors sought to evaluate the information being presented to them.
This new public voice and the persistent supplications of bankers caused
increasing numbers of corporations to elect auditors and to have their statements
certified in the years prior to 1929. However, there was little uniform agreement
on just what audit objectives and procedures were or just what was being
certified in a "certified statement." Many corporations simply stated that their
records had been examined by certain auditors and neglected to mention the
results of that examination. The efforts of the profession to develop uniform
standards for reporting and for audit examination were drowned in the euphoria
of investor speculation.
Regulatory Influence. The crash of 1929 brought into sharp focus the reporting abuses that had existed all along, but which had been tolerated or ignored.
The influence of the stock exchanges, the emergence of the SEC and other
regulatory agencies, and pressure from the investing public, encouraged the
accounting profession to work in earnest to codify and enforce uniform rules of
financial reporting and audit examination.
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are,
of course, the foundation of the legislative structure that has been erected to
establish the basic requirements of standardization of disclosure and mandatory
audits. The SEC has steadily widened the extent of regulation through the
periodic issuance of Accounting Series Releases, SEC Regulations, and the
opinions of the Chief Accountant. The stock exchanges have amended their
regulations to specify more rigorous requirements, and the courts have consistently
expanded the scope and applicability of the original regulations. Thus, today's
growing public pressure for more disclosure and greater uniformity in financial
reporting is all the more effective because of this broader range of "tools" at
its disposal.
7

Legal Environment It was in the aftermath of the depression that the
broader judicial view of individual and professional liability, which is continuing
to develop, had its roots. The courts assumed a progressively more activist role
toward all phases of society; they also reoriented their posture toward the
business world from an attitude of "caveat emptor" to one of staunch defense
of the rights of the public consumer of products and financial information. The
courts progressively translated the ethical considerations of the past into the
legal duties of today.
The reasons for this shift in judicial perspective can be traced in part to
the increasing power and remoteness of business vis-a-vis private investors, and
the desire to place the responsibility for the consequences of unfavorable events
upon those who have the authority and ability to directly influence the events.
The impact of this judicial evolution has, of course, been a drastically expanded definition of the common-law liability of public accountants for injury
to third parties. The concepts of limited liability established by Justice Cardozo
in the Ultramares case in 1931 have been steadily broadened until the doctrines
of privity, foreseeability and scienter were obscured. The BarChris decision
in 1968 established the liability of auditors to third parties not "in privity" and
the Continental Vending case (U.S. vs. Simon, 1969) punctured the shield of
"generally accepted accounting principles" by requiring adherence to higher
standards of fair presentation and informativeness.
Not only have the courts expanded the common law liability of accountants,
but they have broadened and more rigorously enforced the existing regulations
of the SEC and the stock exchanges. Of greatest impact have been the cases
decided under SEC Rule 10b-5, which was originally intended to protect against
fraud in the purchase as well as the sale of securities. Accountants' liability under
this regulation was broadened by Fisher vs. Kelty in 1967, where defenses of
"absence of privity" and "lack of personal gain" were overruled and a requirement for more complete disclosure was established. The Texas Gulf case, also
prosecuted under Rule 10b-5, expanded the spectre of liability by establishing that
evidence of "wrongful purpose" was not a requirement of a 10b-5 violation.
The impact of this legal onslaught upon the sanctity of the auditor has been
reflected in standardization and codification of audit procedures. Two cases in
point were the promulgation of "Extensions of Auditing Procedures," which
established the requirements for more rigorous receivables and inventories testing
in 1939 following the McKesson-Robbins case, and the adoption of Statement
on Auditing Procedure Number 41 which detailed the accountant's responsibility to report the discovery of facts subsequent to the completion of the audit,
as the direct result of the Fisher vs. Kelty decision.
Broader Social Changes. One can reasonably hypothesize that the legal trend
described above is merely a reflection of the broader shift in the attitudes of
society as a whole. One impact of an affluent society is to see a subordination of
the drives for basic needs to the drives for love, acceptance, and self-actualization.
The business world has lost its "mystique" and more and more people are
concerned with the quality of life versus the quantity of goods, with the social
cost of public goods, and with the social responsibility of business. Certainly
the greater awareness and higher educational levels of the public have created
8

the demand for disclosure of matters previously considered to be privileged
information and for greater professional responsibility.
One aspect of this greater social and public awareness is reflected in the
accounting profession's desires to improve the quality of the financial representations produced for the public as well as the underlying audit support of that
product. Liaison committees with the stock exchanges, the SEC and other
regulatory agencies have been re-emphasized. The APB was formed to establish
an authoritative professional doctrine that would serve to clarify and standardize
corporatefinancialreporting so as to make it more meaningful for the public and
more relevant for investment decision making. This increasing degree of professionalism (the assumption of responsibility for shaping one's own destiny and
for responding to social needs) has been characteristic of the accounting profession recently.
Technological Change. Though the socio-economic trends have been the
prime determinants of audit development, there is one technological influence
that cannot be overlooked. The development of computers has drastically altered
methods for data manipulation and allowed accomplishment of tasks of a
magnitude previously unimagined, as well as accomplishment of routine tasks
of previously infinite duration in a relatively short period of time. Since Univac
I was introduced in 1951 we have progressed through three generations of computer sophistication and reached the stage where business simply cannot function
without computer processing.
The transfer of much of business accounting data manipulation to computers
may have improved the accuracy and speed of performance of simple clerical
tasks, but it has added another dimension of the internal control problem: the
computer programmer/operator complex; and it has in many cases made the
audit trail much more difficult to follow. These factors have caused auditors
to accelerate the development of corroborative and generalized evaluative techniques of auditing. The development of and increased reliance upon analytic
review, statistical sampling, quantitative internal control evaluation, and comprehensive overall audit systems have been greatly accelerated by the computerization of business.
Summary
Our attempts to develop some reasonable structure for viewing audit milestones have tended to reinforce the assertions made earlier in the paper about the
lack of orderly development of the profession. Auditing has not been characterized by a systematic and orderly development. It has not progressed down a
well-defined path toward some predetermined goal. It has not, until recently,
taken a. strong professional responsibility for shaping change rather than responding to change. Much of the progress which can be identified has resulted from
strong environmental influences, not the least of which has been the evolving
regulatory and legal climate.
Unfortunately, many of these observations of the past seem to be still with
us when assertions as to the future are made. Perhaps, due to the service nature
of auditing, one cannot but expect a somewhat chaotic development, since the
demand for and nature of work to be done is itself chaotic. Certain highly
probable events on the horizon will tend to be professionally disruptive should
9

they occur. Three of the most prominent of these are (1) the trend toward
"current value" measurements in financial reporting, (2) steps being taken
toward increased publication of financial forecasts, and (3) increasing internal
and external questioning of the scope and nature of traditional audit field work.
Current value reporting, in the sense of reporting valuations based upon
existing market prices, replacement costs, or net realizable values, presents unique
auditing problems of verifiability and testing. To the extent that many members
of the accounting profession and investment community are advocating using
current values for financial reporting, and to the extent that some progress has
already been made in this direction, the auditing profession will face new requirements in planning and implementing the attest process.
With regard to publishingfinancialforecasts, a great deal of study is taking
place within the professional societies in the accounting and financial communities, and many individuals are advocating formalization of such reporting.
The SEC has already held hearings on publishing forecasts, and forecasts are
now published in a variety of ways in the United States. In Great Britain and
Holland financial forecasts are required to be published in some circumstances
and certain audit responsibilities have been defined with respect to these forecasts. This attest responsibility has thus far been limited to an expression of an
opinion with respect to whether or not the forecasts are consistent with the underlying assumptions used by management (and published with the forecasts) in
making the forecasts themselves. Even if audit responsibility were so limited
in the United States, new questions of liability and audit relationships between
the various parties at interest would arise. In fact, it seems that tremendous
conflict could occur if the auditor found that the rather mechanical forecasting
calculations were in fact in accordance with the underlying assumptions, but
that one or more of the assumptions themselves were questionable or fallacious.
A more subtle, and debatable, difficulty which we foresee arises more from
a feeling and from conversations than from a discernible trend in the literature
or in professional meetings. It seems to us that there is little basis for believing
that the rather extensive audit testing that still occurs (even though the amount
of detailed testing has been reduced) is justified when one looks at the types
of difficulties which require a qualified opinion, a disclaimer, or extensive conversation between auditor and client prior to issuance of a clean opinion. Most
reporting issues are exactly that, issues, arising from a measurement choice made
by management from the alternative reporting possibilities available to them.
In fact, most of these issues are known to both client and auditor and are not
disclosed by "testing," in the usual sense. Other than for establishing precise
cutoffs, audit testing tends to be defensive, wherein many tests performed cannot
possibly lead to evidence that would cause the auditor to alter his opinion; indeed, many of the tests are apt to disclose internal control weaknesses or routine
processing errors of concern to the management of a company but not to the
shareholders. A possible exception would be disclosure of fraudulent transactions
or events, where it is officially argued that the normal audit is not designed to,
nor can it be relied upon, to disclose defalcations that do not materially affect
the financial statements. As clients, outside investors, and auditors themselves
push for higher quality work and better financial reporting, we feel that the
entire audit process will be re-thought, including audit objectives and techniques.
10

Despite the rather critical evaluation which we have made of the manner
in which audit progress has taken place, and the causation for that progress, we
do have confidence that the profession will become an ever more constructive
influence in the broad arena of financial reporting. However, such progress will
not come in as orderly a manner as one would like, nor will the profession
achieve its potential until it assumes an even more aggressive posture toward
structuring its environment and itself, and until it does a more rigorous job of
defining its goals and mapping the road to travel to attain those goals, including
the measurable milestones.
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Discussant's Response to
Some Historical Auditing Milestones;
An Epistemology of an Inexact Art
Horace G. Barden
Ernst & Ernst, Retired
My initial invitation to participate in this symposium asked if I would undertake to discuss a paper entitled, "Some Historical Auditing Milestones—How
They Got There, What They Portend for the Future." (The authors of the paper
subsequently proposed the revised title as it appears herein.) I wondered somewhat
about how they happened to extend the invitation to me. I finally concluded
they must believe that I am one of the few old practitioners still tottering around
who was actually on hand as the profession encountered many of the events in
the last forty-five years that are now considered milestones. The organizers of the
symposium probably figured that if I had been there at the time these events
occurred, I should at least be able to pass on the first part of the question, namely,
"How They Got There," and if so, they would take a chance on my viewpoint
when it came to distilling what the events portend for the future.
My active interest in accounting began in 1924, and it has been my principal
interest since 1927. Accordingly, I was on hand and watching most of the
events that Gene Brown and Roger Salquist have listed as historical auditing
milestones. I think I can answer some of their questions as to whether they
have omitted any important events. I should also be able to clear up some of
their uncertainties as to causes underlying certain of the milestone events, their
importance at the time, and the resultant influences on the profession.
I don't believe the combined efforts of the authors and myself are going to
uncover any hitherto unknown facet of our heritage, or structure any new theory
leading to a greater understanding of our present state of affairs. I do believe that
our combined efforts might enhance understanding of the past, and give a wider
perspective of today's moment in auditing history.
The Problem
I really doubt that I would have undertaken the authors' task by attempting
the route of "an epistemological study." I shall admit that I quietly stalked
that word "epistemology" for two or three days after my initial shock of finding
it in the subtitle of their paper. I finally got up the courage to sneak into the
library and pounce on it in an unabridged dictionary. According to the knowledge so recently obtained, I shall attempt to keep my discussion of their paper
within a framework of interpreting the milestones in terms of the knowledge
to be gained therefrom, its limits, and its validity.
I turnfirstto the question of whether we are, in fact, dealing with an inexact
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art, irregular in its evolution, without articulated goals, but developed principally
within a framework of pressures from within and from its external environment.
I believe there is little argument about the notion that auditing is an art in the
sense that it involves the systematic application of knowledge in performing
certain actions to accomplish a desired result. It is definitely a service function,
performed for business enterprises, with its indirect benefits flowing to management and other users of financial reporting. Like accounting itself, it is pragmatic in nature and its evolution has been shaped and modified to meet the
needs of the various interests which it serves. Auditing theory has not been
developed from a precise set of postulates which have been tested conceptually
to deduce principles.
Drawing generalizations from detailed observations is inherent in the methodology of auditing. The same is true of the manner in which most theory of
auditing has been established. This process has, nevertheless, developed a rather
rigorous applied discipline, with a reasonably good organization of its underlying knowledge. Because of the pragmatic nature of auditing, its evolution has
obviously taken place without very many specifically articulated goals which can
be identified by milestones of planned accomplishments. Instead, we might
better look at the historical events in its evolution as landmarks, from which new
courses have been plotted in the development of auditing.
Auditing Theory and Practice vs. Accounting Principles
Some of the real milestones and landmarks in auditing history have been
obscured somewhat because many people fail to distinguish auditing theory and
practice from the development of accounting principles. The accounting profession has carried the primary responsibility for the latter for many years. It has
found its attempts to develop authoritative pronouncements on accounting principles fraught with many pitfalls and with much unfavorable criticism from
many directions. This has overshadowed much of the steady development of
sound auditing theory and practice which has been taking place on a truly professional basis. I hope my discussion of the Brown-Salquist paper will demonstrate
this more clearly. Much of the development has taken place quietly and discreetly within the profession in the same type of atmosphere in which the auditor
exercises judgments in the confidential work required in carrying on his services.
The Ordering of the Events
The authors state they are fearful of committing errors of commission or
omission by basing their observations on a sequential inventory of important
publications and events which seems to them to lack order and logic. I can see
how this approach might seem tenuous without some first-hand knowledge of
the cause and effect relationships which would help rationalize the occurrence
of the events.
In the final analysis, they select two approaches to their study of events, the
"era" ordering of events, and the "macro" approach of ordering things in terms
of the "major socio-econo-technological environmental influences." The two
methods are used to test the validity of their selections to some extent. Reviewing these two orderings, I find myself relating more closely to the "macro" ap13

proach. I have some difficulty with their classification of audit history milestones
by eras, as to the timing and the descriptions of some of the eras.
I shall comment on the milestones selected under both means of ordering
which the authors use, but I find it easier to take them up in about the order of
time in which I observed them. I think that most of the milestone events were
well understood as to cause and effect relationships by leaders in the profession
at the time they occurred, even though the documentation of their understandings
appears principally in the form of internal professional development rather than
in published writings. I find that I need very little hypothesizing to recognize a
few clear-cut landmarks that have had continuing monumental effects on the
development of the profession.
The Industrial Revolution and Expansion of Public Ownership of Business
Auditing was a matter of relatively little concern until the time of the industrial expansion that occurred in the nineteenth century. Auditing for internal
purposes might have expanded somewhat as business enterprises grew in size
so as to assure management of proper accountability for liquid assets and the
adequacy of internal controls, but the significant effect of the industrial revolution was the expanding public ownership of business enterprises which began
in the early 1900's. This, combined with the expanding use of credit, brought
about the concept of general financial reporting as the essential route through
which to monitor the stewardship of management. These developments caused
the auditor to expand his primary objective from that of providing assurances on
internal accounting controls, to that of monitoring management's external reportings for the benefit of creditors, shareholders, and other outside users of
financial information.
The environmental influences of the period of expanding size of business
enterprises and public ownership induced what was truly an era of emergence,
as the authors have designated in their ordering of the milestones by era. The
growth and recognition of the auditing profession during this period was not
particularly exciting. Historical milestones such as the first CPA laws, formations
of professional accounting organizations, and the early attempts to formulate
authoritative pronouncements on general financial reporting and auditing, all
reflect orderly progress in meeting the need of the financial community of that
time. The advent of income taxation added to the professional stature of the
auditor. His knowledge of income taxation was necessary for auditing company
liabilities, and his knowledge about the determination of income as the basis for
the new tax naturally caused his clients to turn to him for his professional advice
in this area. The authors might have noted this event as the beginning of a
fifty year controversy between the budding accounting profession and the legal
profession. The history of that controversy, incidentally, is replete with evidence
of just how persevering accountants can be when they set their mind to achieving
well-articulated goals.
I find it difficult to obtain much of a reading prior to 1929 on the "new
public voice" of the "large base of investors" whose supplications, together with
those of corporate creditors, were causing increasing numbers of corporations to
elect auditors. It seems to me that the Accounting Objectives Study Group,
which was formed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
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some forty years later, is still seeking to get readings on that same old public
voice of the large base of public shareholders.
The State of the Art at the 1929 Crash
I would extend the era of emergence through 1929. The crash of the whole
economy certainly was the landmark ending the first period of expanding public
ownership in business. As to the state of the auditing art, I find a pretty clear
picture in the booklet "Verification of Financial Statements" published in May
of 1929, some six months before the crash. (As an aside, the booklet was available for 10ft per copy.) This booklet was the American Institute's revision of the
original publication by the Federal Reserve Board in 1917. The sub-title described
the booklet as a method of procedure for the consideration of bankers, merchants,
manufacturers, auditors, and accountants. The booklet contained some twenty
pages describing the audit procedures considered appropriate at the time for
"verification of assets and liabilities at a given date, verification of the profit and
loss account for the period under review, and (incidentally) an examination of
the accounting system for the purpose of ascertaining the effectiveness of internal
check." The booklet concluded that, "If the auditor is convinced that his examination has been adequate and in conformity with these general instructions,
that the balance sheet and profit and loss statement are correct, and that any
minor qualifications are stated, he may issue a certificate," to the effect that he
has examined the statements and that he certifies that in his opinion they set
forth the financial position and results of operations. The audit instructions are
evidence that a considerable amount of detailed checking was considered necessary
at that time, but that it was not mandatory to confirm receivables and have contact with physical inventory-taking.
Many of the large firms still hired "temporary help" for their "busy seasons" in order to handle the large volume of detailed auditing work being done
at that time. The rank and file of their staff organizations contained relatively
limited numbers of university graduates. About twenty universities in the United
States offered courses for a major in accounting, and there was considerable
difference of opinion between professional accountants and the academic field as
to what the content of the courses should be.
Beginning of a New Era: Foundations of Modern Auditing Concepts
Brown and Salquist set 1929 as the beginning of an era of "consolidation"
which lasted through the early 1940's. They mention the public reaction to the
stock market crash as bringing on the federal regulation of securities beginning
in 1932-1933, and the Ultramares decision as two outstanding milestones in both
their era and their macro approaches to auditing history. Considerably later,
under their listing of broad social changes influencing the evolution of auditing,
the authors classify the formation of the APB as evidence of the profession's increasing assumption of responsibility for the shaping of their own destinies and
responding to social needs.
I combine the state of the art in 1929 with Ultramares and the SEC to place
a different interpretation on the importance of these events and the extent of
their influence on the profession. These events combined to cause the develop-
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ment of modern concepts of auditing and the profession's initial assumption of
responsibility for shaping its own destinies, all back in those troubled days of
the 1930's. Within the framework of this new era of professional development,
I can see several landmarks that I believe should be given greater recognition
than that accorded by the authors.
A Theoretical Base for Auditing. The need for improved general financial
reporting which was highlighted by the 1929 crash of the securities markets and
the deep economic depression which it triggered, gave rise to the beginning of
cooperative efforts between the accounting profession, as represented by the then
American Institute of Accountants, the investment community, as represented
by the stock exchanges, and industry, as represented by the Controllers Institute.
These groups were later joined by representatives of the newly-organized Securities and Exchange Commission. Agreements reached in a series of correspondence between the New York Stock Exchange and the AIA during the
period of 1932 through 1934, gave birth to the first generally accepted concepts
of accounting principles and auditing theory. These concepts were embodied in
the agreed form of short-form auditor's report which is used today with very
much the same substance.
The theoretical base for auditing as we see it today is reflected in these features of the short-form auditor's report:
1. Financial statements are basic representations of management, and
management has primary responsibility for them and for maintaining an adequate system of internal controls.
2. There is a body of generally accepted accounting principles which,
if applied consistently, produces accounting information from which
to prepare financial reports fairly presenting financial positions and
results of operations.
3. The auditor operates in an environment of examining management's
financial statements and rendering his professional opinion thereon,
after carrying out such auditing procedures as he considers necessary
and in conformance with generally accepted standards of performance.
These basic concepts of financial reporting and auditing were agreed upon in
1934, as a foundation for improvement in the format and quality of general
financial reporting even though the agreements reached at that time did not
attempt to document the generally accepted accounting principles and the generally accepted auditing standards.
I believe that this landmark of the middle 1930's was the point at which
the profession really accepted the full responsibility for shaping its own destinies.
The Chief Accountant of the SEC had been issued an order by the Commission
at that point to establish the meaning of the term, "generally accepted accounting
principles," and to issue an authoritative pronouncement on them. He had
received the Commission's approval, however, to withhold any such action on
his part, with the understanding that the AIA would set up the needed machinery
to proceed with the issuance of authoritative pronouncements on both generally
accepted accounting principles and generally accepted auditing standards.
The Institute did begin work on these two projects through its Committee
on Accounting Procedure. Progress was slow and many of the proposals for
developing accounting principles and auditing standards met with delays and
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controversial actions by the Institute's governing body and its membership.
Little had been accomplished when, late in 1938, the infamous McKesson &
Robbins case came to light. The entire financial community, and particularly
the stock exchanges and SEC were shocked to realize that, in almost ten years
since the 1929 crash, relatively little progress had been made in improving the
reliability of financial reporting. The immediate action prompted by this event
was the Institute membership's approval in 1939, of "Extensions of Auditing
Procedure," which made mandatory the confirmations of receivables and physical
contact with inventory-taking.
Restructuring the Accounting Profession
Brown and Salquist recognize the McKesson & Robbins milestone in their
"consolidation era," and in their listing of regulatory and legal influences on
auditing evolution. I accord a great deal more significance to the event. To me,
it was the beginning of an era of consolidation for the profession rather than the
end. It could be designated better as the end of a period of "conflict and uncertainty" rather than designating that era as beginning in the 1970's as the
authors do. I consider the lasting consequences of the McKesson & Robbins
landmark to include the restructuring of the profession and the laying of the
groundwork for the extensive internal educational and professional development
programs of the Institute.
Separating the Development of Auditing Standards from the Establishment
of Accounting Principles. The real shock of McKesson & Robbins to the leadership of the Institute was the realization that if they were really going to shape
their own destinies, they would have to restructure the organization to overcome
the cumbersome procedures which had caused them to bog down in attempting
to carry out responsibilities they had undertaken some five years earlier. The
result was a revision in their charter to enable establishment of "senior technical
committees" which could speak authoritatively for the Institute without going
through the lengthy processes of approvals by its governing body and membership. The Committee on Auditing Procedure was formed to deal with matters
relating to auditing standards and procedures. The Committee on Accounting
Procedure was designated to deal with accounting principles and their implementation. They were each charged initially with the respective responsibilities
to develop authoritative pronouncements on auditing standards and generally
accepted accounting principles.
You are all familiar with how the Committee on Accounting Procedure has
fared since that time, eventually being replaced by the expanded concept of the
Accounting Principles Board in 1959, and now about to be replaced with a new
entity which is expected to relieve the Institute of some of the basic responsibility
for the development of principles which they accepted, somewhat by default, in
the 1930's. As I noted earlier in these comments, the attention that has been
focussed on the difficulties of establishing principles has overshadowed a great
deal of the progress that has been made in the field of auditing. The formation
of the APB is designated by Brown and Salquist as a milestone in their era of
professionalism and in meeting some of the broader social challenges of the
times. The event really has had very little cause and effect relationship on the
profession's auditing standards or procedures.
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The restructuring of the early 1940's went beyond acceptance for developing
auditing standards and accounting principles. The foundations were laid at that
time for expanding the recognition of three basic functional areas in which accountants render professional service: auditing, tax consultation, and management advisory services. The Institute began formulating goals toward refining
its organization so as to expand its services to members and to the profession
generally in areas of, (1) examining and qualifying those seeking to enter the
profession, (2) furnishing continuing educational and professional development
programs in all three branches of accounting services, and (3) improving the
quality of professional services by maintaining an appropriate code of ethics
governing the professional behavior of its members. These are the hallmarks
that have come to distinguish accounting as a profession rather than as a trade
or an art.
Auditing Standards. World War II slowed progress, but the first big payoff
of the restructured Institute's programs went on display in 1948 with the publishing of the tentative statement, "Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, Their
Significance and Scope." I class this as a monumental milestone—marking the
achievement of a carefully planned goal. It is a true landmark in auditing history in the sense that it provides a point from which to guide the course of action
for those engaged in the most professional of the services rendered by professional accountants.
Perhaps I am more impressed by this event than many others because I was
there and witnessed it. The initial exposure of this important document took
place at the Institute's annual meeting in 1947. At a technical session presided
over by Paul Grady, the then chairman of the Committee on Auditing Procedure,
three committee members, Edward Kracke, Alvin Jennings, and John Lindquist
presented, respectively, the general or personal standards of the auditor, the
standards of field work, and the standards of reporting. To this day, I still consider that afternoon session as one of the most impressive technical presentations
I have ever witnessed.
The Committee on Auditing Procedure restudied this document in 1954,
for the purpose of adding one reporting standard to require the auditor to provide
a clear-cut indication of the character of his examination and the degree of
responsibility he is taking whenever his name is associated with financial statements. Hardly another word was changed except to take the term "tentative"
out of the title. Practically the identical wording of the standards was carried
over into the codification of auditing standards and procedures—issued as Statement on Auditing Procedure 33, in 1963.
Thus, I view the consequences of those milestone events of the late 1930's
and early 1940's as providing the financial community today with a set of standards for measuring the quality of the professional auditing services upon which
it relies. These same standards provide the auditor with a gospel by which to
measure and challenge the truthfulness of his statement on the scope of his examination and his resulting opinion on the financial statements.
In addition to a continuing monitoring of performance standards and their
adequacy, the Committee on Auditing Procedure has issued some fifty statements on auditing procedure, to provide guidance in new techniques required
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by current developments in accounting and auditing. They have issued numerous
booklets on special auditing problems of particular industries.
Educational and Professional Development Programs
Brown and Salquist find it difficult in searching for an ordering of historical
milestones, to identify any part of auditing evolution as having resulted from the
establishment of articulated goals against which to measure progress. I have very
little difficulty in this respect. I can find the goals and the orderly progress not
only in the development of auditing standards, but even more evident in the
area of education and professional development of the auditor.
The outstanding milestone and landmark events in this area also go back
to the restructuring that took place in the early 1940's, when the Institute began
shaping its own destinies. Concentrating on the problems of developing an acceptable set of standards with which to measure the training and proficiency of
the auditor focussed attention on educational requirements and professional
developments.
The milestones that do exist as measuring progress in reaching the goals of
well articulated programs have been recognized by many within the profession,
but not particularly so by those outside. For example, a truly significant milestone occurred in the early 1950's when the goal was reached of having every
state CPA law implemented through the Institute's uniform CPA examination.
Today, the same examination is not only used in all fifty states, but all are accorded the Institute's uniform grading services. No other recognized profession
can equal this degree of control over its admittance requirements.
Educational developments within the profession in the last twenty years have
been sensational. Last year, over 10,000 accountants attended some twenty-five
basic training programs, workshops, and courses in special accounting and tax
subjects that were offered by the Institute in conjunction with state CPA associations. More than 15,000 accountants attended forty seminars and lecture programs
on specialized subjects. Many state CPA associations offer additional programs.
Most of the larger firms operate extensive in-house training and professional development programs. On the basis of my ownfirm'srecent experience, I estimate
roughly that partners and staff employees of the so-called big eight firms are
currently spending in excess of 2,000,000 hours annually in attendance at in-house
educational programs, and at least that amount in advance preparation and study
for these programs. Several larger firms operate separate school facilities to conduct these training programs. Two states have adopted compulsory continuing
educational requirements for maintaining a right to engage in practice as a CPA
from year to year, and the Institute Council has recommended adoption of such
requirements.
Another milestone in the profession's educational development programs is
the publication in 1967 of Horizons for a Profession, by Robert H . Roy, and
James H . MacNeill. This publication culminated an extensive study by a distinguished commission under the sponsorship of the Carnegie Foundation and
the Institute, with an objective of delineating the common body of knowledge
which should be possessed by those about to begin careers as CPAs. This study
will have continuing effects on refining and coordinating the academic and professional training of future programs.
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The Legal Environment
The following session of this symposium will discuss the subject of what the
courts are saying to professional accountants in recent cases. The BrownSalquist paper mentions the milestone cases which have had significant effects
on the auditing environment. These are matters of deep concern to all professional accountants. Leaders in the profession and technical bodies in professional
accounting organizations are concentrating on programs to alleviate some of the
burdensome liability problems facing the profession.
Summary
In summarizing, I refer back to the final era selected by Brown and
Salquist—the one they label, "Conflict and Uncertainty," beginning in the
1970's. They cite public criticism of accounting principles, current judicial concepts of auditors' legal liabilities, loss of professionalism in auditing through
increasing standardization and uniformity of techniques, and challenges regarding forecasting, interim reporting, and current value reporting—all as the sources
of the profession's conflict and uncertainty. Later in their summary, they mention
these same factors as those that are bound to have a disruptive effect on the
profession. They also restate their views that auditing has not been characterized
by systematic and orderly development and that it has had no well defined
path and predetermined goals. They conclude that you could expect little more
than chaotic development from auditing since the work itself is chaotic in nature.
I find myself in complete disagreement with these conclusions.
Their initial listing of public criticisms of accounting principles as a source
of conflict and uncertainty leads me to believe that the authors, together with
many other critics of the profession, have let the APB struggles with principles
completely overshadow a very orderly evolution and development of auditing.
I believe that my outline of the milestones and landmarks of the last forty years
present an entirely different picture. I trace a well defined path of development
of auditing standards and procedures beginning in 1941. It outlines how numerous hurdles were overcome in achieving predetermined goals.
The progress in educational areas has been effective. The programs and
courses offered today make it possible for any man in the profession to obtain
the training needed to meet changing conditions of technological and environmental nature. The advent of computers and electronic data processing, the increased use of statistical sampling, extensions of audit services to banks and
insurance companies, have all been provided for in training programs of high
quality. These developments, together with the Institute's uniform examination
program, have moved the profession in the United States into a position of leadership of the field in the world. It is in this position that I believe we view the
current state of affairs.
The Nature of the Work. Professional auditing has the same characteristics
as most other professional work. The auditor's time is not his own, it's his
client's. The client is not interested in how busy he is. He is interested in when
his auditor is going to apply his very best professional talent to the company's
problems and meet their deadline in completing the work. This may seem like
a chaotic state of affairs to some. The well qualified auditor has learned to live
this sort of a life, just as the doctor and the lawyer have. He knows that once he
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has accepted an engagement, he has offered himself as one having all the qualifications to perform in accordance with the gospel of generally accepted auditing
standards. And when he sits down on the job, he knows full well that he has
all of those responsibilities of being independent in attitude and performing with
due professional care in planning and supervising and formulating his report on
the engagement. There are very few cases that get into the courts where the
auditor is flawless in performing according to those personal standards and
standards of field work.
I think I have seen most of the significant landmarks in auditing history
over the last forty five years that have led us to our present position of a learned
profession of well qualified men. If I were to choose one word to describe this
evolution in place of the authors' word, "chaotic," it would probably be the
word, "stolid."
There are uncertainties and deep concern over the current court decisions
regarding accountants' liabilities. Quite frankly, I don't know how we could
be much better organized than we are in the profession to solve these problems.
I believe they will be solved in a manner that will not discredit nor injure the
profession's ability to continue performing its important services to the financial
community, and to society as a whole.
I see nothing chaotic or disruptive about the trends toward current value
reporting, publishing forecasts, questioning the audit scope, and the like. They
do involve controversial and critical issues. But I don't view each as a new crisis.
I think we are inclined to get into the rut of assuming that a new crisis looms
every other day. We have the energy crisis, the ecology crisis, and the current
value reporting crisis. Secretary Connally responded to one of these new loomings the other day by saying that we have vast resources of hydrocarbons and he
doesn't think we are going to run out of a clean supply of energy for many
hundred years. I feel much the same way about the accounting profession. We
have vast resources of well organized talent to cope with our problems and I
think these resources will not be exhausted before the problems are solved.
If our client's management decides that he needs our professional opinion
on his interim financial statements or on his annual forecast of operations, I
think we can find a reasonable way to provide the opinion he needs. We have
been doing this in isolated situations for as many years as I can remember. I am
sure that many will oppose the forecast problem with arguments that we just
cannot become soothsayers, just as they said we would have to become appraisers
in order to have meaningful contact with physical inventories. We have the
capacity needed to formulate the groundrules and train the people to perform,
if we are called upon for these additional services.
I don't believe anyone in the auditing profession should have fears about
light being shed on the extent of their audit testing and the procedures they
employ. There have been some tremendous changes in the last twenty years
resulting from more extensive use of statistical sampling, and with learning how
to audit through computers. By far the principal purpose of the auditor's tests
of detailed transactions, however, is to establish his own opinion as to the
adequacy of internal controls for producing reliable financial data. The auditor's
review of the internal administrative controls is the basis of his appraisal of the
general character of the client's organization and management. All of this bears
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heavily on his judgment when issues arise over accounting measurement choices
and alternative reporting procedures.
I am glad to see the authors finally conclude with confidence that the auditing
profession will become an even more constructive factor in the financial arena.
I'm glad that my experience in the auditing arena has left me with more confidence than they have that the profession can do a rigorous job of defining the
necessary goals and achieving them.
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2
What are the Courts Saying to Auditors?
A. A. Sommer, Jr.
Calfee, Halter, Calfee, Griswold & Sommer, Attorneys at Law
The acquaintance of accountants with courts is not a new phenomenon.
In 1954 Saul Levy, in Accountants' Legal Responsibility, said that in England
cases involving accountants had been quite numerous and went back more than
sixty years. These early cases were really part of two developments. First, they
were part of the development of English common law concerning liability which
might attach to spoken or written statements if they were negligently made:
Was there an action? If so who might maintain it? What were its elements?
Second, they were part of the development of English corporation law embodied
largely in the English Companies Acts which progressively created stricter standards of responsibility for officers and directors of English corporations, and for
their auditors as well.
1

Common Law Developments
Most of the earlier cases in England and in the United States arose in
common law situations, i.e. they did not arise out of statutorily created duties.
The cases presented a wide variety of situations in which auditors were charged
either with falsification or recklessness or simply negligence and the courts were
largely concerned with relating the kind and degree of fault to the situations of
those who might have a recovery because of the fault.
In this country Ultramares v. Touche, decided in 1931 by the New York
Court of Appeals (the highest court in New York state), fairly definitively marked
off the limits of accountants' liability under common law in this country for a
generation. In that case, the New York court, speaking through Judge (later
Justice of the United States Supreme Court) Benjamin Cardozo, articulated
these principles:
1. Fraudulent conduct, or conduct so reckless as to be tantamount to fraud,
created liability not only to the accountant's client but to third parties as well
who were injured as a consequence.
2. Negligent conduct may create liability to the client because of "privity,"
but there would be liability to third parties only if the preparation and transmission of thefinancialstatement and opinion were the "end and aim of the transaction." Thus if a client engaged an auditor to prepare audited financial statements
for the express and understood purpose of giving them to a specific bank, the
bank might have a claim if the auditor were negligent. Other cases elaborated
this to encompass members of a circumscribed class of persons; thus if the auditor
2
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understood the client intended to seek bankfinancing,then any bank from which
such financing was sought might have a claim based on negligence. But the
use of the statements to secure thefinancingstill had to be "the end and aim of
the transaction" between the auditor and his client.
Statutory Law—The Securities Acts
These principles remained relatively intact into the 60's (and for that matter
in many states are still apparently "good" law: recent litigation in Florida has
expressly followed the Ultramares case). The most significant extension of potential liability for accountants occurred in the United States Congress when it
adopted the Securities Act of 1933. Under this statute accountants (included in
the broader word "experts" used in the Act) might have liability with respect
to the contents of financial statements used in registration statements with their
consent unless they could show as a matter of defense they had ". . . after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time
such [expertised] part of the registration statement became effective, that the
statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading..." (Section 11).
It is difficult now, almost four decades later, to understand the impact this
enactment had not only upon auditors, but the underwriting and business community in general. The Investment Bankers Association predicted that ". . . its
practical results . . . will be to suspend the underwriting or distribution of many
capital issues by responsible persons . . . ."
For the first time issuers might be held liable for misstatements in a registration statement (part of which constituted the prospectus required to be given
to purchasers and in many instances offerees of registered securities), regardless
of conventional notions such as privity, due care, reliance, causality and the like.
The burden and danger thrust upon others beside the issuer—its directors, certain
officers, "experts" (including accountants), underwriters—was slightly less burdensome, but nonetheless a significant departure from common law standards for
liability. An accountant might be liable to the purchaser of the registered security
even if the purchaser had not relied in the slightest on the auditor's opinion and
did not in fact even know of the opinion. The liability flowed simply from a
material omission or misstatement in the audited statements, unless the accountant
could show reasonable investigation and that he had reasonable ground to believe
there was no misstatement or omission.
This departure from earlier law, virtually all of which in this country had
been judge-made, alarmed many leaders of the profession not the least of whom
was the venerated George O. May, who said grimly,
3

I cannot believe that a law is just or can long be maintained in effect
which deliberately contemplates the possibility that a purchaser may recover from a person from whom he has not bought, in respect of a statement which at the time of his purchase he had not read, contained in a
document which he did not then know to exist, a sum which is not
measured by injury resulting from falsity in such statement.
4

Despite the misgivings of Mr. May and others, the implications of the
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Securities Act of 1933 were never explored judicially to any significant extent
until 1968 when the United States District Court in New York rendered its
opinion in Escott v. BarChris Construction Corporation which is discussed
hereafter.
In 1934 the Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which
provided, among other things, for the filing of registration statements and periodic
reports by listed companies including certified financial statements. Again the
statute contained provisions for liability that could be asserted against auditors,
but in many particulars these perils were less frightening; very little litigation
has been prosecuted successfully against anyone under Section 18 of the 1934 Act,
but this is no assurance that it may not be the source of such in the future.
5

Effect of the Securities Acts
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, of
course, did not repeal in any way previous common law holdings, such as the
Ultramares case. Previous litigation had been largely in state courts and generally it was state substantive law that was determinative of liability. Thus the
enactment of these federal measures did not explicitly broaden the scope of
accountants' liabilities except when they consented to the use of their opinions
in registration statements under the 1933 Act or in filings under the 1934 Act.
With regard to the ordinary run of mine matters the liability of auditors still
depended upon state law with its then fairly narrowly drawn concepts.
A process, an event plus a process, and broader cultural and political movements have combined to change this.
The process is the subtle interaction of statutory law and judge-made law.
This has been expressed by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and James M .
Landis, once dean of Harvard Law School.
Justice Holmes wrote,
6

[I]t seems to me that courts in dealing with statutes have been too slow
to recognize that statutes even when in terms covering only particular
cases may imply a policy different from that of the common law, and
therefore may exclude a reference to the common law for the purpose
of limiting their scope.
And Landis, in the same vein, stated:
. . . much of what is ordinarily regarded as "common" law finds its
source in legislative enactment.
7

Thus statutory notions, literally unconcerned with more than a narrow band
of common law, leak through the edges into other domains. As will be clear
shortly, this has been a significant factor in the expansion of liability dangers
for the accounting profession.
The Securities and Exchange Commission Enacts Rule 10b-5
Assisting in strenuous fashion this development has been the event plus a
process. The event was the adoption by the Securities and Exchange Commission
in 1942 of Rule 10b-5 under the 1934 Act. This rule was quickly adopted by
the Commission pursuant to a broad rule-making power under the 1934 Act

25

for the purpose of curing a peculiar hiatus in the scheme of federal securities
regulation that provided a fulsome system of penalties for the fraudulent seller
of securities, but was completely silent as far as fraudulent purchasers were
concerned.
The terms of Rule 10b-5 are extremely broad:
Rule 10b-5
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails,
or of any facility of a national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Notably absent in this Rule are many of the particularizations contained in
the 1933 Act defining the conditions of liability; particularly absent is any statement of a defense being available if there is a showing of reasonable investigation
and reasonable belief. There is no specification of those to whom liability may
run, there is no measure of damages, there is no limitation upon those who may
be held responsible: "It shall be unlawful for any person . . . . "
Rule 10b-5 was intended purely as an enforcement tool for the Commission.
In 1946 an imaginative plaintiff's counsel and a creative court combined to yield
the conclusion that Rule 10b-5 was not only available to the Commission for enforcement purposes but was available to private claimants as well who could
establish they had been harmed by a violation of the Rule. Thus was opened
thefloodgatethrough which oceans of litigation have passed in the intervening
twenty-six years, virtually to the point that other more explicit liability-creating
provisions of the federal securities laws have been vastly overshadowed as litigants
sought the benefits of Rule 10b-5.
8

9

Causes of Recent Litigation
But these somewhat technical legal developments are not sufficient to explain
the explosion of litigation that has confronted accountants during the past ten
years. Broad social developments have been the soil in which these seeds have
become rooted and have yielded often bitter fruit.
First, there has been the emergence of the consumer, so dramatic that it has
been suggested we are entering upon the "age of the consumer." The whys of
the broad phenomenon are too complex to narrate here, but it is clear that restlessness with the impersonality of technology, political necessities, the emergence
of a new brand of populism (Naderism is one form of it), have combined with
legal resourcefulness to bring about an equalizing of the position before the law
of the consumer and commercial interests (or perhaps a disequilibrium in favor
of the consumer). The courts have joined with legislatures to expand the litigation potential of the class suit and develop other means of redress for wrongs
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which, while existing in the past, because of inertia or legal technicalities were
never susceptible of effective redress. Legislatures, state and federal, have tripped
over each other providing protection for consumers.
Much of this, of course, has familiar ring to those familiar with the development of federal securities law. Most of the devices now urged for consumer
protection have their counterparts in this structure dating back decades: disclosure
("Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking
Is Dangerous to Your Health" parallels the scheme of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
[as well as parts of other SEC-administered statutes]); regulation (the requirement that more and more products must be approved by federal authority before
they can be sold to the public sounds surprisingly similar to the Investment
Company Act of 1940 governing mutual funds); licensing of purveyors (the
requirement of federal licensing in many areas parallels the provisions of the
1934 Act requiring the licensing of broker-dealers).
As people have become alert to the possibility of redress in their many roles
as consumers, the potentials of the federal scheme of securities regulation have
been explored and used.
Consequences of Professional Stature
Also the accounting profession itself has become even more pronouncedly
a profession. Levy in 1954 could write, "When speaking of public accountancy
as a learned profession it must be realized that in this country, at any rate, it is
a relatively new profession . . . . " If question there ever was, surely it is beyond
cavil that accounting is now a highly developed profession which has gone
through many travails in recent years to develop principles of conduct and
principles governing the quality of its work. As this has happened, it has not
escaped the notice of those of the public who feel they have suffered harm as a
consequence of shortcomings of the profession, either as a whole in failing to
establish sufficiently high standards or because of individual members who have
failed even to reach those which have been articulated. The possibility of this
was foreseen:
10

Thus as the legal liabilities of professional accountants in the United
States have seemed to be extended by court decisions and legislation,
the [American] Institute [of Certified Public Accountants] has become
increasingly aware that pronouncements and rules which encourage
higher standards of performance might be used against its members
unfairly in the courts.
11

Other circumstances could be recounted which have led to the proliferation
of litigation against accountants: the dynamics of the economy, with the
multiplication of mergers and complicated financial transactions involving publicly held companies; more and more imaginative use of accounting principles
to achieve financial magic (e.g. the pooling concept); the participation of vast
numbers in the market (31 million shareholders plus millions more who participate indirectly through mutual funds, pension and profit sharing trusts and other
pooling devices); the development of more exacting standards of disclosure and
the vastly increased importance of information in the investment process.
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The Voice of Litigated Cases
In our way of doing things often the situations created by social and economic
forces are not resolved in a systematic fashion aimed to embrace in a broad, expansive manner the full range of the problem, as is sought to be done through
such legislation as the Uniform Commercial Code, or in a different milieu, the
civil codes that characterize continental legal systems. Rather it is the genius,
and often the frustration, of our system that emerging broad-scale problems are
dealt with through the medium of litigating particular fact situations and through
this process, accompanied by skilled (and sometimes not so skilled) interpretation,
the law is moved along. Thus no single case resolves more than the litigation
confronting the court; no single case purports to codify an area of human conduct.
But cases, analyzed one with the other, can often provide clues for solving other
controversies and can be used to shape standards of conduct, lay and professional,
to avoid future legal liability.
What the courts are saying to auditors, then, is not an integrated set of
precepts; they are not weaving a properly proportioned whole. They are simply
deciding cases and in the process they are using established legal principles, they
are modifying others, they are bringing to the surface principles that may long
have been latent, they are producing results in particular litigation which they
conceive to be the just, rational result—in that case.
Five cases have been the most noted in this present period of development:
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corporation, noted earlier; Fischer v. Kletz;
U.S. v. Simon; Drake v. Thor Power Company; SEC v. Bangor Punta Corporation. Of less direct significance, but nonetheless an important part of this
pattern, is the case of Gamble v. Gerstle-Skogmo, Inc.
13
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BarChris Construction Corporation
The first of these (though not first in time), and in some respects the least
singular, was the Escott case. In this case purchasers of convertible debentures
of BarChris Construction Corporation sued the corporation (which was bankrupt
at the time of suit), the directors, certain officers, the underwriters and the
auditors because of alleged misstatements and omissions in the registration statement for the debentures. All of the defendants were found liable under Section
11 of the Securities Act of 1933, the provision governing liabilities arising out of
registration statements. The auditors were found wanting in two areas: first,
it was found that there were errors in the audited statements on which they
opined and that they had not exercised due care; and second, it was found that
they had failed to exercise due diligence in conducting the "S-1 review" covering
developments between the audit date and the effective date of the registration
statement.
The case is less noteworthy for the enunciation or development of legal
principles than it is because it was thefirstsystematic treatment of the responsibilities of auditors under the 1933 Act (an earlier case, Shonts v. Hirliman, the
only previous case dealing with the responsibilities of auditors under the 1933
Act, was almost universally believed to have been wrongly decided). The court
did however state some significant points. It found that the standards for the
S-1 review contained in Statements on Auditing Procedure No. 33 adopted by
17
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the AICPA were sufficient in outlining procedures for satisfying the due diligence
standard and it further found that the standards established by the firm internally
were compliant with SAP No. 33. The fault of the auditors, said the court, was
in failing to comply with their own established standards.
There is some reason to believe that the court was, at least in some particulars, unduly harsh on the auditors and perhaps held them to higher standards
than it should have.
However, the case did remind auditors of the perils latent in Section 11 and
undoubtedly led to stricter standards among them.
18

Yale Express
The second case of significance was Fischer v. Kletz. In this case auditors
for Yale Express Systems, Inc. during the course of making some special studies
for the client unrelated to their auditing function discovered that the statements
which they had certified contained material errors. The court found fault with
their failure to make this known other than to management when it came to
their attention; rather they allowed the statements to continue unquestioned for
a considerable time while those making transactions in the securities of Yale
Express in the marketplace presumably relied upon them. The court found this
a violation of common law principles, basing its opinion largely upon the Restatement of Torts, which is an authoritative effort to systematize and clarify
common law tort principles, and left open the possibility of a violation of Rule
10b-5. The duty found by the court to make this disclosure has been codified
in Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 41.
Continental Vending
The case that rocked the accounting profession far more than any of the
others discussed herein, and with good reason, and the one that may in the long
run do most to adjust accounting standards and practices was U.S. v. Simon.
In this case two partners and an associate of a national firm of auditors were
indicted for alleged violation of the Federal Mail Fraud Statute and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. The charge was that a footnote in thefinancialstatements
of Continental Vending Machine Corporation for the year ended September 30,
1962, was materially misleading and suffered from material omissions, and that
this was the result of knowing conduct by the defendants. After a first trial
ended in a hung jury, a second trial brought their conviction.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a unanimous opinion written
by Judge Henry J. Friendly, one of the most knowledgeable federal judges in
financial, securities and accounting matters, affirmed the convictions.
It is clear from reading the charge of the trial judge to the jury, a charge
which in affirming the Court of Appeals confirmed as a correct statement of the
law, and from reading the Court of Appeals opinion, that the courts thrust compliance with generally accepted accounting principles into a position subsidiary
to fair presentation. In effect, the courts said that not only mustfinancialstatements be prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles,
they must also "fairly present" thefinancialcondition of the company and whatever else they purport to present. In the lower court's words,
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A firm of public accountants . . . engaged to perform an independent
audit, represents that it will perform the audit in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards and accounting principles and
that it will render an opinion, based on its audit, as to whether the
financial statement of the company fairly presents its financial position
and the results of its operations.
Proof that a defendant, in conducting the 1962 audit, departed from
such auditing standards, or participated in the preparation or approval
of afinancialstatement that did not fairly present Continental's financial
position, results of its 1962 operations in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and accounting principles, is evidence, not
necessarily conclusive, that the defendant did not act honestly and in
good faith, and that statements contrary to such standards and principles
may have been materially false or misleading. On the other hand, proof
that the defendant did act in accordance with such generally accepted
auditing standards and accounting principles is evidence which may be
very persuasive but not necessarily conclusive that he acted in good faith,
and that the facts as certified were not materially false or misleading.
* * * * *
So the auditor's responsibility in accordance with his engagement
is, first, to render an opinion that must satisfy the auditor that the statement fairly presents the results of the operations about the financial
position of the client; and, second, to be satisfied that the statement contains no misstatements of fact, or, at least, no misstatement of facts
known to the auditor.
The critical test, therefore, is whether the financial statement here,
as a whole, fairly presented the financial condition of Continental as of
September 30, 1962, and whether it accurately reported the operations
for fiscal 1962. (emphasis supplied)
At the Seaview Symposium on Ethics in Corporate Financial Reporting held
in the latter part of 1971, it was clear that this notion of the primacy of fairness
over generally accepted accounting principles is less than unanimously acceptable
to accountants. This is understandable. Most accountants probably feel more
comfortable dealing with the principles that have been warp and woof of their
educational and professional experience than they do in placing their professional
reputations (not to mention their finances) at the mercy of determining compliance with a vaguely defined standard that is more ethical than legal or financial.
And yet this notion is not radical. It has been suggested in the past. In the
Associated Gas and Electric Company case decided by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942, the Commission, after an extraordinarily detailed
examination of alleged accounting improprieties in the accounts of Associated
Gas and Electric, shifted to what it considered more basic considerations and said:
19

We think, however, that too much attention to the question whether the
financial statements formally complied with principles, practice and conventions accepted at the time should not be permitted to blind us to the
basic question whether the financial statements performed the function
of enlightenment, which is their only reason for existence. Each of the
accountants' certificates in question contained the opinion that, subject
to various qualifications therein, thefinancialstatements fairly presented
thefinancialcondition of the registrant, in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. If that basic representation was not ac30

curate as to thefinancialstatements as a whole, no weight of precedent
or practice with respect to the minutiae of the statements could justify
the accountants' certificates... . For the average investor [read layman?]
the financial statements of this system contain not a hint of the rot
hidden beneath the surface of this holding company system.
We believe that, in addition to the question whether the individual
items of financial statements are stated in accordance with accounting
principles, practices and conventions, there must be considered the further
question whether, on an overall basis, the statements are informative.
20

Liability to Third Parties
Beginning in 1951 the carefully delineated common law restraints on the
imposition of liability to third parties on auditors laid out in the Ultramares
case began to erode. In a long, rather brilliant, dissenting opinion, Lord Justice
Denning in Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. laid out what he conceived
should be the broad principles of liability to third parties for negligence in these
words:
21

[To] whom do these professional people owe a duty? They [accountants] owe the duty, of course, to their employer or client; and
also I think to any third person to whom they themselves show the
accounts, or to whom they know their employer is going to show the
accounts, so as to induce him to invest money or take some other action
on them . . . . In my opinion accountants owe a duty of care not only
to their own clients, but also to all those whom they \now will rely on
their accounts in the transactions for which these accounts are prepared.
(emphasis supplied)
Thirteen years later this viewpoint became the law of England in Hedley,
Byrne & Co., Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. Four years later a sizable dent
was made in the earlier doctrine in this country in Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin.
The Court there peered into the same pit of danger that had caused Justice
Cardozo to recoil from finding liability to third parties for simple negligence
and said:
22
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The wisdom of the decision in Ultramares has been doubted . . . and
this Court shares the doubt. Why should an innocent reliant party be
forced to carry the weighty burden of an accountant's professional misconduct? Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and spread by
imposing it on the accounting profession, which can pass the cost of
insuring against the risk onto its customers, who can in turn pass the
cost onto the entire consuming public?
The Court then added this pregnant thought:
Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate the cautionary techniques of the accounting profession?
Paralleling this expansion of liability under common law has been the development under Rule 10b-5. In Drake v. Thor Power Company, the federal
district court in Chicago determined that auditors could be liable under Rule
10b-5 if they were negligent in giving their opinion.
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These cases, of course, create significant dangers for auditors. If simple
negligence is sufficient to establish monetary liability, and that liability runs to
all those whose reliance "can be actually foreseen," isn't the door opened for
appalling damages? An error in the audit of General Motors or American Telephone & Telegraph or any other substantial publicly held company might result
in catastrophic consequences. The hovering hope that such a burden may not
be inflicted on auditors is the fact that it is not yet clear whether negligence can
create monetary liability for a Rule 10b-5 offender who did not participate in
the purchase or sale of securities. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., a case in
which one of the charges was that the company had put out a misleading press
release as a consequence of negligence, Judge Friendly said in his concurring
opinion:
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The consequences of holding that negligence in the drafting of a press
release . . . may impose civil liability on the corporations are frightening.
Despite this uncertainty, however, it is reported that accounting firms or
their insurance carriers have paid several millions of dollars in settling claims
that appear to have been based upon negligence.
25

Responsibility for Adequate Disclosure
Two other cases are of importance in analyzing the developing responsibilities of accountants, though neither of them involved accountants as defendants.
In the first, Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., the District Court determined
that a proxy statement used in soliciting approval of a merger of General Outdoor Advertising Co. with Gamble-Skogmo was misleading. Thefinancialstatements of General carried certain fixed assets of the company in accordance with
customary accounting principles: historical cost less depreciation. However, the
court stated, without suggesting that the financial statements were incorrect, that
in addition to that information there should have been disclosed additional information indicating a market value higher than book since there was significant
evidence of the intention of Gamble-Skogmo after the merger to dispose of the
assets by sale, there had been a number of sales of similar assets at prices substantially above book, and the company had received offers and appraisals for
the remaining ones that indicated market value higher than book.
In the next case, SEC v. Bangor Punta Corporation, the court went further
and indicated that in the somewhat special circumstances of that case a significant
asset, the stock of the Bangor and Aroostock Railroad, should have been written
down on Bangor Punta's balance sheet because of indications that its value had
become less than the carrying value. In that case, for somewhat obscure reasons,
Bangor Punta had put the railroad on its books at $18.4 million, an amount
based upon an appraisal; this treatment had been allowed earlier by the SEC.
The court determined that, given the status of negotiations looking toward the
possible sale of the stock of the railroad, it should have been written down to
about $5 million, the amount which was being discussed with a potential buyer.
The court remarked that its requirement of this write-down might not be required in ". . . cases where book carrying figures are in accordance with principles
of conventional transactional accounting or where circumstances might be
different."
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Both of these cases, admittedly each posing somewhat unique problems,
suggest that permissible accounting treatment may not be sufficiently reflective
of economic reality to stand alone: either additional information must be disclosed or the financial statements must be modified to make fuller disclosure.
Conclusions
In the light of all the above, what are the courts saying to auditors?
Obviously, the courts do not speak with a single voice, and they speak always in the context of the particular cases before them. There are, however, some
conclusions that are suggested by this discussion.
First, the performance of the accounting profession is going to be increasingly
subject to judicial scrutiny. As the task of bringing class suits has been moderated,
and as potential plaintiffs and their counsel have witnessed the ease with which
judicial intervention may be secured, accountants increasingly may expect to have
their work thrust into the judicial arena either by private litigants or the SEC.
Second, for the most part the courts are willing to let the profession articulate
accounting principles and auditing standards, but they are inclined to look beyond
conformity to accounting principles for answers to what they consider a more
basic concern: do the financial statements fairly and meaningfully inform the
investor? If they do that, the court would probably be disinclined to fault heavily
an auditor who may have erred in the application of accounting principles; if
they don't, as is evident from the Simon case the court will not be deterred from
penalizing the auditor because of heavy evidence of conformity with the principles.
Third, while the courts and the SEC do not appear to be insisting that
financial statements must be reduced to kindergarten simplicity, still they do appear to be insisting that they have intelligibility to the layman. In 1947 the
Commission stated:
It is not enough to say that here perhaps much . . . of the factual background was given in footnote data. . . . [E]ven if [all significant data]
had been given there is an additional obligation to present the material
in a way in which it will be useful to the informed but less sophisticated
readers. (emphasis supplied)
And a Federal District Court said:
The purpose of the financial statements is to inform the man on the
street, and the underlying policy of the Securities and Exchange Acts
and of Rule 10b-5 is to assure that he can have truthful information in
buying securities, regardless of the intended victim of the fraud. Moreover, the defendants have set themselves up to be independent certified
public auditors. As such, they have assumed a peculiar relation with the
investing public. As accountants, the defendant clearly cannot be immunized from suit. (emphasis supplied)
It is not enough to prepare financial statements in a manner that would
permit intelligent interpretation only by the trained accountant or the investment banker. Above everything else, they are demanding that the statements
disclose and that this disclosure be intelligible and helpful to more than a handful
in understanding the financial condition and the operations of the company.
Fourth, when the profession has established standards, the courts will rely
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heavily upon the extent to which the professional work conforms to those standards. This is not to say, however, that if a court found a standard or principle
lacking it would not fall back on the notion found in the McKesson & Robbins
case of the thirties decided by the SEC to the effect that the entire profession had
been insufficiently cautious.
With the courts more heavily involved in monitoring the way in which accountants do their work, the pressure on the profession to find means of forestalling further disaster is heavy. Certainly to some extent the increased urgency
of the effort to define accounting principles and eliminate alternatives is a fruit
of this judicial scrutiny. Too, surely in some measure the in-depth efforts being
made by the Wheat and Trueblood groups were undertaken in hopes that a more
effective means of establishing accounting principles and a better definition of
the objectives offinancialstatements might allay some of the hazards.
It is sometimes said that the courts are "hostile" to the accounting profession.
This is a doubtful proposition. The courts are concerned, as are the SEC and
state securities authorities, as well as the self-regulatory agencies, with the maintenance of fairness and honesty in the securities markets. Crucial to that task is
disclosure. And central to disclosure isfinancialinformation. As long as this is
so the courts will scrutinize with care how those who purport to give that
financial information a higher degree of credibility perform their role.
After all, the accounting profession came into existence to provide to various
parts of society assurances that could not be secured by relying upon the unverified
assertions of preparers offinancialstatements. The profession had its inception
in the notion that accountants, as members of a learned profession, would exercise
independence, would not prostitute their skills for the venal purposes of their
employers, would be answerable to those who employed them and those to whom
they addressed their conclusions at the behest of those who employed them.
In the earliest days of the profession their efforts were designed to assure honesty
among owners in an enterprise, credibility to the owners' or managers' assertions
to existing or potential creditors. In these roles those who relied upon them
were very limited in number and generally the risks, though large for the time,
were nothing as compared with those involved in present-day financial transactions. The role of auditor is essentially the same. The audience, however, is
larger and the stakes are higher.
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Discussant's Response to
What Are the Courts Saying to Auditors?
Russell A. Taussig
University of Hawaii
Mr. Sommer, in his excellent paper, clearly and forcefully tells us that the
courts are saying to the auditors: "the ante has been raised in the auditing game."
Whatever else the cases he cites imply, they indicate business will be good
for attorneys in the liability area throughout the 1970's. In my opinion, these
cases also will result, as with McKesson-Robbins, in an extension of auditing
standards and an improvement infinancialreporting.
Mr. Sommer summarizes the significant characteristics of the recent cases
under three major headings.
1. The courts are making it much easier to sue the auditors.
2. The courts are asking auditors to establish generally accepted accounting principles; but where those principles are lacking, the courts are
filling the voids.
3. The courts are holding the profession to its announced standards,
but where the profession has been overly restrictive in defining such
standards the courts are interpreting them quite broadly.
Let us consider these three characteristics concretely in terms of another
case, that has yet to go to trial, that of National Student Marketing.
A civil action filed February 3, 1972 by the Securities and Exchange Commission against National Student Marketing Corporation, its auditors and two
law firms in U.S. District Court (Washington, D.C.) asks for injunctive and other
relief. At this early stage, all we have is a complaint. The actual facts, as substantiated by the evidence and decided on by the courts, may differ from the
allegations. Nonetheless, the legal concepts and accounting issues are of such
immediate significance that they are worthy of discussion at this time. Let us,
therefore, review the allegations of the SEC, bearing in mind the possibility of
revisions before final judgment is in.
The SEC charges the defendants with fraud and deceit. If the SEC prevails,
this case will expand the potential liabilities of independent accountants under
Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act for audited financial statements.
It also will enlarge the responsibilities of auditors for comfort letters beyond
those delineated in Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 48. Consistent with its
contemporary activist policy, the SEC seeks injunctive relief not only against the
registrant but also against others, including Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
1

Allegations by Securities and Exchange Commission
The complaint against the auditors contains basically two charges:
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1) Deficiencies in the financial statements prepared between 1968 and
1970;
2) failure to report the contents of a 1969 comfort letter to the SEC.
The Story of National Student Marketing. National Student Marketing
Corporation grew in two years from $723,000 of sales to $67.9 million. Cortes
Randell, the founder and chief executive, captured the imagination of financial
analysts and institutional investors with merchandising schemes ranging from
computer-matched dating to half-fare cards for American Airlines. Wall Street
wanted to believe in Cortes Randell, in view of the $45 billion annual disposable
income of the youth market.
NSM was bought out at $6 in April 1968 and soared to a high of $144 by
December 15, 1969—an increase of 2,300 per cent. The decline was equally
dramatic. On February 1, 1972 NSM was selling at $9—an aggregate loss of
over $450 million.
To what extent were these losses due to the cupidity of the investors? To
what extent, if any, should the auditors absorb the losses? For an understanding
of these questions, let us examine the SEC allegations in further detail.
Accounting for Unbilled Contracts. In the first place, the SEC asserts the
1968-69 financial statements were in error because contracts in progress were
improperly recorded as receivables. For example, the SEC claims the balance
sheet at August 31, 1968 overstated assets approximately $1.7 million by the improper recording of unbilled accounts receivable, and pre-tax earnings for 1968
were overstated approximately $696,000 out of a total of $699,000.
Subsequent to the issuance of the 1968 statements, management wrote-off
unbilled accounts receivable of approximately $1,000,000. Cortes Randell stated
the change was to put the company on a more conservative basis of accounting.
However, the SEC claims that the write-off was in recognition of the fact that
these unbilled receivables never existed or were otherwise uncollectible. Moreover, the SEC claims these changes were not adequately disclosed in the 1969 statements. The SEC also charges similar misstatements in the 1969 financial statements. We must await the answers of the defendants, and testimony of witnesses,
to appraise the validity of these charges and to judge whether thefinancialstatements were, in fact, erroneously prepared, or, simply were prepared according to
the best evidence available at the time—later to be found wanting on the discovery of subsequent events.
Accounting for Sale of Subsidiaries. A second claim of the SEC concerns
1969 gains from the disposition of two wholly owned subsidiaries. It is claimed
the sales not only were not at arm's-length, but also were initiated after 1969 and
dated back to inflate the profits for that year. Moreover, Cortes Randell transferred some of his own NSMC stock to the purchasers, which they then used as
collateral for the acquisitions. The SEC charges PMM failed to conduct its examination in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards once it knew
of Randell's involvement in these transactions. As in Continental Vending, discussed by Mr. Sommer, we find auditing questions arising from the stock transactions of the holder of a controlling interest. Should the auditor expand the scope
of his engagement when he discovers transactions that indicate a potential conflict of interest?
The Comfort Letter, the Auditor, and the Public. In addition to the fore37

going allegations relating to the audited financial statements, the SEC is also
bringing charges regarding a comfort letter requested by counsel in connection
with the merger of NSM and Interstate National Corporation on October 31, 1969.
As a result of facts discovered during its regular annual examination for the
year ended August 31, 1969, the auditors could not render a clean letter. They
proposed the amortization of $500,000 of deferred costs against the nine months
ended May 31, 1969, and they suggested the write-off of receivables and recording
of other charges totalling approximately $300,000. PMM recommended that
NSM should consider submitting corrected data prior to proceeding with the
closing. (This information was conveyed orally; the written letter was not delivered at this time.) Interim statements were not revised. Stockholders were
not informed. Nevertheless, the merger took place.
The SEC charges the auditors failed in accordance with their professional
obligation to insist that the NSMC financial statements be revised in accordance
with the comfort letter, and failing that, to withdraw from the engagement. The
SEC moreover, claims that the auditors had a duty to come forward and notify
the SEC or the shareholders as to the materially misleading nature of the unaudited financial statements. Here, as in BarChris, discussed by Mr. Sommer, the
SEC is attempting to expand the scope of the auditors' attest function in connection with comfort letters.
Relief Sought by the SEC. The SEC in this civil action is asking basically
for two things:
1) a permanent injunction restraining defendants from future violations of federal securities laws; and
2) a mandatory injunction requiring NSM to revise the 10-Ks filed between 1968 and 1970.
Any other lawsuit—possibly a class action for money damages—would, of
course, necessarily have to establish its case independently of the current one.
However, it would seem the discovery of evidence for such an action would be
facilitated somewhat by the present case.
What then Are the Courts Saying to Auditors?
This case reiterates three important issues for accountants outlined by Mr.
Sommer in his thoughtful and well balanced paper:
1) The SEC is escalating its activist role. National Student Marketing
is the first major case against accountants (and others) where a
business failure has not taken place.
2) The SEC is raising once again a possible expansion of the overriding
ethical concept of "fairness."
3) The SEC's actions, if sustained, will greatly expand the responsibility
of the auditor for unaudited financial statements.
The Activist Role of the SEC. We have seen in BarChris, Yale Express, and
Continental Vending a new activist role for the courts—emerging after some 35
years of experience with the federal securities laws. SEC v. NSMC signals another stage in that activist role. This is the first major civil case brought by the
Commission against a registrant, its accountants, and attorneys for alleged de38

ficiencies in financial statements arising out of a situation other than a business
failure. It no doubt will not be the last. At least, criminal action was not asserted, as in Continental Vending. But what is the next logical step in the SEC's
policing of financial information under the federal securities laws? Will the
SEC seek to audit the auditors?
In Yale Express, BarChris, Westec and Continental Vending, claims against
the accountants arose in connection with business failure. In National Student
Marketing, no such calamity triggered SEC action. Perhaps the next step would
be for the SEC to evaluate the quality of auditing on all financials covered by
the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Suppose the SEC, under its broad regulatory powers,
would attempt to review auditors' working papers—at least on a sampling basis?
In my opinion the added cost of such a review of auditors' working papers by the
government would not be justified in terms of additional and more reliable
financial information for investors. However, it seems clear that the already
thorough and generally excellent intra-firm review function that exists in all
major accountingfirmsmust be greatly expanded in the light of the new activist
role of the SEC. The reviewing partner will want to look beyond the audit
program. He will want to ask himself at the end of every engagement: "Would
I invest my money in this company?" If his question raises doubts, he should
proceed on the assumption that he might be called into court to justify each
financial statement item. The reviewing partner should also ask himself as an
investor, "What additional information (by footnote or otherwise) would I like to
have?" This means the courts are saying to the auditors: increase the scope of
your engagements; increase your manpower; increase your fees.
The Primacy of Fairness Over Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
Not only are courts saying to the auditors "expand the scope of your activities,"
they are also making promulgations about "fairness" in financial reporting, a
concept which judges and lay juries are construing to take precedence over generally accepted accounting principles.
In Continental Vending, for example, Judge Friendly stated: "the critical
test is not whether the statements were prepared in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles, but whether they fairly presentfinancialinformation such that they contain no misstatements of fact, or, at least, no misstatements
of facts known to the auditor." As Mr. Sommer comments in his paper: "the
notion of the primacy of fairness over generally accepted accounting principles
is less than unanimously acceptable to accountants." The concept of "fairness"
is not operational. Fairness, like beauty, lies in the eyes of the beholder. To
substitute it for generally accepted accounting principles would expose auditors
to substantially greater hazards without proof that such a change would create
a more liquid capital market.
The SEC is attempting to hold the defendants in NSM to the primacy of
"fairness." The SEC charges PMM with misleadingfinancialstatements because:
1) the statements did not fairly present the facts; and additionally
2) the statements were not prepared in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
Why two separate complaints? Apparently, the SEC will try to establish both
charges, but will be satisfied if it sustains one.
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Action for Standard Beyond that Established by the Auditing Profession.
Not only is the SEC apparently seeking to hold accountants for the primacy of
fairness, but it also is attempting to require a standard of auditing beyond that
required by the profession. At least, so it would appear from the comments of
Victor M . Earle III, general counsel of PMM. The SEC charges the auditors
should have insisted that NSM revise thefinancialstatements in accordance with
the comfort letter, and failing that should have withdrawn from the engagement
and notified the SEC or the shareholders of the two companies. Victor Earle replied: "The plain implication of SAP 41 is that client confidences and state law
and Rule 1.03 of the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics can be breached, if at all,
only where the auditor has subsequently acquired information affecting his previously issued expression of opinion on audited financial statements.
"Here, the information acquired related to the company's previously issued
unaudited financial statements as to which the firm had not expressed an
opinion."
While SAP 41 applies only to events discovered by an auditor subsequent to
the issuance of an opinion on audited financials, other statements on auditing
procedure cover the responsibilities of the auditor to disclose facts he has discovered pertaining to unaudited statements that make such unaudited statements misleading, particularly in connection with a proxy or prospectus. For example SAP 47 (September 1971) at paragraph 23 states ". . . [If the auditor]
concludes on the basis of facts known to him that the unaudited financial statements [in a registration statement] are not in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles he should insist on appropriate revision; failing that he
should add a comment in his report calling attention to the departure; further,
he should consider, probably with advice of legal counsel, withholding his consent to the use of his report on the audited financial statements in the registration
statement."
SAP 47 states that an accountant should insist on "appropriate revision."
It does not specifically state that he should notify the SEC or stockholders. If the
commissioner prevails in NSM, he will thus expand the responsibilities of the
auditors. The courts are again urged to take auditing practice a step beyond that
dictated by the standards currently pronounced by the members of the profession.
2

Concluding Remarks
It may be small comfort—but then at least some—for the accounting profession in the United States to note that they are not alone in their trial of fire.
The U K cases of Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. and Hedley Byrne & Co..
Ltd. v. Heller and Partners, Ltd. were cited by Mr. Sommer.
In the December 1971 Abacus, W. P. Birkett and R. B. Walker describe
major Australian company failures of the past two decades, including the Reid
Murray group, and discuss the resulting lawsuits. They conclude "Perhaps more
than any other factor, company failures have tested accountants' claims to professional status, their capacity to respond to criticism, the quality of their
organization and the rationale of their various practices."
Nor have our Canadian neighbors been without their cases. In the May
1971 Canadian Chartered Accountant William A . Farlinger concludes in the
Atlantic Acceptance Corporation case that although Atlantic's failure resulted in
3
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some large losses, those who suffered them were able to afford it. On the other
hand, Atlantic has stimulated better financial information for investors.
What are the implications of these cases?
First, it seems highly probable that business for attorneys in the liability
area will increase throughout the 1970's.
Second, some major auditing firms will suffer painful consequences, in the
short run.
Third, the 1970's lawsuits—like McKesson-Robbins—will result in further
extensions of auditing practices that will increase the prestige and importance
of the auditing profession in the long run.
4
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Toward Standards for Statistical Sampling
Kenneth W. Stringer
Haskins & Sells
I am always glad to have an opportunity to discuss statistical sampling,
which is one of my favorite subjects. I am particularly pleased to be able to do
so at the invitation of Howard Stettler because my interest in the subject was
first stimulated by reading his article in The Journal of Accountancy in January
1954. At that point I became convinced that statistical sampling is the most
rational means for determining the extent of audit tests of details of transactions
and account balances. Extensive study and experience in implementation of
statistical sampling in our Firm's audit practice in the intervening years has
strengthened that conviction.
Although the use of statistical sampling in the profession has not progressed
as rapidly as I have considered desirable, I think it is fair to say that interest in
the subject is increasing currently. This observation is based on discussions with
interested parties in various firms concerning the extent of their current studies
and/or applications. The reasons why progress in the meantime has been more
evolutionary than revolutionary are understandable, and have involved both
statistical and auditing problems. The statistical problems have included the
general unfamiliarity of auditors with statistical methods, and technical questions
concerning the applicability of certain statistical methods to auditing situations.
The auditing problems have related primarily to defining and expressing audit
objectives in terms susceptible to statistical measurement, and to the difficulty
of combining statistical and subjective evaluations of audit evidence in forming
overall conclusions.
Because the auditing problems are equally or more difficult and also are
more appropriate for my assigned topic, I will confine my discussion today to
them. For this purpose I will review first the evolution of present AICPA
literature concerning statistical sampling, and second the current consideration
being given to the expansion of that literature.
Present Literature
The first official AICPA literature on statistical sampling was a special
report of its Committee on Statistical Sampling, which was published in The
Journal of Accountancy in February 1962. Although this report was quite
general in its coverage, it was the result of extensive deliberations by the Committee and established two landmark positions. First, it stated that:
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The Committee is of the opinion that the use of statistical sampling
is permitted under generally accepted auditing standards.
The second position was expressed as follows:
Although statistical sampling furnishes the auditor a measure of
precision and reliability, statistical techniques do not define for the
auditor the values of each required to provide audit satisfaction.
Specification of the precision and reliability necessary in a given
test is an auditing function and must be based upon judgment in the
same way as is the decision as to audit satisfaction required when
statistical sampling is not used.
The next reference to statistical sampling in AICPA literature was in Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 33, issued in December 1963, which included
the following comment:
In determining the extent of a particular audit test and the method
of selecting items to be examined, the auditor might consider using
statistical sampling techniques which have been found to be advantageous
in certain instances. The use of statistical sampling does not reduce the
use of judgment by the auditor but provides certain statistical measurements as to the results of audit tests, which measurements may not
otherwise be available.
The use of expressions such as "might consider using" and "statistical measurements . . . which . . . may not otherwise be available" (emphasis added) suggests
that the Committee on Auditing Procedure was perhaps neither as enthusiastic
nor as knowledgable as the Sampling Committee. However, the foregoing
excerpt did represent an advance in authoritative recognition because the Committee on Auditing Procedure is senior to the Committee on Statistical Sampling
in the AICPA committee structure.
The next pronouncement was a report by the Committee on Statistical
Sampling that appeared in The Journal of Accountancy in July 1964.
In line with the position taken in the preceding pronouncements, that report
stated that the use of statistical sampling ". . . is permissive rather than mandatory
under generally accepted auditing standards."
As indicated in the introduction of that report, it was issued:
. . . to discuss more specifically a way in which statistical precision
and reliability can be related to generally accepted auditing standards
and to point out some of the factors to be considered by the auditor in
deciding what degree or level of each is satisfactory for a particular
sample; it is not issued to propose definitive numerical criteria for these
measurements nor to discuss their mathematical aspects.
The purpose as stated in this excerpt was in response to some of the principal
questions that were being discussed among those interested in statistical sampling
at that time. For example, there were differing views as to what auditing considerations were relevant to precision and reliability, respectively, and as to
whether—and if so how—internal control should be considered.
As to the first of the questions referred to above, the Committee stated that:
Although "precision" and "reliability" are statistically inseparable,
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the Committee believes that one of the ways in which these measurements can be usefully adapted to the auditor's purposes is by relating
precision to materiality and reliability to the reasonableness of the basis
for this opinion.
Further discussion of this concept and its relation to internal control will be
presented later in this paper.
The next AICPA pronouncement involving statistical sampling was Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 36 issued in August 1966 by the Committee
on Auditing Procedure. This Statement was concerned primarily with the
auditing implications of the use of statistical sampling by clients in lieu of taking complete physical inventories. Pertinent excerpts from this Statement follow:
In recent years some companies have developed inventory controls or
methods of determining inventories, including statistical sampling, of
sufficient reliability to make an annual physical count of each item of
inventory unnecessary in certain instances. The purpose of this Statement is to recognize this development.... If statistical sampling methods
are used by the client in the taking of the physical inventory, the independent auditor must be satisfied that the sampling plan has statistical
validity, that it has been properly applied, and that the resulting precision and reliability, as defined statistically, are reasonable in the
circumstances.
The latest stage in evolution of the AICPA's position concerning statistical
sampling did not result in the issuance of a pronouncement, but I believe it was
equally significant. One of the recent projects of the Committee on Statistical
Sampling was to reconsider the July 1964 report, and after extended study the
Committee concluded that no revision was necessary.
Pronouncement under Consideration
One of the major projects currently on the agenda of the AICPA Committee
on Auditing Procedure is a comprehensive statement concerning internal control.
The present draft of the proposed statement includes a revised definition of internal accounting control and a discussion of basic concepts implicit in such
definition. It also includes discussion of the review, tests, and evaluation of
internal accounting control required by the second generally accepted auditing
standard of field work, and of the correlation of such evaluation with the other
auditing procedures as contemplated by the third standard of field work. The
proposed statement was originally intended to deal also with reporting on
internal control, but the Committee decided to accelerate its pronouncement on
this aspect of the subject and did so by the issuance of Statement on Auditing
Procedure No. 49 in November 1971.
Because of the obvious applicability of statistical sampling to tests of compliance with internal control under the second standard and to the sufficiency
of evidential matter under the third standard, the earlier drafts of the proposed
statement included some discussion of these matters. However, in deference to
the view of some committee members that any extended discussion of statistical
sampling in the text of the proposed statement would give it a degree of prominence incompatible with its permissive status, such discussion has been relegated
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to appendices in the more recent drafts. Because of the subject matter involved
the AICPA Committee on Statistical Sampling has assisted by reviewing and
commenting on the drafts of the appendices.
In order to comply fully with our professional standards of reporting, I
want to express an unequivocal "disclaimer of opinion" as to the extent, if any,
to which the presently proposed appendices on statistical sampling will be included
in any statement issued by the Committee on Auditing Procedure. However,
since the word "toward" in my assigned topic implies movement in the direction
of standards and not necessarily their attainment, I believe it is appropriate to
discuss the purpose and nature of the proposed appendices. The present draft of
the proposed Statement on Auditing Procedure includes an Appendix A and an
Appendix B.
Appendix A is the July 1964 report of the Committee on Statistical Sampling,
which was referred to earlier. This report would be included because of its
general conceptual relevance, and to provide background for Appendix B.
The purpose of Appendix B would be to amplify certain of the concepts
in Appendix A and to provide quantitative criteria or guidelines for their application in practice. Such criteria were not considered timely when the 1964 report
was issued, but they have been included in the draft of Appendix B on the
premise that the intervening years of education, experience, and changing audit
environment have made their inclusion appropriate at this time. In making
this statement, I should confess my personal bias and reiterate my earlier disclaimer as to the eventual decision of the Committee.
The proposed Appendix B discusses criteria for reliability and precision for
tests of compliance with internal control, and also for substantive tests as to the
validity and the propriety of the accounting treatment of transactions and balances.
Although compliance tests and substantive tests are discussed separately in the
proposed Appendix because of the separate considerations relevant to each, the
draft recognizes that a single sample can be designed to serve both of these
purposes simultaneously.
Compliance Tests. The objective of compliance tests is to obtain evidence
of compliance with, or conversely, of deviations from procedures the auditor
considers critical for purposes of his evaluation of a particular aspect of internal
control being tested. Samples designed for this purpose should be evaluated in
terms of deviations from such procedures, either as to the number of such deviations or the monetary amount of the transactions on which the deviations occurred.
For compliance tests, the present drafts suggest a reliability level of 95%
with reference to the upper precision limit related to the estimated internal
control deviations. The draft also suggests that an upper precision limit of 5%
with respect to internal control deviations would provide satisfactory evidence
of compliance to justify maximum reliance on internal control in performing
substantive tests, as discussed later. If the upper precision limit exceeds 5%,
the draft suggests that reliance should be reduced accordingly. In developing this
position, the draft points out that although internal control deviations increase
the risk of errors in the accounting records, such errors do not necessarily follow
from the deviations. Deviations from internal control procedures would result
in errors at the same occurrence rate in the accounting records to be audited only
if such deviations and the actual errors occurred on the same transactions. Conse46

quently, internal control deviations of as much as 5% of the number or amount
of transactions rarely would be expected to result in errors of that magnitude in
the accounting records being audited.
Substantive Tests. In the proposed Appendix, all auditing procedures other
than compliance tests are referred to as substantive tests, and the feature of audit
interest in performing such tests is considered to be the monetary amount of
any errors that would affect thefinancialstatements being audited. It should be
noted that this definition of substantive tests includes both tests of details, which
are susceptible to the use of statistical sampling, and other types of auditing procedures, which are not.
As indicated above, the proposed Appendix suggests a single reliability
level for compliance tests. This was considered appropriate for such tests because
the evidence obtained from them is the primary source of the auditor's reliance
with respect to compliance with internal control procedures. This is not the case,
however, in considering the reliability level for substantive tests, because the reliance on the latter is to be combined with the reliance on internal control in forming the auditor's final opinion on the financial statements. This concept was
expressed in the July 1964 report as follows:
These standards [the second and third standards of field work]
taken together imply that the combination of the auditor's reliance on
internal control and on his auditing procedures should provide a reasonable basis for his opinion in all cases, although the portion of reliance
derived from the respective sources may properly vary between cases.
For statistical samples designed to test the validity or bona fides of
accounting data and to be evaluated in monetary terms, the committee
believes the foregoing concept should be applied by specifying reliability
levels that vary inversely with the subjective reliance assigned to internal
control and to any other auditing procedures or conditions relating to
the particular matters to be tested by such samples.
The foregoing reference to "subjective reliance assigned to internal control"
introduces an important element on which judgment is required. The proposed
appendix would express the Committee's judgment in this respect by establishing
a range of reliability levels to be used where statistical sampling is utilized in
conjunction with the auditor's principal substantive tests.
The upper limit for this range would apply where the auditor's evaluation
indicates that little if any reliance should be assigned to internal control, and
the present draft suggests that a 95% reliability level is reasonable in such circumstances.
Establishing the lower limit for the range of reliability factors for substantive
tests is more difficult. If the auditor's evaluation of internal control indicates
that both the prescribed procedures and the degree of compliance with them
are satisfactory, the extreme position would be to assign all of the desired reliance
to internal control and require none from other auditing procedures. This
would be tantamount to setting the lower limit for reliability levels for substantive tests at zero. The draft rejects this extreme, however, on the grounds
that generally accepted auditing standards contemplate that substantive tests
will be restricted, but not eliminated, through reliance on internal control. This
position recognizes that the maximum potential effectiveness of internal control is
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something less than complete because of the inherent limitations in any such
system.
These limitations arise from such causes as misunderstandings, carelessness,
distraction, fatigue, mistakes of judgment, dishonesty, or collusion, all of which
relate primarily to the potential behavioral characteristics of individuals. The
auditor ordinarily has little if any basis for making a realistic judgment as to
the likelihood that such behavior will occur in individual situations. Accordingly,
the draft suggests that a limit as to the maximum reliance to be assigned to internal control based on the collective judgment of the Committee would be
useful for guidance to auditors in practice.
The risks to be considered for this purpose were described in the July 1964
report as follows:
The ultimate risk against which the auditor and those who rely on
his opinion require reasonable protection is a combination of two
separate risks. The first of these is that material errors will occur in
the accounting process by which the financial statements are developed.
The second is that any material errors that occur will not be detected
in the auditor's examination.
The auditor relies on internal control to reduce the first risk and on
his tests of details and his other auditing procedures to reduce the
second.
In mathematical terms the excerpt quoted above describes a conditional
probability, because the second of the adverse events referred to cannot occur
unless the first has occurred also. Therefore, the combined risk of both of the
related events occurring jointly is the product of the respective risks of their occurring individually. This concept is illustrated numerically in a tabulation that
follows after brief comments concerning the nature of the respective risks.
The magnitude of the inherent risk of occurrence of material errors in the
absence of satisfactory internal control is unknown, but experience indicates
that this risk is moderate. Although this risk is an unknown quantity, it may be
dealt with as such in the illustration that follows by simply designating it as "X."
The reliance that should be assigned to satisfactory internal control is the
portion of the risk of occurrence that may reasonably be expected to be eliminated
by such control, while the residual risk of occurrence is the portion reasonably
attributable to the inherent limitations on internal control.
The risk arising from sampling and other auditing procedures (and the
complementary reliability) is that which is required to establish the combined
audit risk at a specified level. (These risks exclude the risk of any non-sampling
errors and any similar errors relating to other auditing procedures.) Since the
risk from sampling and other auditing procedures may include both of these
elements, the concept being discussed here is broad enough to comprehend
quantification of the latter also. I believe there is a reasonable basis for such
quantification in many cases, but this is beyond the scope of the proposed Appendix B and of this paper. In both, the discussion of sampling reliability levels
applies only to cases in which a sample is the principal element in the auditor's
substantive tests of a particular aspect of the transactions or balances comprising
the population.
Subject to the preceding comments concerning respective risks the following
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tabulation shows for several assumed levels of reliance on internal control, the
resulting risk and reliability that will provide an assumed uniform combined risk:
Inherent
Risk of
Occurrence
Of Errors

Reliance
Assigned to
Internal
Control

Residual
Risk of
Occurrence
Of Errors

Risk from
Sampling
and Other
Procedures

Combined
Audit
Risk

Reliability
from Sampling
and Other
Procedures

X
X
X
X
X
X

.00X
.50X
.75X
.80X
.85X
.90X

1.00X
.50X
.25X
.20X
.15X
.10X

.05
.10
.20
.25
.33
.50

.05X
.05X
.05X
.05X
.05X
.05X

.95
.90
.80
.75
.67
.50

Any presentation of a mathematical model in which subjective judgments
and objective measurements are combined invites the somewhat annoying, but
nevertheless completely accurate, criticism that the former cannot be quantified
precisely. This criticism, however, does not impugn the usefulness of a model
in focusing attention on the separate elements of a complex problem, and in
showing the relationship between those elements. Furthermore, this criticism
invites the rebuttal that it is more rational to quantify some of the separate elements of a problem, subjectively if necessary, than to deal subjectively with the
entire set of elements where some can be measured objectively.
If this analytic approach is accepted, the following two observations about
the tabulation presented may be helpful in considering it. First, auditors' experience and understanding of the potential and the limitations of internal control makes it more realistic for them to exercise professional judgment in deciding
in the framework of that model what reliance should reasonably be assigned to
internal control, than in deciding in the abstract what sampling reliability level
should be used. Second, although the inherent risk " X " is unknown, experience
shows clearly that it is substantially less than 100% and consequently the combined risk ".05X" is substantially less than 5% of all audit populations sampled.
The present draft of Appendix B provides for but has not yet proposed the
reliability level to be used for substantive tests where internal control is considered satisfactory.
As to precision limits for substantive tests, the present draft of the proposed
Appendix B accepts the concept that these should be based on the auditor's judgment concerning materiality in relation to the financial statements and it does
not propose any further guidelines in this respect.
The determination of reliability levels and precision limits is the vital
interface between the subjectivity of auditing judgment and the objectivity of
statistical sampling. I believe the concepts discussed in this paper are sound in
theory and workable in practice. I hope they will become steps—in the words
of my assigned topic—"toward standards for statistical sampling."
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Discussant's Response to
Toward Standards for Statistical Sampling
James W. Kelley
University of Georgia
As was expected, Ken Stringer expertly reviewed the brief history of the
move toward establishing standards for the use of statistical sampling in auditing.
He has also analyzed the situation and referred to specific proposed standards.
His analysis and the recommendations have far reaching implications and
are deserving of our most serious attention and discussion. The purpose of this
paper is to direct further attention to some of what I hope will prove to be the
more serious implications of establishing standards.
Are Standards Needed?
Several years ago over a hundred of us attended a Professional Development
Workshop on the use of computers. We spent two full days working on controls
over commission checks sent to some independent salesmen. Near the end of
the program one of the most inexperienced men in attendance said with absolute
innocence, "I don't see why we can't have the salesmen deduct his commission
as he sends in the order. Then we wouldn't have to send these checks." You
know, he was right. Over 1500 man hours were spent working on a problem
that really didn't exist.
This is not to say we have no problem, but we do hear a lot of conversation
on what standards are needed and very little on why they are needed. We also
hear some recommendations about what the standards should say but almost
nothing can be found about what they will mean.
Let us remember first, that all statistical theory can do for the auditor is
state in mathematical terms the risk he is taking by not examining all items.
Statistical sampling can not tell us what tests are to be performed or what evidence
need be collected to satisfy the test. It deals only with the sample size.
It should be understood that the courts have never ruled on the use of
statistical sampling in auditing. A lawyer friend of mine recently searched the
reported cases involving accountants and found no references to statistics. There
was a by-product to this research, however, that surprised me. He found no
cases where the auditor's sample size was questioned. I understand the attorneys
of a national accounting firm conducted the same type of study with the same
results. This suggests that, to date, the courts have not questioned auditors' judgments on sample sizes. While we may properly decide that standards are necessary, there appears to be no overpowering legal reason to do so just now.
It is argued by some that we need to set standards before someone else does.
This is a powerful argument, with both rational and, in the light of recent de50

velopments within the realm of accounting practice, strong emotional appeal.
This argument would be persuasive even if one feels there is no immediate danger
of the courts setting guidelines, unless there are good reasons not to have standards. Are there such reasons?
Suppose we do establish guidelines (standards) for setting confidence levels
and precision. Now assume a firm chooses a judgment sample and in retrospect,
the judgment sample result proves not to meet the statistical standards imposed
by the guidelines. Would such a firm be held guilty of violating the evidence
standard? One attorney who reviewed these hypothetical facts is certain they
would be.
There are also cases in which firms select sample sizes based on judgment
but draw random samples. These firms do not statistically evaluate their results,
but anyone gaining access to their findings clearly could. In those cases, where
the established standards are not met, there is absolutely no doubt, again in one
attorney's opinion, that the firm could be successfully accused of failing to comply
with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards.
Perhaps now is the time to establish standards regarding the size of audit
samples, but we should recognize that established standards for statistical sampling
will likely be the benchmark that all samples can be measured against. The
dilemma here is a real one. If we fail to enact standards for statistical testing
the courts may well do so. If we do enact them we will, for the first time, give
the courts a specific basis for questioning all sample sizes. Auditors using statistical sampling will no doubt push hard for standards. Since my bias is with
them, I cast a somewhat timid vote to proceed.
Standards for Compliance Tests
The proposed standard suggests a reliability level of 95% with an upper
precision limit of 5%. How would such a standard be applied? First we must
decide 5% of what. Mr. Stringer suggests that compliance tests are performed to
determine the extent of critical errors affecting the evaluation of the internal
control aspect being tested.
Assume we are testing the voucher support for cancelled checks. The system
calls for a purchase requisition, receiving report and invoice to back up each
check. How would the standard apply?
There are many questions we could raise but a few should make the point.
Will the 5% refer to the number of errors or the dollar amount? Will the 5%
apply to purchase requisitions if 5% is proper for invoices? How will we account
for missing documents?
The questions posed here may not be monumental but they do suggest that
auditors do not agree on what is being tested and what standard is to be used
to test compliance. The questions also suggest that auditors will not agree on
how errors should be defined, let alone what makes an error critical. In short,
in my judgment, we will not be able to get agreement on any compliance test
standards in the near future. Since setting a precision standard for compliance
tests is not necessarily essential, I would hate to see us spin our wheels in these
largely semantic arguments while more important issues go unattended.
This position must not be interpreted as opposing the use of statistical sampling in compliance testing, for the opposite is true. The point here is that the
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profession is not agreed as to what types of tests are needed. Any serious attempt
to standardize sample sizes in the face of such disagreement will create more
problems than it will solve. For one thing, it may well keep us from arriving
at standards relative to substantive tests. Standards for substantive tests are both
possible and very desirable.
Relationship of Internal Control to Substantive Tests
There is general agreement that the extent of the substantive tests is somehow inversely related to the reliance placed on internal controls. There are
floating around in published and unpublished articles as well as in private correspondence, mathematical models aimed at measuring this relationship. Mr.
Stringer presents one in his paper. As he points out, it is annoying but accurate
that the subjective judgments necessary cannot be quantified precisely. What he
didn't say was that because they can't be defended they also can not be proven
wrong. Therefore, many of us, secure in the knowledge that we can be inventive
but not proven wrong, have bitten into the apple of temptation and developed
our own models. One of Parkinson's laws surely applies here because the newer
models are much more mathematically complex. One of the unexplained
phenomena of our time is our insistent belief that we can improve our assumptions by chi-squaring, coefficient variationing or plotting them on a curve. In
any event the results of these various models turn out to be about the same.
The problem of precision is easily disposed of. Precision is related to materiality and since there is always a committee working on a definition of materiality we can defer further discussion of that topic until their report is available—or at least until that topic is covered in the program tomorrow. That
leaves the proper confidence level as the only bone of contention. A 95% level
usually is the ceiling, based more on economic necessity than on mathematical
analysis I suspect, but the result is a reasonable one. When we do set standards
regarding the extent of the substantive tests required, the 95% figure probably
will be adopted as the maximum needed when internal controls are weak. What
the level should be when the auditor has maximum faith in internal control is
harder to agree on. Mr. Stringer's 50% suggestion equals the lowest I've seen,
but it does not differ enough from the answer obtained using my own unsophisticated approach to warrant any further comment. Since Mr. Stringer
has, as a member, courageously predicted what the Committee on Auditing
Procedure might do, I'll predict with equal fortitude that the Committee on
Statistical Sampling could recommend the confidence level at 95% when internal
controls are not relied on, and around 65% when controls are proven strong.
(Precision will be related to materiality with materiality remaining undefined.)
Are Compliance Tests Required?
The standards of field work require a proper study and evaluation of internal control as a basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of the
resultant extent to which tests of the accounting procedures are to be restricted.
If the 95% limit is enacted, there will be some interesting ramifications in audit
strategy.
The study of internal control is taken to mean that the auditor must familiar52

ize himself with the workings of the client's system. This study is documented
by completion of internal control questionnaires, and flow charts or narrative
descriptions. On completing this study, the auditor must subjectively decide if
he would rely on the output assuming the system is working as designed.
He may decide he can not rely on the system's output. The system may be
improperly designed or management may be able to render the controls ineffective. If the auditor does not plan to rely on the system, then there is no reason
for him to determine if the system is working.
On the other hand, often the auditor senses that the system is capable of
producing accurate data. In these situations, he must test the system extensively
enough to satisfy his subjective judgment that the controls are working or are
not working.
If the controls are working, he may decrease the substantive tests at a lower
confidence level. If the controls are not working, he must use a 95% confidence
level. Now even limited experience using statistical techniques will show that
proving the controls are working may be very time consuming and expensive.
When the population error rate is close to the maximum rate acceptable to the
auditor, extremely large samples are necessary. If the auditor tests attributes and
sets a maximum error rate of 5% at 95% confidence and the actual error rate is
4%, a sample size of 1,000 is needed. Thus, we can expect cases where the auditor
will use less time by increasing his substantive tests than it takes to accumulate
enough evidence to support reliance on the controls. The auditor in these situations will recognize that even if the controls could be proven reliable it would
be wise not to rely on internal control but to expand the year-end work to the
maximum.
I do not want to create the impression that reliance on internal control is
doomed, or even wrong, but the adoption of the above approach will lead people
to rely on internal controls only when it is expedient to do so.
While the auditor will still be required to review internal control in the
sense that he must clearly understand how the client goes about his business, the
compliance tests will be optional. The tests would only be required when the
auditor plans to use a confidence level of less than 95% in his substantive testing.
Such a proposal has caused some eyebrow-lifting among some of my colleagues but seems entirely consistent with both the proposed statistical standard
and generally accepted auditing standards.
There is one final consideration in the application of this standard that should
also be mentioned. Even if one agrees that 95% confidence is satisfactory to
accept a client's representation, he may not agree that 95% confidence is high
enough to support an adjusting entry. An example here may help. The client
shows an inventory balance of $95,000. The auditor concludes his tests and
estimates the inventory balance to be $98,000 with a precision of ± $5,000 at
95% confidence ($10,000 is considered material).
The auditor is 95% certain the audited balance would be between $93,000
and $103,000. He also believes that any balance within that range will result
in a fair presentation. Since the client's representation is within the range of
acceptable balances, the auditor in accepting the client's statement will have met
the standard.
Now assume another situation in which the auditor estimates the total
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audited value to be $98,000. Again he is 95% confident that if he audited all
the items the audited balance would be somewhere between $93,000 and $103,000,
but in this case the client's balance is $125,000. Clearly the evidence indicates the
auditor should not accept the client's representation. But what can he do?
The auditor is left with three alternatives. I am reminded here of Bob
Uecker's classic work entitled "How to Catch a Knuckle Ball." Chapter I states
there are three recommended methods of catching a knuckle ball. Chapter II
says none of them work. The auditor is in a similar position here, but he must
do something.
(1) He could return the materials to the client for reworking and resubmission.
(2) He could increase his sample and thus identify more specific misstatements in the client's data. As the client adjusts for those errors discovered, he
will eventually bring the balance into line.
(3) He could permit the client to book an adjusting entry to agree the
account with the statistical evidence.
In our example, this would mean the client would book an adjusting entry,
reducing the $125,000 total to one within the acceptable limits.
Since we accepted the client's balance earlier without relying on the system
that produced it, it follows we could accept the second balance based on the same
evidence. This view is consistent with those situations in which clients use
statistical tests to support their own adjustments. In any case, the proposed
standards should clearly indicate the extent of the evidence needed to support
an adjustment as well as to accept a client's representation.
Summary
In summary, these suggestions are made:
(1) No attempt should be made at present to establish confidence level and
precision statements for compliance tests.
(2) The standards clearly indicate the options available to the auditor regarding compliance testing.
(3) A 95% confidence level (precision related to materiality) will meet the
third standard of field work when internal controls are not relied on.
(4) A 50%-60% confidence level will suffice when internal controls are
proved excellent. (Precision again related to materiality.)
(5) If the client's representation is outside the limits of the auditor's statistical
estimates, the auditor may accept an adjustment that brings the representation
within the limits based on the statistical evidence.
The above suggestions are made assuming there is agreement that the standards will not jeopardize the position of auditors doing quality work but not using
statistical techniques.
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4
Future Extensions of Audit Services;
Meeting Investors' Future Needs
Donald J. Bevis
Touche Ross & Co.
In a changing world, the unchanging role of the CPA is to serve the investor.
Selfishly, the CPA wants to be the prime—even the only—servant of the investor.
Generously, the CPA wants to serve the investor all the information he may
need. A little clear thought shows that "only" and "all" are too strong. Yet the
CPA is and should remain in the forefront of the campaign to provide the
investor with quality information.
In our world of very rapid change, the nature of "investor information" is
changing rapidly. For example, where plant capacity, production costs or sales
volume were once the key factors, social values may now also be material. Although our role does not change, the data we audit and the scope of the information we examine and evaluate must change.
The Conditions of Change and Growth
For many centuries, tomorrow and yesterday were very much alike. There
were few dramatic changes, and they were far between. Always, the frontier
was a wilderness. There was very little difference, for example, between 1670—
when the Hudson's Bay Company was formed by a group of venturers and
adventurers—and 1770 when the colonies began to flex their muscle. In those
times, yesterday's results were a strong predictor of tomorrow's performance.
For the investor, the venturer, historical data were very significant.
Today, the great lament is that change comes so fast. We are unable to
keep up, to assimilate, to digest. We wonder what will come next from the
research lab, from the ecologists, from Congress, from the ghetto, via the
satellite, from the moon, or from 400 fathoms. Something is coming all the
time. The effect is to compress time, and for the investor, to diminish the significance of historical data. More useful data must be sought, in broader fields,
and with a visionary eye.
In the days of the Hudson's Bay Company, entrepreneurs banded together
in joint ventures to capitalize on opportunities in strange, new, faraway places.
When the venture was completed, the manager called a meeting to report to the
venturers. Usually his report was oral, and the venturers had an opportunity to
ask questions and interrogate the venture manager and the exploring team.
By experience, the investors found that these review meetings were more suc55

cessful if they brought along their own expert, an experienced businessman who
had no vested interest in that particular venture, to listen to the manager's
presentation and to challenge unreasonable assertions. The venturers were interested in the results of the completed voyage, of course; they also needed an
understanding of management's performance so that they could make reinvestment decisions intelligently.
From these early beginnings came the auditing profession of today. The
objective and critical independence which made the auditor valuable to the investing public during the time of colonial exploration is of even more value
today. Absentee owners still need an independent, objective, informed opinion
about their investments. Today, the owner is more detached than ever from the
activity in which he invests. The detachment of the investor, the complexity of
business today, and the trend from laissez faire to consumerism have heightened
the need for reliable decision making information—decision making information
independently attested.
As the investing public demanded better decision making information, the
profession responded. We might argue about how successful the response has
been, but there should be no argument that the need has been evident, the profession has recognized the need, and an effort has been made to meet that need.
We now take it for granted that a publicly-held business will prepare
an annual financial statement. It has not always been so, however.
The investing public is demanding more timely information and it's
clear that interim reporting is taking on additional importance. It's safe
to predict that eventually quarterly financial statements will be as routine
as the present annual report.
Accounting Trends and Techniques now reports that all companies in
its sample provide sales information. Many in the profession will remember that the issue of sales disclosure was so controversial that it was
viewed as the final cut which if insisted upon would alienate the accountants from the business community. Today, however, many companies are experimenting with segmented reporting of sales and profit
contributions.
Today, we are grappling with quantifying complexities such as leases
and option plans. These studies are also controversial, but the investor
has made it clear that there must be a better way to communicate than
by complex, obscure footnotes.
Each new development in public reporting brought with it cries of anguish
from those who could only see potential dangers. Public pressure, however, has
overcome that resistance and with the help of the profession, the investor today
has more reliable, more useful decision making information than ever before.
But, considering the changing, complex world today, is the investor really
informed? Does he have more information, relatively, than the venturer who
invested in the Hudson's Bay Company?
Public Forecasting Is the Next Step
It has become increasingly clear that the investing public is dissatisfied with
simple, historical data. The public is saying that they need more information
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about the future prospects for a business. Based on past developments in financial
reporting, it seems safe to predict that the investors will be given what they
demand.
It has long been acknowledged that the public investor tends to use the
classic, historical financial statement as an indication of the company's future
prospects. The market price of a stock is influenced by many factors, but even
the most uninitiated investor recognizes that a major influence is a company's
prospects for future earnings growth. Analysts use the historicalfinancialstatements as the basis for their projections, adjusting prior years' performance for
predicted variations in the economy and the industry. Individual investors follow
trend lines and tend to make assumptions about the future based on the company's past performance. But in all too many cases investors find these historybased trends to be inadequate and turn to rumor and speculation to make their
decisions about the future.
The investing public is hungry for profit—and therefore for information
about a company's prospects. Whether we like it or not, decisions will be made
based on forecast data. The decisions will be made whether the forecast data are
reliable or not.
The SEC had long taken the position that a company may not talk about
its prospects for the future when it is in registration. However, the SEC is
taking another look at that policy, and has stated that factual information should
always be timely given. And in a recent speech, the Chairman of the SEC suggested it might be appropriate to experiment with forecast information in a
prospectus. The Commission has apparently concluded that the investor should
have formalized, controlled forecast data rather than relying on street talk.
In England, the City of London Code requires an accountant's report on
any projection of operating results included in a takeover or merger proposal.
John P. Grenside, writing in The Journal of Accountancy, said, "It is indeed
difficult to see how shareholders can form a judgment as to the value of their
shares or the merits of the [takeover] offer without this [profit forecast] information, particularly when a significant change in a company's fortunes is expected."
In a speech before the Chicago Chapter of the Planning Executives Institute
in January, 1972, Dean Sidney Davidson of the University of Chicago Graduate
School of Business, predicted that within five years publicly held companies
would be including forecast data with their regular annual reports. Dean Davidson said "It is not a question of if, it is simply a question when and in what form."
The financial analysts have concluded that public companies must give the
investing public more information about their prospects—and do it in a more
structured way. At the Seaview Symposium in November of 1971, the analysts
expressed their concern that a company avoid surprises in the market place. In
that context, it was concluded, "Among the participants the analysts seemed
generally in agreement that public forecasting was an idea whose time had come."
The trend seems abundantly clear. The investing public will demand information about the future potential of their investments and that demand will
be met. It also seems clear that the profession must anticipate that demand and
be prepared to meet the public need in the most productive way.
1

2

Forecasting Defined
Before we pursue this subject further, it will be helpful to define our terms.
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Forecasting is a broad term, and it encompasses many different levels of predictive
information—micro and macro, internal and external. Let us agree, for instance,
that a feasibility study to determine whether to expand the plant or whether to
buy a component from a supplier or manfacture it ourselves is one form of forecast. Investment analysts estimate earnings per share information for many
publicly traded companies, and this data too can be considered to be forecast data.
Some consumer oriented companies publish actual and projected information
about their industry. For our purposes, these industry projections still can be
considered forecast data even though the investor must make his own assumptions about market share and product costs to convert this broad economic
information into a measure of a company's operating prospects. Finally, most
well managed companies prepare a profit plan to guide them in their current
decisions. That profit plan is technically a budget, but for the purpose of this
paper, we will consider it to be a part of the family of forecast data.
Reporting Forecast Data to the Public
What kind of forecast information should be made available to the investing
public? Since we are on the threshold of a new accounting concept, perhaps we
can take a new approach to the kinds of information to be made available.
Perhaps we can avoid some of the problems we have had with traditional financial
statements. Traditional historical statements have grown like Topsy; perhaps we
can anticipate the need for forecasting information and shape its development
rather than follow its evolution.
It would be a mistake to insist on one format for forecast data from all
companies. The kind of information provided should vary, depending on such
circumstances as the quality of information available, the degree of certainty
related to the assumptions, and the company's track record.
The long-established, stable company, such as a public utility, might well
present comparative earnings information: last year, this year and next year.
Ideally, such an earnings statement should show last year's projections for the
current year, this year's actual results, and next year's forecast. This presentation
would be appropriate for most stable companies because their products are accepted, they can look to their own sales experience as well as reliable external
information to forecast volume, and their management experience gives them a
clearer understanding of their company's volume—cost relationship.
At the other extreme, a new development company, formed to exploit an
idea, should not try to provide that kind of comprehensive information. Instead,
they should make available all reliable component information. What are product
costs expected to be at various sales levels? What are the results of market research studies? What factors might influence the company's sales success? For
many companies in the development stage, it would be inappropriate to prepare
a comprehensive earnings forecast because there are simply too many variables.
Those variables do not excuse a company from publishing the information it
has available, however. The investor must recognize that his investment in a
development stage company carries greater risks than his investment in the
long-time, stable company. The investor will assemble his own forecast for the
development company—he is doing so today, but he must be given all of the
reliable information that is available.
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In between these two extremes, the stable company and the development
company, different kinds of presentation will be required. For most companies,
the single, most important variable in their forecast is product sales. It may be
appropriate to present several earnings projections based on different sales assumptions, making appropriate cost adjustments because of the different volume
projections. The text of the forecast should describe the sales assumptions and
relate them to the company's prior experience and to that predictive information
which is available about the industry or the economy as a whole.
In any situation, the assumptions underlying the forecast data must be
clearly spelled out. All significant assumptions should be disclosed; "significant"
in this context should be related to the significance of the assumptions to the
reader's understanding of the forecast data and the degree of certainty or risk
associated with the forecast.
Auditing a Published Forecast
It seems apparent that the public investor will demand and will be given
forecasting information. It also seems apparent that the public will insist on some
form of attestation on the forecast data. The outside stockholder has felt the
need of an objective, independent comment on the representations of management as expressed in historicalfinancialstatements. It seems reasonable to expect
that management representations about forecast data will become critical to
investment decisions, and as they increase in importance, independent attestation
will be required.
Ijiri says ". . . usefulness of budget disclosure to stockholders and other
investors is unquestionable. Implementation of budget disclosure must be
supported by effective budget auditing in order to insure the reliability of the
budgets."
Nurnberg agrees, "It seems apparent that budgets will be published eventually . . . and once budgets are published, auditors will be called upon to attest
to them. The attest function will be extended to budgets as the need for attestation is demonstrated."
Our English counterparts experienced this evolving demand. Originally,
the City Code required that in any proposed merger or takeover, the directors
were to prepare forecast information and the accountants were to act as advisors
and consultants to see that the forecast data was prepared with due care. The
accountants agreed to report on their study of the forecast data and to make
their reports available to the City Panel but not to the public stockholders. This
proved to be an untenable situation:
3

4

The public knew that the accountants had issued a report on the forecast and they were exerting pressure to have that information made
available.
Company management took the position that they had paid substantial
sums to have the auditors participate and they ought to be able to make
the auditors' report public information.
If an auditor had some reservation about forecast material prepared by
a company, he found it very difficult to make his reservations known
when he was precluded from publishing his report.
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Mr. Grenside reports, "There were thus obvious and increasing difficulties
in the application in practice of the Institute's advice that reporting accountants
should not permit their names to be directly associated with profit forecasts
and there was pressure for the accountancy bodies to reconsider their position."
After much soul searching and negotiation, the accountants and the City authorities agreed that the accountant's report, covering the accounting basis and
calculations for the forecast, would be published and the accountant would
formally consent to (or deny) the use of his report in the merger documents.
The public accounting profession is in a unique position to meet the need
for audited forecast information. In the area of historicalfinancialreporting, the
profession has established a reputation for independence and objectivity. The investing community also accepts as fact that the CPA is a prudent business
man, an expert in the field of accountancy and reporting and that he has
thorough understanding of his client's business. These qualities—and the public
recognition and acceptance of them—are necessary for effective attestation of historical and forecastfinancialdata.
5

Standards of Performance—Auditing Forecast Data
If we accept the fact that the public accounting profession will be a part
of this new accounting concept—published forecast data—it will be important
to develop a framework for his participation. As a starting point, let us paraphrase the ten generally accepted auditing standards and consider how they apply to the auditing of forecast data. For some of the standards, their application
will be self-evident and no further comment will be required; for some others we
must expand our traditional understanding for this new application.
The General Standards
The examination is to be performed by experienced CPAs who have
training in the unique skills required for forecasting. The CPAs will
conduct their examination with independence and due professional care.
Clearly the spirit of the General Standards applies to the examination of
forecast data. The examination should be performed by a proficient CPA: one
who is trained to gather and evaluate evidential matter; one who is trained to
evaluate the fairness of presentation; one who is experienced in challenging the
representations of management.
It is true, of course, that there are a number of unique skills involved in the
preparation of a forecast. Companies who do internal forecasting today may use
the skills of a market researcher, an economist, and an expert in cost behavior
analysis. The CPA must be expected to be familiar with these unique skills in
order to evaluate management's forecasting, but it's not necessary that he be a
specialist in all of these fields. He must understand them so that he can be alert
to possible misapplication or misuse of the procedures, but he need not have the
same level of expertise as the specialist in the field any more than he need be a
specialist in cost accounting, credit and collection, or electronic data processing
in order to perform his traditional examination of historical financial statements.
It is understood that the CPA must proceed with an independent mental
attitude. We're not talking about the independence rule which forbids him from
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owning stock in his client, although the appearance of independence is certainly
crucial to the public acceptance of any attestation. When we're talking about
auditing a forecast, however, we're looking for the kind of independence that
is demonstrated when a CPA:
Issues a qualified opinion on historical statements even though he knows
he is inviting criticism of his prior years' unqualified opinions:
Insists on a certain accounting treatment because he is convinced it is
right, even though there may be precedent for an alternative;
Faces up to a mistake and insists on withdrawal and correction of a
report which he previously certified;
Proceeds on the basis that his client is the investing public.
The Standards of Field Work
The CPA will review the procedures used by management in preparing
the forecast data and will gather and evaluate such competent evidential
matter as is necessary for him to formulate an opinion as to the reasonableness of the underlying assumptions and the forecast presentation.
If we're going to be involved in forecast reporting, we must go beyond the
compilation stage. If we're to be associated with a forecast, we must be satisfied
that the assumptions used in preparing the forecast are reasonable. Again, the
experience of our English friends as reported by Grenside will be helpful:
. . . the accountants' report is to be published, but it is to be confined
to the "accounting bases and calculations for the forecast."
The accountants are, however, required to give their consent to the
publication of their report. This, in my opinion, imposes on the accountants an obligation to satisfy themselves as to the general reasonableness of the forecast itself and the assumptions on which it is based.
If they are unable to do this, the accountants should qualify their report
or, as an ultimate resort, withhold their consent to publish.
In attesting to the reasonableness of the assumptions used in the forecast,
the CPA will also have to be satisfied that a thorough job has been done. He
will have to be satisfied that management has taken all steps that could reasonably
be expected to search out those factors which might influence the forecast.
If a CPA is to form an opinion on the reasonableness of the underlying assumptions and the forecast presentation, he must have evidence in support of
his opinion. It is not possible to anticipate what form the evidence might take
because the circumstances in each situation will vary. However, it is reasonable
to assume that the CPA will want to consider:
6

published statistics from trade associations
government information about a market segment
specific market research studies by the company or outside consultants
volume—cost studies prepared by the company's accounting unit.
In some cases, it may be necessary for the CPA to retain an outside consultant to assist him in his evaluations of the evidence.
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As companies develop experience in public forecasting, good procedures
will be codified. When a company is able to proceduralize its forecasting process, the auditor will be able to review the procedures and will report on their
reasonableness and their consistent application. It is doubtful whether a new
company (or one new to forecasting) will have developed a satisfactory set of
forecasting procedures, and this stage of development will naturally affect the
CPA's level of satisfaction. The public investor will expect audit comments on
forecasting procedures, and it is reasonable to assume that he will expect improvement from management.
The Standards of Reporting
The objective of the CPA's report is to assure the reader that the forecast
information is the best available under the circumstances and that it is
presented without bias, but the CPA must disclaim any opinion as to
the outcome of the forecast.
In the same way that the presentation of the forecast information should
vary depending on the circumstances, the attest report on forecast data must not
be confined to a standard format. Today, audit reports on historical statements
are either unqualified, qualified, or adverse. The traditional, historical financial
statement can not be understood in "yes or no" terms, and the profession should
never have allowed itself to fall into the trap of issuing a boilerplate, "yes or no"
report. Forecast data is even more complex than traditional financial statements,
and the attest report on forecast data must be written in such a way that the
reader will read the report, evaluate all of the CPA's comments, and understand
what he is trying to say. For instance, the CPA must be able to say, if necessary,
that there is insufficient data available to form an opinion, without leaving an
implication that management has been derelict in its duty. There will be many
straight-forward, clearly legitimate situations where there will be inadequate
data. The investing public must be able to understand the report, understand
the nature of the risk, and act accordingly.
Each report on a forecast engagement must be a special report, written for
the unique engagement. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify the key elements
required in any such report:
Identification of the data covered by the report
Statement of the purpose of the forecast
Reference to the underlying assumptions and an opinion on their reasonableness. (If certain assumptions are not evaluable, a statement to
that effect)
A disclaimer as to responsibility for the ultimate attainment of the projected results
For example, a forecast report on a real estate tax shelter program might take the
following form:
The accompanying forecast financial statements of X Y Z Properties (a
limited partnership) for the years 1970 through 1990, shown on pages
2 through 6, were prepared to provide estimates of cash inflow from
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partners' investments, net cash flow returned to partners, and tax
consequences of projected operations to individual partners in selected
income tax brackets. The forecast statements have been prepared using
the assumptions and rationale set forth on pages 7 through 11.
We have reviewed the assumptions and rationale underlying the forecast financial statements. We believe these assumptions and rationale
are reasonable and appropriate for the purpose of this forecast.
Since forecasts are based on assumptions about circumstances and events
that have not yet taken place, they are subject to the variations that
may arise as future operations actually occur. Accordingly, we cannot
give assurance that the predicted results will actually be attained.
If the CPA has not been able to find support for the key assumptions underlying
the forecast report he might use the following words:
The accompanying statement of projected operations of the ABC Company (proposed to be formed) for the year ending June 30, 1972 was
prepared on the basis of the assumptions and rationale as set forth on
pages 3 through 8, to estimate what net income might be if the company were to produce a certain new line of children's toys.
We have reviewed the assumptions and rationable underlying the statement of projected operations. Since there is no similar line of toys
presently on the market and no marketing research has been conducted,
we are unable to evaluate the reasonableness of the assumptions relating
to unit volume and selling prices. All other assumptions appear reasonable and appropriate for the purpose of this projection, but since their
application to the statement of projected operations is, in most cases,
directly related to unit volume, the reliability of their application depends
on the accuracy of the unit volume assumption.
These projections are based on assumptions about future circumstances
and events. We do not know the future and we cannot give assurance
that the projected results will actually be attained.
It should be understood that the CPA would insist on disclosure of material conflicting evidence, or if he should conclude that the forecast data is misleading,
he would withdraw from the engagement.
Forward Work
The issue is not whether forecast material will be provided to the users of
financial statements, but what form will the forecast report take. The question
is not whether CPAs will be asked to comment on the forecast data, but what
must be done to be able to comment intelligently. There is a great deal of research to be done, and judging by the momentum behind the idea, there may
not be much time. There are three specific areas which should be explored carefully in practice and in the literature:
We must understand how the public will use forecast data when it is
provided to them in an organized way.
We must develop the principles to be followed in presenting forecast data.
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We must study the question of a common body of knowledge for those
who will work in forecasting, and bring the profession up to speed.
But What About—
There are those who say that the legal liability aspects of reporting on forecast data are so great that we can't afford to be involved. There are those who
say that the investor will lose confidence in the auditor's attestation on historical
statements when some of the forecast data we attest to prove to be only a reasonable man's best efforts. However, George O. May put it very well when he
said, "Preoccupation with the importance of not misleading investors has obscured the desirability of enlightening them."
7

Numbers Aren't Enough—How about Management's Performance
A CPA engaged for an examination of public forecast data finds himself in
familiar territory—he will be evaluating and reporting on financial data. It has
been suggested, however, than an analysis of data, historical or prospective, is a
superficial way to comprehend an enterprise. It has been suggested that the
only way to understand a company's prospects for the future is to understand
management's ability to manage.
Within the profession there is considerable interest and debate about whether
or not the CPA can appropriately give an evaluation of management. The major
objections seem to be:
there are no standards for measurement of management performance.
people (management) change, conceivably rapidly, and they all have
their "good" periods and "bad" periods.
It seems fair, however, to point out that it took a while to develop a base of
generally accepted auditing standards, and certainly there is more to be done in
the basic audit area where we feel so comfortable. You will recall that CPAs
were attesting to financial statements before today's auditing standards were
articulated. If the profession were not continually evolving, we would not be
discussing in this symposium "Where do we go from here?"
The Hudson's Bay venturers never went exploring but they had first hand
contact with their agents who did. At the completion of a voyage they had the
opportunity to sign up for the next trip or look elsewhere for investment potential. They made their decision based on their experience and on their firsthand appraisal of management's skills. Today, can the investor make an intelligent appraisal of management skills? He can do so only on the basis of the
company's historical performance. Tomorrow we may be able to evaluate management's ability based on their performance against a forecast. Doesn't the
investor need—can't he be given—a more direct appraisal?
What Is a Management Evaluation?
Semantics give us a problem. If we are evaluating management, we are
probably talking about people. If we are evaluating management systems, we are
covering both people and their adopted systems in a given area. If we are
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evaluating management performance, we must consider how the people performed against their systems, which also must be evaluated in terms of external
standards.
We should not attempt to evaluate management except in the broadest
terms—management performance. While doing less may seem to be a conservative extension of the attest function, there is a probability that stopping short is
a most dangerous posture. Partial consideration of a given subject by the CPA,
a professional expected (in the information user's subjective view) to assure full
disclosure, will leave an implication that what is not said is satisfactory.
Where to Begin
Let us examine our recent efforts on reporting on internal control (Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 49). This pronouncement resulted because
CPAs were already attesting to the adequacy of internal controls. The degrees
varied, of course, from simple specification of weaknesses, to negative assurance,
to a positive opinion on adequacy. The AICPA Committee on Auditing Procedure had planned to develop an SAP on the substance of internal control and
the related auditor's approach, but contemporary pressures required attention to
the visible problem of reporting. The result: a long, but informative, report
cautioning the reader about the difficulties of measurement and concluding with
what amounts to a form of negative assurance. The reception to SAP 49 has not
been uniformly laudatory, particularly by government agencies, some of which
suggest that it is a cutback in auditing as well as in responsibility assumed by
the CPA. Change may be required in SAP 49, but when is change not required
on the path of progress?
The formal entry into reporting on internal control is but a few steps removed
from evaluations of management performance. If we admit that the system of
internal accounting controls can be evaluated, then we will have to agree that
administrative controls are similarly situated, given standards and a competent
examiner. If we can address ourselves to the entire system of internal control,
accounting and administrative, we should be able to evaluate the system as well
as management's performance within it.
The Critical Factors
The issues of standards of evaluation and the competence of the evaluator
are critical, of course. John L. Carey, in The CPA Plans for the Future, lists a
number of possible quantitative criteria; perhaps those in which public interest
was high at the time. Surely the list can be adjusted if the profession is willing
to invest in the effort needed to articulate preliminary performance standards,
both social and profit oriented. And there should be no misconception that there
can ever be a standard for every situation. We do not have this now. A good
example is the debate over whether non-arm's length transactions require no
disclosure, full disclosure, or full disclosure with evaluation of the terms of the
transactions—yet we continue attesting to historical financial statements nonetheless.
If we tell our attest users what we are attesting to in the area of management
performance, the users will let us know what changes they want made. And the
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standards will evolve in any event, through continuous consideration by the
profession.
What about the CPA's competence? The major assets of the CPA are his
independence, his objectivity and a thorough knowledge of his client. Even if
specially engaged to evaluate management performance, the CPA has the knowledge of how to go about investigating the whole of the business, because of his
usual audit approach. The use of experts from other disciplines is already common in financial auditing, particularly when major uncertainties seem to exist.
There is every reason to believe this use can expand to accommodate the new
criteria needing evaluation. The auditing profession will be far better off attesting to management performance under its own guidelines than being required
to consider, as in historical financial auditing, performance criteria which will
surely be created outside the profession.
Professors Langenderfer and Robertson believe it is feasible to perform
independent management auditing. Their hypotheses are considered in parallel
tofinancialauditing postulates, and they believe that the same philosophy covers
both financial and management auditing. Their position would make a good
starting point for serious consideration of the CPA's role in this area.
8
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Conclusion
Historical financial information has value to an investor—to a limited
degree because it is history, but more so because it has been an indicator of the
future. Because of the rapid rate of change, the value of historical data as an
indicator of the future has diminished. The investor needs and will somehow
find other indicators of future performance. It is our responsibility to see that
the investor has the best possible information. If we are to meet our time
honored responsibilities in the future we must move beyond traditional practice
and into the frontiers of forecasting and management evaluation. Like the
voyagers of old, we must take the risk so that we may thereby best serve the
needs of the public.
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Discussant's Response to
Future Extensions of Audit Services;
Meeting Investors' Future Needs
John C. Burton
Columbia University
Historically, when I have been asked to comment on the observations of a
leading member of the public accounting profession I have been in the position
of saying, "Go faster; look at the potential benefits of innovation rather than
emphasizing the costs and dangers." After reading Don Bevis' paper, I am
happy to be able to say "three cheers!" It may even be that some of my remarks
might be interpreted as urging deliberate rather than precipitous speed toward
some of his well articulated objectives.
Two Principal Extensions
The paper develops two principal extensions of the attest function: reporting
on forecasts and reporting on management performance. I concur that both are
logical and needed. It has long been my view that the current short form report
which is the auditor's principal public output represents an enormous public underutilization of the competence of the highly talented professionals who perform
audits. To render a standard report, substantial economic and human investments
must be made which could logically lead to far greater and more useful public
output than two standard paragraphs. This is not to belittle the importance of
the attest function today, since I believe it is one of the underpinnings of our
capital markets and corporate system, but simply to call attention to the opportunity costs which exist.
The paper devotes far more space to the subject of forecasting, and it develops
the subject in an interesting and thoughtful manner. The discussion of auditing
standards applied to forecast data and the illustration of possible audit reports
on forecasts are significant contributions. They go far to indicate the conceptual
feasibility of this extension of auditing within the broad framework of auditing
standards today.
The second major extension discussed in the paper suggests an auditor's
report on management performance, but the topic is only considered superficially.
The author asserts his faith in the CPA's competence to undertake the task of
evaluating management, and he incorporates by reference the article by Langenderfer and Robertson on the theoretical structure for such audits, but he does
not offer any significant new insights of his own. While the fact that he supports
such an extension of the auditor's function is in itself significant, one might
have hoped for the same kind of new insights as to how this might be done as
are found in the discussion on audits of forecasts.
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Since I support fully the concepts advanced in this paper and because I
largely applaud the way in which the author develops them, the rest of my
comments will be devoted to some supplemental views on the topics advanced
rather than specific comments relating to the paper.
Forecasts
The subject of forecasts has received great attention of late, both because
of demands by investors and because of an apparent prospective change in the
Securities and Exchange Commission's historical opposition to the public disclosure of forecasts in registration statements and other documents filed with the
Commission. I concur with the conclusion in the paper that something is going
to happen in the near future and it is important to make every effort to assure
that it is the right thing.
The need for forecast data is a reflection of the fact that business is a continuum which cannot be adequately described by looking simply at history. Traditionally, history was valued for its objectivity and because it served as a basis
for prediction. Recent developments have indicated that both of these qualities
have perhaps been excessively attributed to financial statements to the detriment
of users who accepted them on faith. Financial statements already contain many
explicit forecasts, and in the face of the uncertainties of the future, it may be that
our traditional single-valued format is obsolete. In addition, as Bevis points out,
the world is now changing so rapidly that the predictive power of historical data
is also being eroded.
An appropriate response to these developments is to expand the availability
of future expectations which are being used by management to run the business,
as well as possibly to adjust the traditional accounting model for "historical"
financial statements. It is important, however, that in doing this, we do not
create even in the short run a childlike faith on the part of users of financial
statements in the forecasts which are presented. This means we must identify
the uncertainties which exist and distinguish between history and projection
both in forecast data and in standard financial statements.
A first step in this process would be clearly distinguishing in format between
historical data and forecasts. I am troubled by Bevis' suggestion that for a stable
business we could show "last year-this year-next year" data in simple columnar
form. It would seem more desirable to make the "next year" data quite different
in format. Perhaps we should use ranges or sensitivity analyses which analyze
the relationships between data and identify the crucial variables which will affect
the operations of the business in the future. It should not be the job of the
Company or the auditor to furnish a simple crutch for the analyst such as next
year's earnings per share. Rather, information about the business continuum—
past, present and future—should be supplied in a variety of formats appropriate
to the information being communicated so that improved allocation of resources
in the economy can take place.
The public accountant's role in this process is twofold. First, he must be a
reporting consultant who can effectively discuss with the company the types
of disclosure which would be appropriate in particular circumstances. This will
not simply represent the performance of a truth ritual; it will require long and
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hard work to establish criteria for various kinds of data and then probably the
application of personal judgment to many ad-hoc problems.
Second, the auditor must add reliability to the forecast data which is reported to the public. Here he must play the role of the objective, dispassionate
professional. He must understand what represents good current forecasting
techniques and decide whether they are in use in a particular firm. He must
appraise assumptions. While he may today possess many of the skills necessary
in this area, a significant increment will be required and must be developed
within the profession if this function is to be performed.
There are several other problems in this extension of the audit function which
must be considered and acted upon. The question of liability for error is a
major one. In some fashion this must be defined. In addition, we must deal
with the problems of self-fulfilling prophecies in forecasting. One of the major
arguments against presenting next year's income statement is that the fact of
public presentation will bias the subsequent actual figures in the direction of the
forecast. If the same auditor reports on both, the problem is made more acute,
although both forecast and historical data are part of the information system
under audit. With sufficient quality controls in the firm, a rotation of staff and
other increases in professionalism, these problems may be overcome.
Evaluation of Management
The extension of the attest function to the evaluation of management is in
some ways more frightening and in others more familiar than its extension in
the forecast area. Auditors have appraised internal control for many years, even
though few public reports have been issued thereon and few probably will be
until SAP 49 is revised. Nevertheless, appraisal of a control system in the largest
sense is a form of management appraisal. The review of the system does not
complete the appraisal of management but it is a starting point.
Another step may be associated with the audit of forecasts. Management
itself has long used the analysis of the variances that arise between actual and
forecast data as a means of appraising subordinates, and the same general approach
may be applied to the top management by an outsider such as an auditor or
analyst. The CPA might, for example, express an opinion as to the fairness of
a company's description of the reasons for variances between historical and forecast data. This would leave the decision as to whether the variance was a management deficiency or a chance fluctuation up to the user of the statement.
It may well be that the evaluation of management will take the form of a
number of specific attestations such as the ones relating to control and the explanation of variances just referred to. It seems unlikely that a single overall appraisal could be effectively presented until standards have been developed, and
there are few signs that such development is imminent. A piecemeal approach
therefore seems more likely. This is not inconsistent with the ideas expressed
by Bevis, although he does not explicitly predict development in this fashion.
Summary
In the final analysis, I can only agree with and cheer for Don Bevis' forecast
as to the extension of the attest function, even if I cannot as a CPA ethically
associate my name with it in a manner which may lead to the belief that I vouch
for its achievability.
69

5
Toward Standards for Materiality(?)
William Holmes
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
The term "materiality" in accounting and auditing literature is variously
used in relation to misrepresentation, disclosure, segregation of extraordinary
items, and audit requirements. The original use in accounting was in relation
to misrepresentation and disclosure. If we can concentrate on these aspects of
materiality, I believe the findings will apply equally well to the remaining aspects.
This is the approach that has been adopted throughout this paper.
Some History of Materiality
In an artictle I recently wrote for the February, 1972 Journal of Accountancy,
entitled "Materiality Through the Looking Glass," I traced the history of the
use of the term materiality in American accounting and quoted examples to show
that the concept was already well established in the early 1900's. I pointed out
that the English Chartered Accountants who arrived in the 1880's and 1890's
had brought the concept with them, and I showed that the concept was inherent
in the provisions of the early British Companies Acts. I quoted the definition of
Lord Davey's committee relative to an 1895 updating of these acts that—
Every contract or fact is material which would influence the judgment
of a prudent investor in determining whether he would subscribe for the
shares or debentures offered by the prospectus.
1

The article pointed out that this type of definition was merely the old common law doctrine governing cases of misrepresentation and deceit applied to the
sale of securities, and Oliver Wendell Holmes was quoted to show that the
American Common Law paralleled the English Common Law in this respect.
The article also reviewed the accounting literature in America on the
subject of materiality, pointing out that the earliest articles on the subject date
from the 1930's. I surmised that prior to the 1930s accountants generally regarded the term in its legal context; as something for the courts to interpret and
not something over which accountants could claim jurisdiction.
The term materiality was increasingly used in "official" accounting literature
beginning with the 1930's. An "official" definition from the Securities Acts was
incorporated in the S-X Regulations published in 1940, and the term was also
used extensively in the early Bulletins of the American Institute. Despite this,
writers in the 1930's and 1940's still seem to have regarded the concept as a
child of law and only a foster child of accounting and asked for, at most, "a part in
any final determination of its meaning."
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The Search for Standards
Since the early 1950's a different mood predominates—a search for standards,
and a growing conviction that the accounting profession should be the one to
establish such standards. This "positivist" attitude has been best represented in
the writings of Sam Woolsey and Leopold Bernstein, who believed "standards,"
"official guidelines," and "border zones" should be established, and established
by accountants. In my earlier article I discussed this matter briefly in the light
of recent court decisions and articles by non-accountants and suggested that it
would be extremely difficult to establish meaningful standards which would
embrace "all the circumstances"—to quote the judge in the BarChris case. Robert
H . Montgomery recognized the problem succinctly in his 1940 sixth edition,
which took account of the impact of the Securities Acts, when he said—
The auditor who examines a balance sheet to be included in a registration statement must decide for himself what the mental processes of the
"average prudent investor" might be! (The final punctuation is expressive.)
2

As I see it, the chief difficulty in establishing standards for materiality lies
with the common law doctrines of "influence" or "reliance." To quote Oliver
Wendell Holmes again—
It is said that a fraudulent representation must be material to have that
effect. But how are we to decide whether it is material or not? It must
be by an appeal to ordinary experience to decide whether a belief that
the fact was as represented would naturally have led to, or a contrary
belief would naturally have prevented, the making of the contract.
(Emphasis added)

3

The more modern Restatement of Torts says much the same thing.
A fact is material if its existence or non-existence is a matter to which
a reasonable man would attach importance in determining his course
of action in the transaction. (Emphasis added)
So we see that in the common law it is not so much the nature or extent of the
"fact" as the influence it had on the mind of a reasonable man in the particular
transaction, and, to quote the judge in BarChris, ". . . in the light of all the
circumstances."
Professor Louis Loss comments that many of the Blue Sky Laws carry forward the common law concept. With respect to the New York law, he says—
The offense is committed by material misrepresentation intended to
influence the bargain, although they may be due to negligence rather
than dishonesty. (Emphasis added)
4

The Securities Acts, where they apply, introduced a different doctrine in
that reliance on the misrepresentation is not always necessary—for instance under
Section 12(2). This may explain the different emphasis of the SEC definition
which—
. . . limits the information required to those matters as to which an
average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing the securities. (Emphasis added)
5

72

I do not know whether the words "before purchasing the securities" carry
with them the thought of influence and reliability. However, if it is argued
that materiality has a different meaning under the Securities Acts than under
common law or under respective Blue Sky laws, the problem of setting standards
becomes doubly difficult. Presumably then materiality would mean one thing
for a large private placement of bonds and another for a public sale of common
stock under the SEC.
To quote Louis Loss again—
Inevitably, to be sure, some element of reliance is inherent in the concept
of materiality.
6

So we see that the concepts of "reliance" and "influence" coupled with the
requirement to look at "all the circumstances" lie at the heart of difficulties in
any attempt to establish accounting standards for materiality. The weight of the
accounting data as against the weight of other factors will vary case by case and
an accounting misrepresentation that would be material in one situation may
well not be material in another. The factors are entirely relative rather than
absolute. One wonders whether this dichotomy between relative and absolute
values could be at the heart of the disagreement between the Company and its
auditors on the one hand and the SEC on the other hand in the Occidental
Petroleum matter where, based on the figures given in the Wall Street Journal
report, the distortion of net income amounted to $8.9 million out of a total of
$174.8 million. We noted above the different emphasis of the SEC definition
of materiality.
My own opinion is that if we accept the term materiality with all its
attendant legal nuances—and I see no alternative to doing so—it becomes impractical to establish purely accounting standards for the term. I would suggest,
however, a practical alternative.
A Practical Alternative: Significant Distortion
The auditor's "certificate" states that the financial statements are fairly
presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. We have
no professional definition for the word "fairness," but it would seem to me to
be more of an intrinsic attribute of the financial statements themselves and less
dependent on the many factors involved in the term materiality. If we accept
this for the moment, we might establish standards to measure the point at
which financial statements per se might cease to be "fair"—a standard of "significant distortion" if I may coin a phrase. For instance, we might decide that
any distortion in the balance sheet in excess of say five per cent of total assets
would be "significant distortion" of the balance sheet, irrespective of the effect
in a particular instance on the average prudent investor. The income statement,
of course, poses more problems since the standard would have to embrace companies with regular income, companies with cyclical income, and companies with
a pattern of negligible income. It might be better to relate such a standard to a
theoretical income necessary to provide "normal" return on investment. To
cancel the effect of variations in debt/equity ratio as between companies it might
be advisable to measure the return on a base of total assets less current liabilities.
However, my purpose here is not to offer solutions as to how the standard would
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be defined but merely to set the stage. If we adopted such standards we could
then require disclosure action or qualification of the auditor's opinion for distortion in excess of such standard—even if materiality indicated a higher level. For
instance, turning again to BarChris, the 15.7 per cent difference in net income
might be "significant distortion" even although the judge ruled it was not material.
When materiality considerations suggested a factor lower than the "significant distortion" factor, the lower measure would take effect—a rule of
"lower of materiality or standard significant distortion factor." For example,
suppose we establish a 10 per cent factor for the income statement, and in a
particular case the company is on the verge of breaking through a "times interest"
coverage factor affecting its bondholders where a 5 per cent change in income
would spell the difference between interest covered and interest not covered. In
this case the 10 per cent standard distortion factor might have to give way to
the 5 per cent materiality factor.
It is fairly obvious that in those cases where the accounting misrepresentation
is the only factor involved which would influence the investor—i.e., ignoring
completely such things as nature of industry, size of company, history of stock
prices, changes in management, announcement of technology breakthrough,
acquisition of significant patents, discovery of new resources, environmental problems, the state of the national economy, and the international financial scene,
etc. etc.—then, ignoring all of these except the accounting data,
Materiality = Significant Distortion
This is the problem in evaluating the possibility of establishing materiality
standards from research studies based on case examples, such as those used by
Professor Woolsey in 1954. The responses were answers primarily to levels of significant distortion rather than to real life problems in materiality.
It is for this reason, also, that I do not like the latest (1968) English Institute
pronouncement that, "In an accounting sense a matter is material if its nondisclosure, misstatement or omission would be likely to distort the view given by
the accounts or other statement under consideration." I don't believe the term
materiality can be limited to "in an accounting sense." It may be said that any
decision by an accountant as to materiality in a particular case is always correct
short of a court of law. If the decision isn't challenged, then at least pragmatically,
the decision was a good one. The court will not limit its judgment to matters
"in an accounting sense." I believe the English Institute was seeking to isolate
the accounting misrepresentation in the manner I have suggested above and might
have solved the problem by recognizing this as "significant distortion" rather
than materiality. The English common law and the various Companies Acts
have always followed the "reliance" concept with its attendant "in the light of
all the circumstances," and I do not believe the Institute's latest definition is
meaningful since it obviously seeks to establish a concept of materiality based
purely on the accounting data.
7

Distinguishing Materiality and Significant Distortion
It may be suggested that the above arguments amount to no more than
splitting hairs on a matter of semantics. This may be so, but they are hairs of
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some importance and this distinction between materiality and significance is
somewhat overdue. In 1959 Carman Blough was saying—
Possibly these (reasonably informative disclosures; materiality; and
significance) are terms which defy definition . . .
8

and the need for the distinction is noticeable in paragraph .11 of the General
section of the Current Text of APB Accounting Principles, which states—
The committee contemplates that its opinions will have application
only to items material and significant in the relative circumstances.
(Emphasis added)

9

As things stand today I am not sure what distinction between the terms the
committee had in mind.
An interesting situation related to this matter of semantics is evident in
looking at the evolution of the present AICPA ethics rule governing misrepresentation. The earliest rule in 1917 used the word "essential," and in 1923 this
was changed to "essential and material" with respect to misrepresentation for
which disciplinary action could be taken. However, in both cases the rule was left
in the broad concept of looking beyond the financial statements in measuring materiality. The 1941 version of Rule 5, which has been readopted as Article 2.02
of the 1965 amendment, reads as follows:
In expressing an opinion on representations infinancialstatements which
he has examined, a member or an associate shall be held guilty of an act
discreditable to the profession if—
(a) He fails to disclose a material fact known to him which is not disclosed in the financial statements but disclosure of which is necessary to make the financial statements not misleading (emphasis
added)
(b) He fails to report any material misstatement known to him to
appear in thefinancialstatements
(c) Etc., etc.
It should be noted that paragraph (a) is aimed at the financial statements
themselves; paragraph (b) leaves the concept open for the concept of influencing
the investor. Paragraph (a) is "significant distortion;" paragraph (b) is
"materiality."
Proprietary Considerations
I believe we must take note of the legal origin of the term materiality. I
have pointed out before that frequent use of the term in accounting literature
does not establish for accountants a proprietary right to the term. The courts
would still try us subject to the legal concept of materiality if we had never
mentioned the word in accounting literature. Nor do I believe the courts would
be overly impressed with any standards we might adopt which looked only to
accounting data.
On the other hand the word significant is ours to do with what we will—
despite some use of the term in SEC literature. We can have significance "in
an accounting sense" and can set standards of significance if that seems desirable.
However, as I have pointed out above, the adoption of such standards does not
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absolve us from making a judgment also in each instance as to whether "in the
light of all the circumstances" materiality might not suggest a lower factor.
The question remains, if we adopt standards of significance, how do we
police our standards? For instance, how would we deal with those cases where
the courts rule that the "significant distortion factor" in a particular instance was
not material? This is not an easy matter to decide. However, the present ethics
rule with respect to mispresentation of material facts must be even more difficult
to apply until some court has made a decision. How, for instance, would the
Ethics Committee rule on the facts presented in Occidental Petroleum short of a
decision in the courts? It would obviously ease the problem somewhat if their
decision in a particular case was based only on the accounting data without the
need to examine "all the circumstances." It would seem to me, moreover, that
a judge would find a "standard of significant distortion" set by the accounting
profession a useful starting point in arriving at his decision in a matter involving
materiality. Here would be one factor quantified for him which he could weigh
against other factors in arriving at his decision.
Conclusions
Adopting a standard of significant distortion does not do away with the
problem of materiality, particularly where other factors indicate a lower level of
concern. I have stated that I do not believe we can "standardize" the measure
of such other factors. How, then, will the accountant deal with this problem?
The first thing is for the accountant to recognize the problem exists. I will
repeat a quote from an article written by Martin J. Whitman and Martin Shubik
in The Financial Executive, May 1971, which takes issue with the importance attached to net income by accountants as a factor in determining or influencing
stock market values:
The accountants, the regulatory authorities, and the so-called fundamentalists have taken a limited tool of analysis which is useful for appraising large, stable public utilities which enjoy little, or no, tax shelter;
which reinvest virtually all their retained earnings in their own industry; and whose common stockholders tend to be non-speculative and
dividend-income conscious; and they have assumed that this is either
the appropriate tool of analysis for almost all investor owned companies
or that everyone else thinks that it is an appropriate tool of analysis.
Many of us can remember the late 1950's when certain textile companies
with reasonable earnings were selling below book value so that management
found it advantageous to buy publicly traded stock into the Treasury to improve
earnings per share. The relationship between earnings and market value was
less than sensitive. The same can be said for many "start-up" ventures, the
cable-T.V. companies being an excellent example in the first four or five years
of their existence, when they are building their base load connections. At the
other end of the scale are the established "high-flyers" where the market has
discounted the future on the basis of an annualized coumpounded rate of growth.
The stocks of such companies are significantly more sensitive to any failure to
meet the expected earnings. I believe the accountant must make some evaluation
of these investor behavioral patterns in assessing a materiality—as distinct from
"significant distortion"—decision.
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The example I cited earlier with respect to "times interest coverage" with
respect to utility bonds suggests another area of sensitivity where contractual
clauses of debt agreements impose restrictions of one kind or another on additional borrowing powers, freedom to pay dividends, etc. In marginal situations
such restrictions may well influence a materiality decision. The accountant can
surely be cognizant of these factors as they arise. I have attached as an Appendix
a few additional examples to bring out the scope of the problem.
The examples above, however, do not cover the whole field. Consider the
effect of discovery of new oil or gas resources (Alaska), the impact of sudden
new technology that makes existing plants obsolete (coke-oven gas when natural
gas lines expanded), action of foreign governments (the copper companies), and
so on. The items mentioned had such impact on investors that they superseded
the reported earnings as a factor influencing investor behavior, sometimes over
a period of years.
My rule of "lower of the standard distortion factor or materiality factor"
simplifies the problem by at least 50 per cent. The accountant need only concern
himself with the situation where the materiality factor is lower—not higher—
than the distortion factor. That is, the accounting data must be more important
than usual and, as influencing the investor, these situations are usually within
the ken of the accountant.
And what of the other 50 per cent? I believe we have a way to go before
we can come close to standardizing that. Much of stock market response is
still pure Barnum & Bailey, a circus where W. C. Fields rates equal time with
Graham & Dodd. I will close with the same paragraph I used to close my
earlier article.
By all means let us continue to discuss, dispute, dissect, deplore, and generally "look before and after and pine for what is not" in this matter of materiality.
My personal opinion is that we must widen our understanding and narrow our
judgments—short of official standards.
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Appendix
Some Interesting Examples Showing Problems in Determining
Materiality Purely in Terms of Financial Statements
Cases relatively insensitive to present earnings:
From Newsweek—March 6, 1972:
(a) Curtis Wright has doubled in price since January 1 and in one week
alone nearly 30% of its shares were traded—all because the company hold limited North American rights to the Wankel engine,
and on the fragile theory that the major automakers may turn to
the Wankel and suddenly transform Curtis-Wright, one of the
market's perennial laggards, into a hot property.
(b) Cartridge Television, Inc.
At current prices the stock market was saying the company was
worth close to $75 million. Yet Cartridge T.V. not only hasn't
made any profits, it isn't even scheduled to make its first sale until
this month. But the company's story is that it hopes to cash in on
a long-time dream—a massive consumer market for video recorders
and video cassette players.
Cases particularly sensitive to earnings:
From Newsweek—July 26, 1971:
When IBM reported that its second-quarter net was unchanged from a
year ago at $2.22 a share—and added that the outlook for the rest of
the year wasn't exciting—investors stampeded for the exit. The stock
slumped 13 points in a single day, continued to drift lower and finally
closed the week at $294-1/2 vs. the 1971 high of almost $366.
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Discussant's Response to
Toward Standards for Materiality(?)
Sam M. Woolsey
University of Houston
Mr. Holmes has prepared a very interesting and thought provoking paper
on this elusive problem of materiality. As discussant it is my intention to reinforce and stress the importance of many of his points as they affect the accounting
profession. A few of my own concepts on how to handle the problem will be
given, either as a modification or an addition to his other comments and
conclusions.
Various Meanings of Materiality
Mr. Holmes' references to legal opinions and interpretations given by
regulatory bodies have brought out different shades of meaning associated with
the word "material." Materiality, as it is used in the narrow sense, relates to
the correct recording and reporting of accounting data. Mr. Holmes points out
that for a statement to be considered "fair" it must be free of "significant distortion." This concept says that if a statement contains significant accounting
errors, it should be corrected regardless of the surrounding circumstances and
without the necessity of being concerned whether or not the error is large enough
to influence the action of the "average prudent investor."
Materiality, in its broadest sense, is related to whether or not the item in
question (e.g., the existence of an error) will likely influence the thoughts and
actions of the reader when considered under the surrounding circumstances.
There may or may not be significant distortion.
I believe that the profession should recognize the difference between the
two meanings of materiality (significant distortion and materiality) and that,
as Mr. Holmes suggests, the terms "significant distortion factor" and "materiality
factor" could be used to identify them. His suggested rule of "lower of standard
distortion factor or materiality factor" may become generally accepted by the
profession.
Setting Standards
In response to the problem of whether the profession can set standards for
judging significant distortion and/or materiality, Mr. Holmes implies that it
might be possible to establish standards for the former. But he says, "It may
be said that any decision by an accountant as to materiality in a particular case
is always correct short of a court of law." It is hard to believe that a materiality
decision is correct just because it has not been challenged and settled in court.
If so, how do we explain the situation where one qualified accountant, after
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giving consideration to all surrounding circumstances says an item is material
while an equally qualified accountant in the same situation says it is not material.
Both decisions cannot be correct. Probably what he means is that until a court
has decided a case involving materiality no one knows for sure what the legal
answer is. That situation—difference of opinions (based primarily upon judgment) of company accountants, independent auditors, SEC, courts, security
analysts, and others—stresses the need for more objective guidelines for making
materiality decisions as well as decisions related to significant errors.
If this need is urgent, should the accounting profession undertake to establish acceptable standards to guide the accountant in his distortion/materiality
decisions? Can such standards be set? I wish to give an affirmative response
to each question and would like to express my belief as to the type and form of
such standards and to recommend a general approach on how to set them.
The errors referred to when attempting to determine if their existence
significantly distorts financial statements include errors in recording amounts
(or failure to record), errors in statement presentation (e.g., wrong classification
of an item or failure to set it out separately), and failure to disclose pertinent
information (such as the existence of a contingent liability). It is to be recognized
that some errors, because of their nature are not subject to being judged by a
significant distortion factor. The answer to the question of how large an error
may be before it results in significant distortion may be based on a relative
amount, expressed percentagewise with upper and lower limits. Suppose that,
for a particular type of error, the most relevant base for judging significant distortion is average net income. The primary standard distortion factor could be
expressed, for example, as 7%—10% of average net income. An error above
10% should be considered as significant, and one below 7% as not significant,
unless the accountant can justify departure from this guideline. The gray area
(7% to 10%) recognizes that no attempt should be made to set an exact dividing
line between significant and insignificant errors. A precedent for setting this
type of guideline is found in the Committee on Accounting Procedure pronouncement that in the case of stock dividends, retained earnings should be
charged for par (or other legal capital base) for large dividends and charged
with market price of the stock for small dividends. The Committee gave a
dividend rate range of 20% to 25% as a basis for distinguishing between large
and small stock dividends.
For a given instance of an error it is usually necessary to recognize that the
significance of an item may have to be judged on two or more bases. A guideline
for each base should be established (e.g., 12%—15% of stockholders' equity,
9%—12% of current assets, etc.). An error (or accumulation of errors) would
be considered insignificant only if it was found to be insignificant by each of
the tests applied.
I suggest that some board, such as the newly approved Financial Accounting Standards Board, should be responsible for determining which situations
involving errors should have significant distortion factors set for them and it
should establish upper and lower limits of the factor in each case. The board
need not undertake to study the entire problem of significant distortion as one
project with the hopes of coming up with a pronouncement covering the entire
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field. Instead, a study resulting in a pronouncement could be made of each type
of significant distortion, each taken one at a time.
The board, using questionnaires and personal interviews, could identify the
most frequently found instances on which accountants have found it necessary
to make a significant distortion decision, could determine bases and percentages
that have been used in actual practice, and could, after presenting an exposure
draft based on the study, come up with guidelines for making a decision related
to the type of error in question. Instances of a professional organization or a
governmental agency providing numerical guidelines for decision making are not
unique. Many examples of this practice are found in APB Opinions and SEC
Regulations.
Materiality Standards
But what about errors that are insignificant, but which might be considered
as material such that under the existing circumstances they would influence the
action or opinion of the reasonably prudent investor, etc.? If the importance of
an error is to be determined by Mr. Holmes' rule of "lower of significant distortion factor or materiality factor," there should be some way of determining
the latter measure. Mr. Holmes correctly says "we have a way to go before we
come close to standardizing that." It is certainly recognized that considerable
judgment by the accountant is necessary to decide whether an error or other
item would likely influence or mislead an informed reader.
Factors to be considered in making a materiality decision may be of a
quantitative nature or of a non-quantitative nature or both. The accountant's
judgment may be the sole basis for determining materiality if factors to be considered are non-quantitative. However, even in that situation, a standard may
provide that the mere existence of an item or circumstance should require its
disclosure or special reporting. For most materiality decisions involving accounting (quantitative) data, it should be possible to set standards in somewhat the
same form as those suggested to provide guidelines for judging significant distortion. Some of these standards could be different in two respects. They could
require use of a different base or have a different border zone.
For example, in his recent Journal of Accountancy article, Mr. Holmes referred to a recommendation by a well-known analyst that materiality of an error
in earnings "be based on the percent of change from the prior year rather than
the percent of net income."
In many instances, it may be possible to use the same base for a materiality
factor—but to set different percentages for the border zone than were set for
the significant distortion factor. For example, if the investor likely would be
sensitive to a change in trend of earnings, the standard distortion guideline could
be reduced by a certain number of percentage points (hereinafter called points)
to provide new limits for judging materiality. Additional circumstances may be
found in a particular company such that an error would be considered material
for decision and analytical purposes even though it would not result in significantly distortedfinancialstatements. For each type of circumstance a certain
number of points could be set as a basis for lowering the guidelines for judging
significant distortion to give guidelines to be used to judge materiality. This
procedure is somewhat in line with the thinking expressed in Mr. Holmes' paper
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when he says, "Suppose we establish a 10 per cent factor for the income statement, and in a particular case the company is on the verge of breaking through
a 'times interest' coverage factor affecting its bondholders where a 5 per cent
change in income would spell the difference between interest covered and interest
not covered. In this case the 10 per cent standard distortion factor might, in some
situations, give way to the 5 per cent materiality factor." As Mr. Holmes suggests, circumstances which would cause the materiality factor to be higher should
be ignored. Of those circumstances which would cause the materiality factor to
be lower, the one which causes the standard distortion factor to be lowered by
the greatest number of points should be used to obtain guidelines for judging
materiality. As an alternate to using points for adjusting a significant distortion
factor to obtain a materiality factor, link relatives may be used. For example,
the guideline for judging significant distortion may be 8% to 11% of income
in some cases. The existence of an unusual circumstance may require a "70%
adjustment factor" which would result in the guideline for judging materiality
becoming 5.6% to 7.7% (8% X 70% to 11% X 70%). If appropriate, more than
one adjustment factor could be used in this link relative.
A study of all major distortion/materiality problems and the issuing of
recommended guidelines for each will take several years. In the meantime, any
issued guideline can be revised as it may become appropriate.
Mr. Holmes implies that it is possible to establish standards to measure significant distortion when he says, "My rule of 'lower of standard distortion factor
or materiality factor' simplifies the problem at least 50 per cent." That belief
certainly seems to be a reasonable one. Although I agree with him that the
problem of determining materiality is a much more difficult one, it does seem
that guidelines could be provided which would simplify the problem another
20 to 25 per cent.
Benefits
The establishment of guidelines with border zones would provide a tentative
answer to a distortion/materiality decision. These benefits should result:
1. The guidelines should be the basis for settling a disagreement on
the subject between the company and the independent auditor. The
burden of proof is on the one departing from the guideline. The
auditor would be much more inclined to "stick to his guns" if his
decision agrees with the guidelines.
2. As Mr. Holmes says of court cases, "A judge would find a 'standard
of significant distortion' set by the accounting profession a useful
starting point in arriving at his decision in a matter involving
materiality."
3. An Ethics Committee would have a better basis for making a decision.
4. The use of established guidelines should help close the credulity gap
which exists in the minds of many readers who see two qualified
accountants making opposite decisions. Statements should be more
useful with controversial items handled on a uniform basis.
Mr. Holmes raises the question, "If we adopt standards of significance, how
do we police our standards?" That question could be asked about the enforcement of any pronouncement or generally accepted accounting principle. For82

tunately, most accountants are ethical and would try to make a correct decision
on a difficult problem if they have some guideline for doing so.

Summary
I wish to commend Mr. Holmes on his very interesting and challenging
paper. I agree with most of what he has said. I have tried to show how it would
be possible to carry out some of his suggestions, especially those related to the
establishment of significant distortion standards. I admit that I feel more
optimistic than he and other accountants, as to the practicality of putting the
process of making materiality decisions on a more objective basis.
I hope that, as a result of hearing Mr. Holmes' paper and his comments and
participating in the discussion which follows, you will want to encourage the
development of guidelines to help in the exercise of judgment in making materiality decisions.
Is there merit in trying to set standards? I think so. Will it be an impossible task? Difficult, but not impossible. Will the accounting profession rise
to the challenge? I have confidence that it will.
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6
Toward a Philosophy of Auditing
R. K. Mautz
Ernst & Ernst (formerly of University of Illinois)
Some may be wondering what more anyone can possibly have to say who
has already used two hundred and forty-eight pages of fairly fine print to discuss
the philosophy of auditing. This troubles me a little also. The assigned topic
may imply that all those pages didn't take us in the right direction. But there
are also some advantages in the wording of my assignment. "Toward" is a
vague kind of direction, so with such a guide one might be excused if he appears
to wander somewhat, and "philosophy" is a word subject to varying interpretation as well.
To refresh myself, I referred to my dictionary and found the following
definition of "philosophy":
1) The inquiry into the most comprehensive principles of reality in
general, or of some limited sector of it, such as human knowledge or
human values
2) The love of wisdom, and the search for it.
3) A philosophical system; also, treatise on such a system.
4) The general laws that furnish the rational explanation of anything:
the philosophy of banking.
5) Practical wisdom; fortitude, as in enduring reverses and suffering.
And then two definitions noted as "archaic":
6) Reasoned science; a scientific system: natural philosophy.
7) The sciences as formerly studied in the universities.
This provides quite a range doesn't it? An attempt to establish a fairly specific
or limited topic with no more boundaries than those provides so little restriction
that almost anything qualifies.
I have tried to reduce it to reasonable dimensions by using my earlier work
with Hussein Sharaf as a base, and by trying to tie to what appear to be some
current problems. The result combines two quite different kinds of efforts; first
an attempt to develop a concept of responsibility that meshes with, or at least is
not in conflict with, the concepts of evidence, due audit care, fair presentation,
independence, and ethical conduct, which we explored in our Philosophy; second, an emphasis, using a "practical wisdom" approach, on something of a personal philosophy for auditors, that is, a way of viewing what our essential responsibilities as auditors are. Thus, the paper centers on two major questions:
1) To whom are we responsible?
2) For what are we responsible?
85

To Whom Are We Responsible?
The Traditional View. Two conflicting views appear to exist. Traditionally, auditors have considered themselves responsible to the client company as
represented by its management. Auditing engagements have come primarily
through management. It is the management of the company that makes the
arrangements with the auditor to provide audit service. If one goes back far
enough, he finds ownership and management identified in the owner-managed
company. As companies grew larger and the idea of professional management
took hold, a separation between ownership and management appeared, a separation to which many independent auditors may have given less attention than
desirable.
Largely ignoring that separation, auditors continued to make audit arrangements with management. At the same time, an increase in the extent of
tax and management advisory services plus the emphasis upon constructive
auditing, that is, the desire to be of positive help to the client as well as to offer
an opinion onfinancialstatements, may have led to an inadvertent identification
by independent auditors of the interests of management with the interests of the
company. In some cases, perhaps in many, this resulted in efforts to be of as
much assistance to the management of client companies as possible.
In many engagements, management is the only interest in the company
with which the independent auditor has significant contact. True, the auditor
may be invited to the annual meeting of the shareholders, but in appearing there
his position is likely to be as an aid to management to answer questions by
shareholders and to strengthen the representations of management about the
reliability of the financial statements. Certainly in closing conferences on independent audits, unless the company has an audit committee composed of nonofficer directors, any discussions of accounting problems are likely to be settled
between management and the auditor. Insofar as auditor-client relationships are
concerned, in many cases one has difficulty in distinguishing these from auditormanagement relationships.
A Competing View. Recently, however, quite a different point of view has
been expressed. It may best be summarized, perhaps, in the expression, "The
public is the accountant's only client in the world of today." This assertion
recognizes a much larger responsibility for independent accountants—and, indeed,
a different role for them. It recognizes that there are many users and uses of
accounting data, and and that many of those users must be regarded as noninsiders. Public shareholders, creditors who are not represented directly on the
board of directors, potential shareholders, financial analysts and fund managers,
representatives of labor unions, government planners who rely upon financial
statement data as a basis for their prognostications, and members of the general
public, all have an interest in financial statements. Yet many of these have no
way of assuring themselves that the financial data presented to them are useful
or reliable other than to depend upon the services of independent certified public
accountants as expressed in audit opinions. This leads some writers to contend
that the dependence of these people on CPAs creates a client-type relationship
between the auditor and the public.
Those who emphasize this new and expanded role for independent auditors
are quick to point out that financial statement data are an important basis for
1
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resource allocation and that the social importance of the nation's resource allocation is such that the work of accountants must be considered to have a strong
public interest. They argue that although the audited company pays the bill,
the accountant's responsibility runs more to the public and to those outside the
company than to the company's management.
Which view is right? There is a great deal of difference philosophically,
and I think practically as well, in this emphasis on the public service aspects
rather than the client-management aspects of audit responsibility. Let us turn
first to an inquiry as to the nature of the client-professional relationship in general. Perhaps we can find some indications here that will help us come to a
conclusion.
Nature of the Client-Professional Relationship. With only unusual exceptions, the services of professionals, whether accountants, lawyers, doctors, architects, or others, are obtained on the initiative of the client who selects the professional, has some control over the scope of the engagement, and can terminate
the relationship at will. The professional has a direct, contractual relationship
with the client and owes the client a degree of loyalty that requires him to
resign the engagement if he cannot avoid conflict between the client's interests
and the interests of anyone else to whom the professional has a competing
responsibility. We find this, for example, in the lawyer's refusal to serve contesting clients and in our own rules about confidentiality.
In the typical situation, the client who has selected the professional compensates him for his work. The relationship is not exactly an employer and
employee relationship although there are some similarities. The professional
maintains that his expertise not only qualifies him to make independent decisions
about the method of accomplishing his objectives, but requires him to establish
and maintain a degree of independence from his client in order to be of maximum
service. Thus, he is willing to discuss the scope of the engagement in broad
general terms but refuses to be limited by a specification of detailed procedures
imposed on him by the client.
By no stretch of the imagination does "the public is our only client" notion
fit this pattern. Members of the public do not choose the independent auditor,
they have no control over the scope of the engagement, they cannot terminate the
engagement, nor do they compensate the auditor for his services.
But, then, neither does the notion that management is the auditor's client
fit the situation either. In some cases, a company's management may indeed
select the auditor, discuss with him the extent of his examination, make arrangements for compensation, and may even be in a position to terminate the examination. But, in so doing, management operates not as an independent user
of the auditor's services, but as a representative of the company. It is the company's funds that compensate the auditor, not the management's. Other interests
in the company require that the services of the auditor be obtained, and they
benefit from those services as much as does management. In more and more
cases we see evidence of this relationship as independent auditors are elected, or at
least ratified, at shareholder's meetings, and as audit committees made up of nonofficer directors work closely with the independent auditors in the development
of audit programs and review of the auditor's conclusions.
Ultimately, it is the shareholders who are "the company." Either directly
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by them or through their representatives, independent auditors are selected, instructed, compensated, and, if necessary, the audit relationship terminated.
As with the work of other types of professionals, a CPA's services are
beneficial to people other than his direct client; they are something of a social
good. The nature of his service induces others to rely onfinancialinformation,
and such reliance leads to financial decisions. If the service is found to be misleading or substandard, a liability on the part of the auditor to others who are
not directly his clients may result. CPAs are not the only professionals to face
such a possibility. It is not unheard of, for example, for the relatives of a deceased
patient to sue the doctor, or for the relatives of victims in a building failure to
sue the engineer or architect.
The fact that some type of obligation runs from the professional to people
other than the professional's client is not the same thing as establishing a client
relationship, however real that obligation may be. If an expression like "the
public is our only client" is intended to remind us of this kind of relationship
and of the social responsibility of professionals in general, one cannot quarrel
with it. However, as a statement of audit responsibility, it is grossly in error and
at odds with reality. Further, it may well be a virtual invitation to those who
would impute additional responsibility to public accountants.
Some there are in the profession who feel that the independent auditor's
burdens are already overwhelming in their potential impact and out of proportion
to what he can bear. An open invitation to an unknown number of people with
whom he has no direct relationship to consider themselves to be his client with
the rights and privileges thus implied borders on the reckless.
The Auditor's Varying Responsibilities. To follow this up a little, note that
the CPA has responsibilities to a variety of interests and these vary in extent and
nature. He is responsible to:
1) Shareholders. Here the client relationship is at its strongest. He owes
to the shareholders his primary loyalty including the duty of maintaining confidential anything that would work an injury to their best
interests. [But see (2) and (5).]
2) Management. The CPA has a derivative responsibility to management. The interests of management in the CPA's activities derive
from its position as the authorized representative of the shareholders.
To the extent that management's requests to the auditor benefit shareholders and do not infringe on the auditor's necessary independence,
the auditor should consider them. Improper activities by management, that is, those which injure the interests of the shareholders,
are diametrically opposed to those which benefit shareholders.
3) Creditors. Two kinds of creditors can be distinguished: those with
a presentfinancialinterest and commitment to the company and those
with only a potential interest. Surely the auditor's responsibility
should not be the same for these. In the one case, there is a real existing financial commitment; in the other there is no more than a possible commitment. Reality and possibility are not the same. A major
loan by a bank may be so important to the company and to the bank
that all parties at interest agree the bank's relationship is such that it
is to have periodic reports of information not provided to others. A
contention that such a creditor should be considered to have no rights
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to information any greater than the rights of potential minor trade
creditors is to ignore both reality and equity.
4) Potential shareholders. Like potential creditors and for the same
reasons, potential investors have a claim on the auditors but a more
limited one than that of present creditors and investors. To potential
investors the auditor owes the responsibility of professional quality
work in his examination of financial statements and the opinions he
issues thereon. Potential investors have the right to rely on the auditor's opinion and to the extent that it is unreliable because of his
substandard work they may have some cause for action against him.
They do not have any right to instruct the auditor, to make specific
demands upon him, or to influence his selection.
5) General public. If the general public has an interest in the work of
auditors separate from that of potential creditors and investors, it
must be that they expect the auditor, as a licensed and acknowledged
professional, to have appropriate consideration for the public good in
all that he does. As a minimum this would mean that the auditor
would provide no support of any kind for illegal acts or their concealment.
Conflicting Responsibilities. It is not difficult to conceive of situations when
the independent auditor's responsibility to one of these interests might conflict
with his responsibility to another. Let us take an extreme case, one in which
the management of the company has engaged in an illegal action for the benefit
of shareholders. In The Wreck of the Penn Central, its authors point out that
the Penn Central management was unlawfully involved in attempting to establish an air transportation system in violation of the 1958 Federal Aviation Act
which prohibits rail carriers from doing so. Later, the company was fined a total
of seventy thousand dollars, allegedly the second largest fine in CAB history.
Now without expressing any views at all on responsibility for discovering
such a development, let us assume that independent auditors learned of this
activity, knew of its illegality, but, because of their ethical rule requiring that
they keep all matters confidential, felt constrained to make no public mention
of this. Given the size of the Penn Central, it is quite likely that the potential
fine would be considered immaterial. What should the independent auditors
do in this situation?
Does the established professional rule requiring confidentiality define appropriate conduct, or can society expect and require something more of auditors?
Let me suggest as a tentative conclusion that in a situation of this kind, one in
which a company's management is clearly in violation of the law, that management has little, if any, right to claim the loyalty of the auditor. In such cases,
may the auditor's loyalty run to another audience? May not society expect the
CPA, as part of his professional responsibility, to have concern for all interests,
to take into account the specific circumstances, and to give wise professional
consideration to the relative rights of all those interests? No single set of rules
can cover all possible cases of conflict among those interests. The auditor must
have in mind certain general principles regarding the nature of his responsibilities
to each of these interests. Given those principles, he must then be prepared to
apply "situation ethics" in arriving at a solution to any given conflict.
Summary of Auditor Responsibilities. To whom then is an auditor responsible? To a variety of interests and in a variety of ways. His first responsibility
3
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runs to the present shareholders of the company under examination. In serving
them adequately he should supply whatever service to management that is requested and can be provided without violation of his obligation to others. To
those others, an auditor has an obligation to perform in accordance with reasonable professional standards and to refuse to condone any actions that are in conflict with established laws or accepted moral standards. This may require that
he withdraw from an engagement if he learns of illegal or even immoral acts.
In my opinion it would not require that he hold a press conference to disclose
it to the world.
My conclusion is that management is not the auditor's client. Neither is
the general public. To steer a course that gives proper respect to the relative
rights of all the several interests in the auditor's work is not an easy one, but it
is the kind of responsibility that can rightfully be expected of professionals.
4

For What Are We Responsible?
This question is inseparable from the preceding question because in discussing the extent of responsibility which auditors have to the various interests in
the company, the nature of that responsibility could not be avoided. Now, however, I would like to explore the question from a different point of view. Let me
suggest that the independent auditor is responsible to all interests in his work for:
1) Professional competence.
2) Independence.
3) Authority.
Professional competence has two aspects: technical competence and "social
competence." Technical competence includes (1) a knowledge of accounting principles, (2) an understanding of the theory of evidence, which covers the matter
of auditing standards, auditing techniques and procedures, and their application
in specific situations, (3) an understanding of internal control, and (4) the
procedural expertise to perform the steps in an audit program, prepare adequate
work papers, develop audit programs, and review the work of subordinates. These
are all matters which have been discussed elsewhere and to which I will devote
no further attention now.
The Responsibility for Social Competence. Another type of competence at
least hinted at in my preceding comments might be described as "social competence." It includes at least three aspects. First, the socially competent auditor
must appreciate the role of auditing in the economy. He must accept his task
as something more than just getting his client past the Securities and Exchange
Commission requirements. He must view his role in the broad sense as an essential step in the allocation of resources and as a factor in the financial decisions
of unknown people and organizations. The auditor has an obligation of some
sort to all who benefit from allocation of the nation's resources through the functioning of the investment market mechanism, an obligation to avoid any sympathies with the company's management or its shareholders that would permit
him to find unrealistic financial presentations to be fair.
He must constantly balance his responsibility to the shareholders against his
responsibility to society generally. In the same way, he must recognize that a
great many individuals stake their personal fortunes on investments in the com90

pany. He also has a responsibility to balance his obligation to present shareholders against his obligation to potential shareholders and to avoid any unfairness in serving either one of these at the expense of the other.
Social Competence and Competition. Another aspect of social competence
is that it is unavoidably affected by one's attitude toward competition. In this
country we are strong believers in the benefits of competition. Those benefits
run to the services of professional practitioners as well as to business activities.
But like so many forces, competition is a good thing only within reason. No, I
am not about to take a position on competitive bidding. My interest is of
another kind.
Public accounting is a highly competitive profession. On the one hand,
this competition undoubtedly urges both individual members and firms in the
profession to higher standards of performance, in their desires to retain and
attract clients, than might otherwise exist. Unfortunately, an opposite result is
also possible. The competitive pressures upon independent CPAs as company
managements "shop for accounting principles" could, at least in some cases, result in lower rather than higher standards. If we look closely at the nature of
competition among public accounting firms we see that it can be effective on three
different levels: at the levels of price, of principles, and of service.
Competition on the basis of price is in some ways unfortunate, but it is impossible to avoid. For instance, price competition is within the scope of what
the Department of Justice considers desirable, as indicated by recent actions of
the Department.
Competition in the matter of accounting principles, if deliberate, should be
regarded as almost unforgivable. To the extent that it does occur, it probably
is not intentional but rather is an unintended and often unrecognized result of
trying to meet the needs of clients in the face of competition from other firms.
The ever present knowledge that there are other firms of equal prestige and status
that just might see the results of a transaction differently is a specter difficult to
shake from the minds of any who make audit decisions.
Competition on the basis of service, to the extent that we can separate
service from price and principles, is a good thing and we should be in favor of it.
Social competence requires not only that the auditor understand the nature and
influence of competition on his decisions but that he discipline himself sufficiently
to be constantly alert to its pressures.
Attitude Toward Clients. A final aspect of social competence for the independent auditor is found in his attitude toward his clients. Obviously, he has
a responsibility to them to be as efficient, effective, and helpful as he can be. In
addition, he fails them in his most important function if he is less independent
in the development of his program, in the performance of the work required
thereby, and in making audit and accounting judgments than the circumstances
require. The auditor also has a responsibility, and a very difficult one, to keep
a client's requests and demands in perspective. Certainly there are times when
a client's request must be rejected as inappropriate. To the extent that the auditor
is aware of and can remember his responsibilities to other interests, he is less
likely to accede to requests that have any taint of impropriety.
Is Audit Service an Inalienable Right? Now let me pose two questions
which I think are related and rather difficult to answer. First, does an auditor
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have a responsibility to avoid unsavory clients? Second, is everyone who needs
the services of an independent certified public accountant entitled to obtain those
services? I see these two questions to be in conflict. We have, on the one hand,
the feeling that auditors will seldom get into any kind of litigation difficulties
if they can hold their practice to seasoned and thoroughly reputable companies.
On the other hand, companies in the development stage, even those promoted
by people with a string of failures, may be considered to have some rights.
Certainly they need the services of an independent CPA if a public offering of
securities is involved in arranging financing.
One can readily argue that the best interests of the public accounting firm
would be to steer clear of any client that might possibly posefinancialdifficulties.
One can also argue that the best interests of the economy require that every
promoter be given a chance because we never know when a speculative undertaking may prove to have significant social benefits. Perhaps what we need is
something a little like the public defender role played by lawyers. Perhaps some
auditors should be designated or assigned to serve clients who otherwise would
not be able to obtain the services of a reputable firm. In such cases the "assigned"
auditor might require some special protection against litigation.
Another Aspect of Independence. Independent auditors are required to be
independent. In this tautology we find one of our most complex concepts. I do
not plan to explore it fully here. In their excellent work, Messrs. Carey and
Doherty distinguish the self-reliance required of every professional from the
special meaning of independence to the CPA. Both Mr. Higgins and Mr.
Blough have emphasized the difference between real independence and apparent independence and found both of them significant. Sharaf and I distinguished practitioner independence from profession independence.
To complicate things a little further, let me experiment with two terms
which are useful in pointing up another problem related to independence.
"Operational independence" was used in our earlier work to describe the kinds
of freedom which an auditor must have in developing his audit program, in
performing the various verification procedures required by it, and in preparing
his report. Without these freedoms he cannot be considered independent. "Attitudinal independence," that is, the state of mind which leads an auditor to be
objective in all his decisions, is no more than another name for the traditional
"state of mind" description of independence already so well expressed in our
professional literature. To be truly independent, an auditor must have both
operational independence and attitudinal independence.
Operationally, the freedom to develop a program, to perform it without
interference, and to report on the results of that performance is not enough. One
must also have sufficient knowledge to utilize that freedom effectively. The less
one knows about an industry or about a company the more he must depend upon
others for guidance. An auditor unacquainted with a specialized industry or
an unfamiliar client may have to ask questions and depend upon the responses
he gets to those questions in order to make any progress whatever. Such dependence may infringe on his operational independence as effectively as would
deliberate interference by company officers or employees. The less one knows
about a company or an industry, the more he must depend upon others. The
more he knows the less dependent he is. Some degree of intimate knowledge is
5
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therefore important to independence. One can therefore argue that the performance of management services is directly beneficial to the auditor in that it
helps him to attain a degree of understanding and knowledge that he might not
be able to obtain in any other way.
Apparently opposed to this is the position we took in our Philosophy that
auditor participation in the performance of management services may infringe
upon the auditor's attitudinal independence. Attitudinal independence requires
that the auditor avoid identification of his goals with those of the company and
its officers. Any activities that bring him into a more intimate relationship with
the company or its personnel may lead him to identify with them, to sympathize
with their problems, to view the welfare of the company and the attainment of
its objectives as taking precedence over his responsibilities to others. Such
identification unavoidably infringes upon attitudinal independence.
Which side do you wish to take? I find myself torn between the two. My
good friend, Walter Frese, argues with me that the performance of management
services is desirable because it helps the auditor to understand the position of
management and therefore to avoid that degree of dependence which ignorance
strengthens. My personal inclination is to argue strongly in favor of maintaining
attitudinal independence for the auditor and requiring that the extent of audit
work be strengthened or expanded sufficiently that true operational independence is possible.
Audit Authority. Those of you who have lasted this far may have noted
that I seem to be getting myself into deeper and deeper trouble as I proceed.
This last item continues that unfortunate trend. In responding to the question,
"For what are we responsible?" I introduced the idea of authority. The independent auditor is responsible for the exercise of authority. I must confess to
some reservations about this choice of words, but at the moment have no better
one to offer.
Authority has been defined as "the power to command and enforce
obedience." Given this definition, what authority does the individual CPA
have in the performance of an audit? Our conclusion must be that his authority
is tenuous at best. This follows from the nature of the client relationship as well
as from our insistence that the financial statements are the client's. As pointed
out earlier, the CPA-client relationship is a voluntary one and can be suspended
by either the client or the CPA. Hence, if the client feels that he is subject to
too much control or authority by his independent auditor, he can terminate the
relationship. The initiative is with him to continue or to terminate. Likewise,
the fact that compensation flows from the client to the CPA almost unavoidably
has some impact. In addition, we have established the position that the financial
statements are representations of the client and, as such, that he should have
the final decision as to what they will or will not say. This combination of
circumstances does not necessarily rob the independent auditor of all "power to
command and enforce obedience," but it serves to reduce that authority in a
good many individual cases.
Now let us turn to the authority of the CPA profession. Here we find a
considerable degree of authority. To the extent that the Securities and Exchange
Commission requires that the opinion of an independent CPA accompany the
financial statements of a company filing with the Commission, and the listing
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requirements of the stock exchanges call for the opinion of an independent CPA,
companies are subject to the audit requirements of the profession. I recall a
former member of the Securities and Exchange Commission stating that the accounting profession was so vital to business that business could not get along without it. Can you imagine what would happen to a major company if an accounting
treatment which its management insisted upon was considered unsatisfactory by
all CPAs? There seems little doubt but that the company would have to give.
To repeat, then, for the sake of emphasis, the CPA profession has considerable authority. The individual CPA seems to have very little. Therein
lies a difficulty.
Perhaps we should give some attention to the question of whether it is desirable that the independent CPA have greater authority. Would we be better off
if a company, having once committed itself to a given CPA, had no choice but to
accept the CPA's decisions with respect to the presentation of financial statements?
My response to that question is that we would not be better off. I believe
strongly that the financial statements must be the company's and that the company
should have the freedom to present those financial statements in any way that
it pleases. The auditor who finds himself in disagreement with the company's
presentation should be expected to so state in his opinion. Is it not conceivable
that the company and its auditors could have an honest difference of opinion,
one that even after careful examination of all the facts and a thorough understanding of the principles involved might be irreconcilable? In such a situation,
are those who use the financial statements better served by a forced agreement,
one in which either the views of one or the other dominate or a compromise
position is worked out, or would the users be better served by having both presentations made available to them with an explanation of the difference?
What I am getting around to saying is that the time honored policy by the
SEC of requiring that qualifications and exceptions be removed from audit
opinions may be working to the disadvantage rather than to the advantage of
financial statement readers. If the requirement of a clean opinion does force
compromise in some cases, if it reduces the total amount of information that
otherwise would be available to the readers of financial statements, if it submerges
actual and perhaps even justified differences between auditors and company
management, is it a good policy?
The purpose of the SEC's policy, of course, is to strengthen the independence
of the accountant, and certainly this is important. Can other ways be found to
strengthen that independence without submerging useful information?
One source of authority is fear. If I am afraid of a physical beating, I may
choose to obey the commands given to me. A company's management may fear
an open comparison of its views with those of its auditors. Fear of the withdrawal
of its auditor from the engagement may also be effective, particularly if this
requires an explanation of the differences between auditor and management at
a shareholder's meeting.
At the present time, the auditor's alternatives are limited. If he has a real
difference with management, he must take an exception which may well cost
him the client and which he has no real opportunity to explain or defend.
Alternatively, he can withdraw from the engagement, but here he faces the
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same problem in that no one will ever know his reasons. If we could establish his
right to report independently of the management, and perhaps even establish a
requirement that differences between them must be publicly disclosed, would not
his alternatives, his independence, and perhaps even his authority be improved?
Conclusion
By way of conclusion let me confess that for few of the questions raised
here today do I even pretend to myself to have final answers. It would be very
useful if some authoritative study group would undertake to establish for us the
nature and extent of the independent CPA's responsibility to each one of the
several interests in financial statements. The tendency to state that "the public
is our only client" is a most unfortunate kind of expression, if for no other reason
than it implies that we are thoroughly confused about who our client is and
what our responsibilities are. It would also be helpful if we could have some
extended discussion of whether what I have called social competence is really
relevant to the independent CPA's activities.
Perhaps you have had from me very little in the way of "practical wisdom"
and a good deal in the way of speculation. I leave it to you to judge. Until we
can answer to whom and for what we are responsible, however, we have not
advanced very far "toward a philosophy of auditing."
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Discussant's Response to
Toward a Philosophy of Auditing
Henry P. Hill
Price Waterhouse & Co.
One of the distinguishing differences between academicians and practitioners
is illustrated in this paper. The academic oriented tends to speak in abstractions,
searching for generalizations of theory in abstract terms whereas the practitioner
tends to use concrete terms and concrete illustrations.
Our chairman was aware of this, I'm sure, when he selected the preparer
and discussant of a paper on the topic Toward a Philosophy of Auditing. The
topic lends itself to a discussion of abstracts, and Dr. Mautz has followed the
route that might be expected and has given us a paper inquiring into the theory
behind auditing. He has also done a job that someone with a long practicing
background like mine could never have done. I think, however, that what's
appropriate to inquire into is whether the presence or absence of a theory makes
any difference.
I have heard for some time the critics of the accounting profession say that
accountants have no idea what the generally accepted accounting principles are
that they so glibly refer to. Now Mautz tells us that we don't have a philosophy
in support of those examinations we, again so glibly, say we have made. There's
only one more accusation that could be made against the professional auditor,
which is, "If you don't have a philosophy for your conduct or a frame of reference
for its output, why do you bother?" However, despite the inarticulateness of
most of its practicing members, there are some members of this profession of
ours who believe the independent auditor has a useful role in society—and there
are some nonaccountants who believe it, too.
Dr. Mautz addresses himself to two questions:
1. "To whom are we responsible"?
2. "For what are we responsible"?
He then proceeds to demonstrate we don't have the answer to either. Let's take
them one at a time.
To Whom Are Auditors Responsible?
First—"To whom are we responsible?" Well, to whom is anyone responsible?
Is a policeman responsible only to his lieutenant because his lieutenant
is the primary control over his paycheck?
If an airplane crash occurs, does the crew have its responsibility defined
as "Get the passengers off the seats so their blood won't stain the upholstery which belongs to the company that pays our salary"?
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Of course not! The days of supremacy of property over people are over.
Society imposes a responsibility on its functionaries which develops as a reaction
to individual situations. Occasionally, of course, this lack of definition backfires
as in the case of my staff assistant who laid his coat down on the subway platform
and helped an injured victim lie down on it and was sued for causing him
physical injury. But, for the most part, it works.
I must say, I am somewhat disturbed by the cynical implications I draw
from the part of the paper that discusses relations with management. In the
early part of the paper, a point is made that independent auditors may have
inadvertently identified the interests of management with the interests of the
company. I used the word "cynical" to describe the implications even though
I know from the rest of the paper and from other things Mautz has written
that cynicism was never intended. Other writers have not been so charitable,
however. Some refuse to believe to this day that one or two of us really do
believe there's such a thing as a pooling of interests or that immediate recognition is the right way to record investment credit.
I am reminded of a number of dinner table conversations that took place
in my house when my sons were approaching their teens. They centered around
just what it was that Daddy did during those daylight and evening hours when
he was away from home. One friend's father drove an airliner, another owned
a print shop, another ran a company that printed school books. Well, to describe
my excuse for living, I finally settled on this: "What I do for a living is spend
my time convincing people they ought to do some things they don't want to do."
Not very illuminating to a nine-year-old, but give me a better one.
It does emphasize, however, that the mature auditor does not make the
mistake Mautz attributes to him. He does not mistake the relative positions of
management and company. This is what we mean by independence. It's what
one of yesterday's speakers was referring to when he spoke of the need for
experience.
What this adds up to is that I, for one, don't see the need for any better
definition of audit philosophy. I don't see any pressure for improvement in
defining responsibility in the terms Bob Mautz has—i.e., to management, shareholders, or the public—debates over Ultramares notwithstanding.
For What Are Auditors Responsible?
Mautz's second question is—"For what are we responsible?"—This is the
key question if we add to it "and to what extent?" It is the key question because
a major apprehension of the accounting profession stems from the potential
assessment offinancialresponsibility against independent accountants for damages
that have no relation to any deficient action of the auditor. For example:
The stockholder who sues for his losses on a highly speculative stock
when he never opened, no less read, the prospectus.
The banker who prides himself in lending on the basis of his evaluation
of the person and then wants restitution from accountants for misstated
assets.
The director who cross-claims against the accountants for misleading
financials when he himself never really asked a question about them.
The purchaser of a company who sues the accountant on the basis of
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lack of disclosure in thefinancialstatements of facts that even a neophyte
would know enough to ask about.
And you can think of others.
We have to start thinking more in terms of responsibility to people who
are truly damaged as a result of legitimate use of the financial reports within the
purpose for which they were intended; a responsibility measured in financial
exposure commensurate with the legitimate assumption of risk. For, after all,
if the legal system demands perfection, there are only three ways for accountants
to go:
1. Become gamblers, start auditing people rather than facts, take a
chance.
2. Raise the total amount of work and the fees.
3. Look for another line of work that's safer, like sandhogging.
Synthesis
Which brings me to a startling conclusion. Despite the negative tone of
these comments, I agree with Mautz. The kind of responsibility that should
be assigned to accountants "gives proper respect to the relative rights of all the
several interests in the auditor's work." That's the "Whom."
As to the "What," I wish he had looked at this proposition: "The auditor
is responsible to see that the reader is not misled if he uses the financial statements
intelligently according to the purpose for which they were intended."
As usual, after I wrote those words down, I found that G. O. May had said
it far better long before I even found myself in the accounting profession.
I cannot believe that a law is just or can long be maintained in effect
which deliberately contemplates the possibility that a purchaser may
recover from a person from whom he has not bought, in respect of a
statement which at the time of his purchase he had not read, contained
in a document which he did not then know to exist, a sum which is not
measured by injury resulting from falsity in such statement.
Using my own, less effective, prose, "The auditor is responsible to see that
the reader is not misled if he uses the financial statements intelligently according
to the purpose for which they were intended." This statement serves to focus
on underlying audit philosophy as a means to an end and to avoid what I'm
afraid is an ever-present danger in inquiries that involve confusion of means
and ends. If an inquiry devotes itself too earnestly to a goal like that contemplated
by Mautz's paper, the effort may make the philosophy the goal rather than the
means. Should we let that occur, we may someday allow our standards to be
governed by the means, i.e., the philosophy, rather than the end, that is, the
attesting offinancialstatements.
This is a very real danger. I am already convinced that some of the assistants on our staff think the objective of their toil is to prepare audit working
papers.
Some Final Comments
So much for philosophy. I should like to put forth a few specific comments
which may serve to stimulate discussion.
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1. When we explore the nature of the client relationship, we may be
helped by the fact that originally the auditor had to be a member of
the company. That is, he was not even allowed to be independent.
What better evidence have we that the starting point was responsibility to shareholders. All else is an extension.
2. The auditor's primary responsibility to his client's management is to
assist the management to perform properly its responsibility to report
to shareholders. To the extent this results in improvements in accounting procedures, etc., it falls within the audit function. Other
services may be performed by accounting firms, but just because they
are accounting firms does not make the services auditing. Whether
accounting firms should be limited to auditing is another question.
3. The primary relationship with shareholders is not confidentiality. It
is anything but. Full disclosure and confidentiality are irreconcilable.
Obviously, a selection has to be made when a conflict arises, but
there's no doubt if full and fair disclosure needed to keep financials
from being misleading is pitted against confidentiality, which has
to win.
4. Every time there is a temptation to chastise an auditor for not telling
something, ask this question: "What has it to do with the audited
financial statements?" You'll be surprised how many questions go
away. Maybe it was morally reprehensible for the Penn Central to
get into Executive Airlines. I don't need to pass that judgment, however, if I know (as Mautz points out) the fine of $70,000 is not material. The real question is whether the discontinuance of the air
transportation business portends a future change infinancialposition
and results of operations of the company. That's what the auditor
talks about and that's what the auditor's responsibility is all about.
5. Finally, let me answer this question that Mautz raises: "Does everyone have a right to an audit?" Well, my answer is that everyone has
a right to medical treatment except the guy who's trying to shoot the
doctor. There are a lot of people around whose objectives toward the
auditor are not much better. I certainly can't see any philosophy that
says they have a right to an audit.
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Future Directions for Auditing Research
Douglas R. Carmichael
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
In mid-1969 the AICPA's auditing research program was officially launched.
For three years I have attempted to plan and initiate a program to provide the
Committee on Auditing Procedure, the Institute membership and others interested in the advancement of auditing theory and practice with evidence and
information useful in reaching sound decisions on auditing problems. A numbered series of monographs has been authorized and additional staff have been
devoted to the effort. We are also beginning to contract for studies by outside
researchers. Since we firmly believe that a researcher should have his own independent commitment to a project, we would prefer to find researchers interested in, and working on, a subject rather than commission an individual with
no demonstrated interest in the area. The main purposes of this paper are to
identify major research problems, or topics, which will be significant in the
future; indicate the factors which should be considered in approaching these
topics to specify the problem and select a research method; and reflect upon the
relationships which should be achieved among research, theory, and practice.
An underlying purpose of the paper is to interest qualified individuals in conducting research for the AICPA's auditing research program.
1

The Relation of Practice, Theory, and Research in Auditing
Research is the meeting ground of theory and practice for any applied field
of knowledge. In its most general form, the research process consists of the
identification and measurement of variables that are relevant to a given problem
or phenomenon and determination of the nature and strength of the interrelationships among these variables. The research process cannot ignore either
theory or practice.
Auditing Theory and Practice. The link between theory and practice, however, exists apart from their intersection in the realm of research. In a treatise
on accounting theory, A. C. Littleton offered the following observation on this
interrelationship:
Practice is fact and action; theory consists of explanation and reasons. Theory states the reason why accounting action is what it is,
why it is not otherwise, or why it might well be otherwise.
2

While the need for and desirability of a theory of accounting have been
well accepted for a respectable length of time, the subject of auditing, until recently, has remained for many a completely practical field of knowledge. From
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the "theory as explanation" viewpoint, there has been a steady development of
auditing theory on a piecemeal basis. Examples of this piecemeal development
include the recognition of auditing standards and their differentiation from procedures, and explication of the nature and classification of evidential matter.
However, a theory is something more than discrete bits of explanation;
theory is comprehensive explanation. A theory of auditing should be an organized and systematized body of knowledge of the field of auditing, which identifies
the variables of auditing practice and explains their importance, interrelationships, and implications.
At the close of their treatise on auditing theory, Mautz and Sharaf made the
following observation on the interrelationship of theory and practice.
In the past, auditing has been conceived only as a practical subject
with little need for or possibility of any underlying theory. Thus attention has been given to its practical applications to the almost complete
exclusion of theoretical considerations. We hope we have indicated
the close connection between the theory and practice of auditing, for
we are convinced that the only sure solution to practical problems is
through the development and use of theory.
3

Thus Mautz and Sharaf propose a relationship of interdependence for auditing
theory and practice. Adequate consideration cannot be given to the practical
applications of auditing without regard to the supporting theory. On the other
hand, auditing theory developed to the exclusion of practical considerations cannot fulfill its primary justification for existence.
Mautz and Sharaf characterize the field of auditing knowledge as
. . . a rigorous field of study able to make a substantial contribution to
our economic life and one requiring considerable attention not only to
the development of a systematic and satisfactory theory but to the application of such a theory to its practical problems.
4

Since auditing is an applied field, its ultimate contribution must be made at the
practice level. Thus, the ultimate test of auditing theory is its application to the
practical problems of auditing.
Auditing Research. The juncture of theory and practice becomes most apparent and important in auditing research. In broad outline, research relies
upon practice to identify problems or phenomena for study and it relies upon
theory to guide the complex task of organizing the facts and actions of practice
into a systematic pattern. Without a scheme of organization, the real significance
of the collected observations of practice might never surpass the level of description. Without the direction of practice to important problems the significance
of theory might not escape the level of trivia. Thus, research brings theory into
contact with practice for the purpose of expanding knowledge and, in the process, research both explains practice and heightens the impact of theory. These,
then, are the general relationships of practice, theory, and research.
Research in Auditing
The above relationships may be highlighted in more detail by a more intensive examination of research. The research process in its ideal form has been
described as follows:
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First, the scientist notes some phenomenon of interest (Y); in the
case of social science, Y is some aspect of human behavior. Then he
notes variation in the phenomenon: sometimes Y is present, sometimes
not; or sometimes Y exists at a high intensity while it has lower intensity
at other times. The scientist then begins a search for concomitants
(X's) of the phenomenon Y; that is, he tries to discover conditions (X's)
under which Y is or is not present, or conditions (X's) which vary as
Y varies. When the scientist has identified an X condition that varies
with Y, he then needs to establish whether X causes Y, Y causes X , or
X and Y both result from some other phenomenon.
While the general procedure can be stated in a fairly simple form,
the research process by which the procedure is carried out is often
complicated, requiring elaborate procedures for measuring phenomena
(Y's) and associated conditions (X's) and for taking into account the
effects of other conditions (Z's).
5

Although actual research seldom follows this exact chronological sequence, that
is the logical sequence of research procedure.
For the moment let us pass the process by which a particular phenomenon
of interest is selected for study, and consider the question of research method—
measurement of variables relevant to a phenomenon and determination of their
interrelationships. A convenient scheme for classifying research methods distinguishes the methods on the basis of the type of setting within which data
may be collected. The following classification scheme is based upon the degree
of abstractness of the data collection setting.
6

I. Natural Setting—Data are obtained from real, existing situations of
the type to which the results of the study are intended to apply.
A. Surveys—Typically a random sample of a defined population to
determine the distribution of a particular characteristic—usually
attitudes, opinions, motivations, or expectations of people.
B. Field Studies—Study of a situation which includes the phenomenon of interest to observe and records the phenomenon
and its surrounding conditions in detail. This method is well
suited for exploratory research to determine major variables. In
contrast, the survey is a broader study of selected variables.
C. Field Experiments—A natural setting with some control exercised over selected major variables.
II. Abstract Setting—Data are obtained from a setting constructed by
the researcher.
A. Experimental Simulation—A created situation which is a relatively faithful representation of the natural setting to study the
activities of the participants. Such studies vary greatly in terms
of the degree offidelityto reality.
B. Laboratory Experiments—A setting which abstracts variables
from the real situation, represents them in some symbolic form,
and studies the operation in that form.
C. Computer Simulation—A closed model (mathematical) of the
situation studied; all variables are built into the model.
Since each of these methods has some disadvantages in terms of what it
cannot do as well as some advantages in terms of what it can do, the methods
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are not freely interchangeable. The particular research problem should determine
the choice of method in any given instance.
Generally, research methods with a natural setting offer less opportunity
for control of variables by the researcher than those with an abstract setting.
Consequently, in the natural setting, measurement of variables is less precise
and less certainty exists that the research results are attributable to a particular
variable. On the other band, with more abstract settings, gains in precision of
measurement and control of variables are accompanied by a loss of realism.
Since the settings are abstracted and artificial representations of the real-life
conditions under which the phenomena actually occur, more doubt surrounds
the applicability of the research results to real-life situations.
More important than considerations of realism versus precision, is the extent
of prior knowledge about the problem implied by the choice of research setting.
To use the more abstract settings, the researcher must either know or assume
that he knows a good deal more about the phenomenon of interest than with
natural settings. In the abstract setting, the researcher creates the situation and
must know what conditions need to be controlled. As the research setting becomes more abstract, the research results become more and more a function of
the structure imposed by the researcher.
Although the natural settings impose less structure on the situation, this
does not mean that no structure at all is imposed. The choice of research setting
highlights an important relationship between theory and research. When abstract settings are used, the researcher must incorporate theory in the situation
before the data are collected. In contrast, when using natural settings the researcher collects the data and then incorporates theory as he interprets the data.
Examples of Auditing Research
Some examples of existing auditing research should make the categories
distinguished in this classification of methods a little more meaningful. This
review of extant research, for convenience, begins with the more abstract settings.
To my knowledge, no computer simulations involving auditing problems have
been attempted; the most abstract setting used has been the laboratory experiment.
Behavioral Impact of Audits. Churchill, with the assistance of several others,
demonstrated that the performance of the audit function influences the people
whose activities are audited. Using laboratory experiments they have shown
that both the anticipation of an audit and the occurrence of an audit cause people
to modify their behavior. According to these experiments audits evidently exert
a positive influence on conformance with prescribed control procedures normally expected.
To conduct the experiments Churchill abstracted the key variables in an
audit and represented them symbolically in the laboratory. The subjects were
given a simple problem solving task—locating a polluting water station in a
water system represented by colored lights in a wired key-board—and a prescribed method for solving of the problem. Some groups were reviewed to see
if they complied with the prescribed solution approach and some groups were
told they would be reviewed in advance of their first attempt at solving the
problem. By ignoring the prescribed method and innovating the subjects could
solve the problem more efficiently. Thus, the key elements of an audit were
7
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present: (1) actions of the participants, (2) prescribed criteria for those actions,
and (3) a comparison of the actions and the criteria. Note that in the laboratory
experiment no attempt is made to recreate the setting of the real situation under
study.
Departure from an APB Opinion. Moving up the continuum to the less
abstract experimental simulation, a study by Purdy, Smith and Gray indicates
that implicit assumptions commonly made concerning the effect of reports on
users may not be valid. Their experimental simulation tested the visibility of
the required notice of departure from an APB Opinion. In October, 1964, the
Council of the AICPA issued a Special Bulletin stating, in part, that departures
from an APB Opinion if they have "substantial authoritative support," may
be disclosed either (1) in the auditor's report or (2) in a footnote to the financial
statements, with no qualification of the auditor's opinion. This study measured
the visibility of these two alternative methods of disclosure to financial statement users. Contrary to normal expectations, the researchers found that the
two forms of disclosure—footnote versus auditor's report—were equally visible
tofinancialstatement users.
The research method involved several groups of businessmen familiar with
financial statements—such as bankers—who were presented with a set of financial
statements accompanied by footnotes and an auditor's report. Some groups received statements disclosing the departure in a footnote while others received
statements disclosing the departure in the audit report. These subjects were
then asked questions about the statements.
In contrast to the laboratory experiment, the experimental simulation attempted to achieve some degree of fidelity to reality. Although the participants
realized that they were involved in some sort of research study, there was an
attempt to approximate the actual analysis offinancialstatements.
Confirmation of Receivables. Several field experiments have been conducted
of the audit procedure of mail confirmation. In all the studies confirmation
requests were sent to actual individuals or businesses. Thus, the setting was
natural and the control exercised by researchers involved only major variables—
the form of the confirmation request and the dollar amount of the account
balance identified in the request (two studies) or a surrogate for the balance.
Auditee Attitudes. Churchill followed his laboratory studies of the audit
process with a field study. Field interviews of people in organizations who had
experienced audits (auditees) indicated that they do not perceive the audit as
influencing their behavior, and view it primarily as a procedural check and
somewhat of a policing function. These results are in direct contrast to the
laboratoryfindingsthat audits did influence behavior.
While the conflicting results of these two studies need not concern us here,
their temporal order is of interest. The research began at the abstract setting
stage with laboratory experiments. The question I wish to raise is whether
auditing researchers should first conduct more extensive studies using a natural
setting. In the social sciences, one researcher suggested this ordered progression
in the use of research methods.
8
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If we are starting research on a relatively unexplored phenomenon,
it would seem best to start far over at the field study end of the continuum. As we learn more about the problem, we can then work with
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methods further along the continuum, with which we can gain more
precise information. Then having explored the problem with precision
and in depth, and perhaps having formulated and thoroughly manipulated a formal model, we can return toward the field study end of the
street to find out how closely our presentations fit the phenomena of the
real world.
11

This suggested order, at least, proved beneficial in a study of criteria used for
the different types of auditor's reports.
The AICPA's ARM No. 1. The study of the fourth standard of reporting
described in Auditing Research Monograph No. 1 used a natural setting—the
field study. The choice of research setting was more or less dictated by the
extent of prior knowledge of the reporting decision process. With so little prior
knowledge, an explanatory study was needed to identify the important variables.
The purpose of the study was to determine the meaning of "sufficiently material,"
the single reporting criterion offered in Chapter 10 of SAP No. 33 for distinguishing between qualified opinions and adverse opinions and disclaimers of
opinion.
It is interesting to consider how the choice of another method might have
influenced the research results. If an abstract setting, such as an experimental
simulation or a laboratory experiment, had been chosen, certain assumptions
would have been necessary in the design of the study. If "sufficiently material"
had been equated with relative magnitude, that variable would have been manipulated by varying the dollar impact of the exception. Research results would
have established relative magnitude cut-off points for distinguishing between
"material" and "sufficiently material" based on reporting decisions made by
the subjects. Note the extent to which the research results would have been
influenced by the structure imposed on the setting. On the other hand, research
results obtained by a case by case study of audit reports indicate that certain
qualitative variables seem to be more important than, or at least as important
as, the quantitative variable.
Surveys. Recently, there has been a virtual explosion of surveys dealing
with auditing topics. In fact they are too numerous to identify specifically, and
singling any one study out for attention is not essential since most accountants
are by now quite familiar with this type of research. However, far too many
of the current surveys deal with insignificant problems and, in my view, the
survey method of research is being abused today. This observation naturally
leads to the critical question: What are the significant problems which should
attract the attention of auditing researchers?
12

Recommendations for Future Research
Developments in auditing research, theory, and practice are by nature evolutionary. For example, the research reported in A R M No. 1 should serve as a
foundation, or at least provide a background, for future study of the decisionmaking process of auditors in reporting. ARM No. 1 identifies the central reporting concepts and describes the role of these concepts in reporting decisions. With
limited prior knowledge about the subject, the research method sacrificed some
precision and several questions remain to be answered. Care was taken to
obtain the data from real, existing situations of the type to which the results
106

were intended to apply. This constraint need not be applied so stringently in
future studies, and precision of measurement may be increased by using more
abstract methods—with one or two important reporting concepts isolated for
study. This approach makes possible exploration of phenomena which do not
occur frequently in practice, such as situations leading to adverse opinions. However, the reporting decision process is certainly not the only important research
topic. Many other subjects are important, some of which are outlined below.
A. Expansion of the attest function
1. Historical financial summaries: what are the minimum requirements for fair presentation?
2. Interimfinancialstatements: what evidential matter is necessary
to support an opinion, and can the evidence-gathering process be
structured to implement the continuous auditing concept?
3. Forecasts and projected financial statements: what degree of
responsibility for assumptions should the CPA assume in light
of the nature of evidence available and the comprehension capabilities of the report reader?
4. Operational auditing: what type of audit report is appropriate
and what form of evidential matter is adequate to support the
report when propriety criteria are not well formulated?
B. Refinement of auditing methods
1. Use of other experts: in what circumstances should evidential
matter include the work of other experts, such as geologists,
actuaries, lawyers, or engineers; should any reference be made to
these experts in the audit report?
2. Auditing fair value: what forms of evidential matter are necessary to support an opinion onfinancialinformation based upon
fair value rather than historical cost?
C. Professional responsibilities
1. Objectivity and integrity: what alternative arrangements for
selecting, changing, and compensating auditors would be feasible?
2. Communication responsibility: to whom—both within the audited entity and outside the entity—and in what manner should
the auditor communicate knowledge which may fall outside the
audit report onfinancialstatements, such as illegal acts, internal
control weaknesses, and improper client-prepared financial information?
These are the auditing subjects which I would regard as most significant
for future study. Each topic is followed by the major question to be answered,
which would have to be reduced to a number of relevant researchable questions.
This distinction is very important—in fact, critical. Each problem must be
specified in terms of more specific researchable questions so that evidence and
information may be gathered that bears directly on the problem. Mautz and
Gray expressed the point in this way:
The specific issue must be stated in such a way that it meets the
needs for which the research is proposed and indicates the kind of evidence relevant to the research subject. The research methodology must
be such that it will provide convincing evidence and valid reasoning
from that evidence.
13
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The Mautz and Gray article is such a well-reasoned blueprint for effective re
search that expanding greatly upon what they have said so well is not necessary.
In the auditing research program, we have endeavored to follow a similar approach from the very beginning of the formal program.
Development of ARM No. 1
Problem specification is such an important aspect of research that I would
like to explore, as an illustration, some of the factors considered in the preparation of A R M No. 1. Many, if not most, discussions of research method focus
on the steps in the process after the phenomenon of interest has been selected
for study and the problem specified in some detail. However, problem selection
and specification are critical steps in the research process. It is at this point that
research should draw significantly upon practice. The difficult problems in practice, at the profession level, should identify what phenomena require study and
explication. Determination of the important questions to be answered—specification of the problem—should also rely heavily on practice. An exploratory review
of practice to determine the major questions to be answered should be undertaken
in every study no matter what research setting is chosen to collect data.
In the study of the fourth reporting standard reported in ARM No. 1, an
initial study of practice disclosed that the primary problem was lack of criteria
for the distinction between a "subject to" qualification and a disclaimer of
opinion. Consequently, uncertainty exceptions received the bulk of attention
in the study. Further exploration disclosed that one particular type of uncertainty
exception—the going-concern problem—was of major importance and, therefore,
that subject was given more extensive treatment than other types of uncertainties.
For a number of reasons, research directed to the influence of audit reports
in the decision process of financial statement users did not seem appropriate for
an initial study. Although future research should definitely consider this dimension of the reporting process, careful attention should be given to those factors
that eliminated that approach as an initial choice.
To study the decision process of financial statement users and retain control
over the relevant variables, an experimental simulation or a laboratory experiment would seem to be the most logical choice for a data collection setting. The
problems involved in this research approach can be conveniently explored by
considering one possible experiment. If we want to test the users' reaction to
different types of audit reports when a material uncertainty is present, we might
prepare a set of financial statements for a company that has a large amount of
research and development cost of doubtful recoverability with extensive footnote
disclosure of the problem. Different groups would be presented with the financial
statements and accompanying auditor's report and control would be exercised
over the type of report. One group would receive statements with a qualified
opinion, another group would receive the same statements with a disclaimer of opinion, and the statements received by a third group would be accompanied by an unqualified opinion. Other sets of financial statements would
be used to vary the relative magnitude of the amount involved. In this manner,
the impact of the type of audit report on users could be measured. However,
while establishing the data stimuli is not too difficult, the method of measuring
response is more troublesome.
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An easy approach would be to allow the subjects to read through the information and then, without allowing reference to the statements, have them answer
a series of questions about the statements. In this fashion, it would be possible
to determine whether variations in the audit report created a greater awareness
of the uncertainty problem. However, this approach does not get at the critical
question of whether the audit report has an impact on the decision process of
the user. Would variations in the audit report cause any change in the user's
decision? Would the different decisions be better decisions?
Research on the impact of the audit report on the decision process adds an
extremely complex element to an already difficult research problem. Research
of this sort would require some knowledge of the financial statement user's forecasting model (conversion of historical data into estimates of the future) and his
decision model (interaction of the estimates in reaching a decision). Research
on the decision process typically assumes that all data presented to the subjects is
of equal reliability. The subject is given no reason to doubt the veracity of the
data. Introducing degrees of qualification concerning the reliability of the data
considerably complicates the research problem.
Usually in research of this type, to achieve adequate controls over the experimental situation, the phenomenon of interest must be simplified to such an
extent that only a portion of the phenomenon can be captured and the research
results are of doubtful applicability to the real world situation abstracted in the
experiment. Consequently, the potential results of this type of research did not
hold enough promise to serve as a basis for major policy decisions. In addition,
with so little information available on the decision process of auditors, establishing the criteria actually used by auditors seemed to be a more logical starting
point. Future research, however, should begin to delve into this complex aspect
of the reporting process.
Those of us involved in the auditing research effort at the AICPA hope
that the above list will serve as an early identification of significant research
topics and stimulate the interest of academic researchers capable of performing
adequate research on the issues.
Research Environment
Those performing research, however, should recognize that a distinction
exists between academic and, for want of a better word, institutional research—
meaning research conducted for a professional organization. Naturally, we expect the two to be different and some of the differences are legitimate, but others
are of doubtful merit and might well be eliminated.
Time-Span. Generally, academic research may be conducted over a longer
time-span. Time constraints are usually personal and imposed by the desire or
interest of the researcher. An academic researcher may envision a series of related
studies conducted over a long period of time with each new study adding additional refinements to the previous effort. Institutional research must usually go
directly from research results to implementing guidelines for practice. The
study is usually related to the development of a professional pronouncement or a
firm position and pressing deadlines may be attached to these publications.
Real-World Referents. Academic research frequently opts for the simplifica109

tion and control of highly abstract research settings. Experiments and simulations allow precise measurement of variables, which is attractive even though
there may be some doubt about the applicability of the results to the "real world."
On the other hand, institutional research must often accept the loss of rigor and
control to gain greater confidence that the research results are applicable to practice.
Audience. Academic research is in many cases unabashedly aimed at other
academicians, while institutional research must satisfy policy makers and practitioners as well as other researchers. Since these groups undoubtedly have different
norms and values, the reaction to institutional research results is likely to be
mixed.
Subject Choice. Institutional research almost always begins with a problem
to be solved. The research method must be fit to the problem and there is little
opportunity for restricting and tailoring the problem so that it may be answered
by the available evidence. If the problem is defined and narrowed too much,
the institutional researcher will fall far short of his task. In contrast, academic researchers in many cases seem to choose a research method they would like to employ and then search for a problem that might be solved by that method.
Bureaucratic Infringement Institutional research seems to be obviously
plagued by possible conflicts between bureaucratic and professional norms. However, the academic researcher has a similar problem. In fact, his plight may be
greater because the problem is much harder to recognize. The university is a
complex oganization and survival and advancement in the academic community
at times requires compliance with norms that may be in conflict with the ideals
of a scholar. Blind adherence to an in vogue research method may take precedence over generation of fresh insight on difficult problems. The nonparametric test of significance may assume more importance than the actual significance—meaning relevance and importance—of the research results to the
resolution of any real problem. As a consequence, too often academic research
results in a glorification of technicians over discoverers, quantification for its own
sake, and fitting problems to research techniques rather than the reverse.
Concluding Remarks
Auditing theory is important, but theory developed in isolation from the
problems of practice at the profession level has little significance and risks being
trivial. Note that there is a substantial difference between those problems which
face the auditing profession collectively and those problems raised in each individual audit.
To be worthwhile in the effort of solving significant problems, auditing
research must be empirical. Nevertheless, deductive reasoning and attention to
theory may never be ignored, and these elements should play an instrumental part
in any auditing research. A clear specification of the problem, which is primarily
a process of logic, may be the most important step in the research process. However, a convincing solution to an important problem is not likely without
empirical evidence on the issues.
There are many forms of empirical research. Too often empirical research
in accounting has meant research methods employing an abstract data collection
setting, with the possible exception of the ubiquitous "survey." At this stage in
the development of the auditing field of knowledge, there is probably a greater
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need for field studies and field experiments, or at least a combination of these
methods with the more abstract methods in an ordered program of research.
In closing, I would not discourage any auditing research, but I would en-

courage

research directed to the problems identified in this paper; research that

gives full recognition to the role of practice, as well as theory, in the research
process. There is no legitimate distinction between theoretical and applied research in auditing since neither theory nor practice can reach its full potential
without the other.
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Discussant's Response to
Future Directions for Auditing Research
Frederick L. Neumann
University of Illinois
We are indebted to Mr. Carmichael for stimulating our awareness of auditing as a subject for research, for broadening our perspective as to the challenges it
presents, and for reminding us of the varied forms such research may take.
One of the difficulties in discussing research is the plethora of terms, the
abundance of jargon, and the attendant confusion which inevitably results from
the clash of varying philosophies that abound in this area. In this respect, at
least, it's easy to believe that scientists were called philosophers well into the
middle of the last century.
One of the first exercises we assign our Masters' students in their research
course is to have them define and discuss their concept of research. You would
be amazed at the range of views this term conjures up. It is for this reason that,
when discussing this area, one must be very careful in defining terms and creating classifications to be sure they are not only understood but are also appropriate
to the intended use. We must try to select those properties for partitioning our
subject matter which will provide the most useful set of pigeonholes for the purpose at hand. I would like to employ some of the classifications used in Mr.
Carmichael's paper as a means of discussing some of the issues they raise.
Theoretical vs. Applied Research
For example, it is inevitable that one or more of our Masters' students will
introduce the theoretical vs. applied dichotomy in discussing research. This distinction may have some advantages conceptually, but it can be confusing when
applied to actual research. It may be used with some benefit to describe the
motivation for specific research, but it can be misleading if employed to label
the results.
I can understand Mr. Carmichael's considerable interest in applied auditing
research but the role of theoretical research in auditing should not be neglected.
(Hopefully, I will be able to avoid any of the semantic traps I have warned
against above.)
Kerlinger defines theory as " . . . a set of interrelated constructs, definitions,
and propositions that presents a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining and predicting phenomena."
The role of theory is to provide general explanations of empirical events
and objects to enable us to link together our knowledge of separate occurrences
and predict events yet unknown. It helps to identify relevant variables and the
1
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relationships between them—regularities which we can express in generalizations.
Without it we have difficulty classifying our knowledge and evaluating our findings. It also helps to direct further research. As has been said, "There is nothing
more practical than a good theory."
Primary induction, to attempt to find explanations for observed behavior,
is interesting and useful for learning facts and developing hypotheses; but our
ultimate goal must be secondary induction, which seeks to incorporate results
of primary induction into an explanatory theory covering a wide range of inquiry.
Limited, specific research projects have their value. Theoretical research, however, is the more general and more widely applicable. I, therefore, believe it is
essential for reasonable progress.
Without adequate theory we may lack direction, proper perspective, and
consistency in our decisions. We have already experienced—in the problems of
the APB—some of the consequences of pragmatically based decisions. As
Business Week recently noted about activity in accounting, "When loopholes
are closed and detailed rules are drawn up on an issue-by-issue basis, the result
often is illogical, arbitrary, and inconsistent."
Without adequate theory, we may extend current actions which are faulty
—simply because they are generally practiced—and, thus, compound the error.
Whitehead pointed out a similar fallacy with regard to common sense by observing, "Its sole criterion for judgment is that the new ideas shall look like the
old ones." Mr. Carmichael seems to favor a role for theory but appears to link
it very closely to the problems of practice. Were others to extend this emphasis
unduly, it could have unfortunate consequences.
Bernstein states that applied accounting research, ". . . has more limited
objectives and addresses itself to finding the most feasible and best possible
solutions to specific problem areas." A preoccupation with practice may tend
to focus primarily on the present state of knowledge to the neglect of its future
development. Lynd has observed that, while ". . . the role of the learned man in
earlier times may have been to stabilize custom and to conserve the past; . . . the
social scientist, as his modern day counterpart [and I view the accountant in this
light] . . . is bound more closely to the moving front edge of man's experience."
Lynd continues:
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This means that, granting all due weight to the institutionalized past
as it conditions present behavior, the variables in the social scientist's
equation must include not only the given set of structured institutions,
but also what the present human carriers of those institutions are groping
to become.
6

In the same BusinessWeekarticle cited above, James S. Mahon, a partner
in Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, ascribes the public's current disillusionment with accounting to the failure of the profession to discern three significant
trends in attitude:
First, we failed to perceive the growing cleavage between independent
ownership and professional management; second, we were slow to recognize the emerging power of the institutional investor in the financial
community; third, and perhaps most important, we did not anticipate
the public clamor for exactitude infinancialreporting.
7
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A singular focus on practice is apt to result in more of such surprises.
Furthermore, to overemphasize practice could lead to the neglect of a vast
amount of knowledge being developed in related fields. As Justin Davidson
has observed:
But perhaps the most serious flaw in the present arrangements is the fact
that needed knowledge of vital interest to the accounting profession is
simply not produced—whole areas of important subject matter can be,
and have been, completely overlooked so far as research is concerned.
8

Moreover, Mr. Carmichael's hope that a theory of auditing that will be a
"comprehensive explanation . . . an organized systematized body of knowledge"
may be illusory if it is drawn from practice which is itself inconsistent, unorganized and unsystematic in its approach to problems.
There are indeed numerous, pressing problems in practice today for which
there is very little, if any, "evidence and information available to assist in reaching sound decisions." And the situation looks as though it may get worse before
it gets better. Nevertheless, if one were to be overly attentive to these practical
issues, without an equal awareness and development of the broad-based theory
which underlies—or should underly—this area, he would be asking for more of
the same confusion which plagues the profession today.
Academic vs. Institutional Research
Another dichotomy in Carmichael's paper which, if improperly interpreted,
could lead us astray is the one of academic vs. institutional research. Again,
this is a distinction which may play a useful role when properly applied but
which can also be the cause of mischief if carried beyond the bounds of its
relevant range.
Mautz and Gray, in the article cited by Carmichael, allude to such a distinction as one means of describing past developments and explaining the current
status. The Wheat Committee and others have done so, as well. While it may
be a useful classification in such a context, it should not be interpreted as a
necessary characterization of research endeavors in the years ahead. If Mr.
Carmichael's remarks were extended in this latter manner, these terms could
have the unfortunate consequence of hardening lines of demarcation which are
at once unnecessary and potentially deleterious. Such a misinterpretation could
perpetuate distinctions which are not germane to the needs of research. Rather
than a possible further widening of the breach, what we need is a greater effort
to narrow the differences. Let's not perpetuate the unfortunate stereotype of
the academician as one who is only incidentally interested in the problems of
the man on the firing line. Alternatively, there is Chambers' characterization of
the practitioner as ". . . concerned with analysis of the immediate problem context of a client." Each party has certain skills and knowledge which may be
of significant help in solving the problems of auditing. Our abilities should be
of more interest than our orientation. In fact, we have some empirical evidence
present here at this conference that this is so and I heartily endorse the suggestion that there be "more attempts at cooperative research linking practitioners
and theorists in joint efforts."
I would recommend to the Institute—and to public accounting firms as
9
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well—that, rather than sort out projects in terms of academic vs. institutional
interest, they endeavor to combine the best attributes of people in both areas and
seek to assign practitioners and academicians to the same project. It may require that those oriented toward practice develop a better understanding of
research and a greater appreciation of the role of theory. Some theoreticians on
the other hand may have to descend from their ivory towers to learn more about
the realities of practice.
The Wheat Committee has estimated one year as sufficient time to complete
most accounting research studies. Many firms now offer internships to faculty
to experience auditing "like it is." Why couldn't there be faculty research internships as well?—or, for that matter, practitioner sabbaticals? They could be at
a firm's office; or some practitioners might find it easier to do such work on the
campus. Also, there is the growing manpower represented by retired practitioners and professors, as well. There would seem to be much potential for
cooperation.
12

Research Methodology
Joint projects might also succeed in getting a better hearing for their results.
The failure of accounting research, to date, to attract more attention, is a problem that concerned Mautz and Gray among others. One explanation hypothesized by them for this condition is the lack of an established research methodology. It may be that we have been derelict in its use but the classical approach
of scientific methodology is as applicable to auditing as it is to any social science.
We may be impatient that such an approach offers, at best, slow and tedious
progress; but it is still the most dependable route to reliable knowledge that
man has yet found. As Pierce has noted,
13
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To satisfy our doubts, . . . therefore, it is necessary that a method should
be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human,
but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect . . . The method must be such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same. Such is the method of science.
Its fundamental hypothesis . . . is this: There are real things, whose
characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them . . .
1 5

Carmichael has stressed—and rightly, I believe—the importance of problem
specification as the first step. If a researcher wishes to solve a problem he must
know what that problem is. Progress toward the solution is significantly enhanced when the researcher determines what it is he is attempting to do. Problems are perhaps best expressed as questions about the relationship of two or
more variables—hopefully, with some indication as to the potential solution.
Carmichael emphasizes the need at this point for a close tie to practice.
Practice "should identify what phenomena require study and explication."
Again, I am reluctant to place such a heavy emphasis on practice. I noted,
above, my fears that using practice as the primary referrent may lead to compounding errors. Primary reliance on the perceptions of the practitioner without
due consideration of the broader issues and of theory may be short-sighted and
could be quite harmful. As the paper observes, "In its most general form, the
research process consists of the identification and measurement of variables that
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are relevant to a given problem or phenomenon . . . " A singular focus on practice
could overlook significant variables and, as a consequence, result in incomplete
observation, inadequate data collection, and misleading results. The selection
process sets in motion the empirical testing program which Carmichael feels is
so important. Limiting the selection process to considerations of practice may
very well bias the program and provide results which are deceptive.
The classical approach of science to a problem is through the formulation
of an hypothesis—a tentative or conjectural statement about the relationship between the variables in question, propounded with the object of following out
its consequences. Morris Cohen has noted,
There is . . . no genuine progress in scientific insight through the
Baconian method of accumulating empirical facts without hypotheses
or anticipation of nature. Without some guiding idea we do not know
what facts to gather. Without something to prove, we cannot determine
what is relevant and what is irrelevant.
16

Hypotheses may be derived from theory and are a means of extending
theory. They should be testable and, under proper conditions, can be demonstrated to be probably true or probably false, independent of man's beliefs or
desires. They are a very powerful tool in acquiring dependable knowledge.
Mr. Carmichael might have formulated several hypotheses in response to
his problem in ARM No. 1, to determine the variables used in defining "sufficiently material." There is ample precedent in the literature, for example, to
have hypothesized certain financial statement measures as both necessary and
sufficient conditions for defining this term.
The next step after hypothesis formulation is to deduce testable consequences
from the selected hypothesis. There is little to be gained from metaphysical
hypotheses that have no testable implications. In ARM No. 1, this step could
have led, as Carmichael suggests, to "if . . . then" propositions that certain
relative magnitudes on the financial statements would prompt practitioners to
change their opinions from "qualified" to either "adverse" or "disclaimed." It
should be noted that the process of formulating hypotheses can often aid in
clarifying problem statements as well as in leading to operational implications
and testing situations.
The test of the hypothesized relation then follows, to see if, under the
deduced conditions, that relationship seems to hold. Here the role of the
hypothesis may become clearer. For without some guide as to what is to be
watched, incomplete and inaccurate observations may be made.
Mr. Carmichael has spelled out in his paper one way in which an hypothesis,
such as the one just propounded, might be tested. He thus gives recognition to
the amenability of auditing phenomena to scientific research methodology.
It should be noted, as Dewey points out, that this methodology, in implementation, is usually not as neatly defined. The sequence may be irregular.
Steps may overlap and mutually support each other in development.
Carmichael chose an alternative approach to his problem, however, for the
reasons explained in his paper. He undertook the study with apparently no
clearly formulated hypotheses but an awareness of the variables which might
possibly be at work in the decision process. In view of the primitive stage of
our theory and the pressing need for decisions, perhaps the best route to knowl17

116

edge about particular issues is to identify as many possible independent variables
as we can, to come up with as many possible explanations as Marvin Stone can
dream up, and undertake large data gathering projects that are guided, of course,
by appropriate statistical methodology. Properly done, such efforts may permit
us to narrow more rapidly the bounds of probability and to focus more readily
on subsequent investigation.
Topics for Investigation
I might also observe that such studies as these that we have been discussing
are of a positive nature—that is, they seek to explain what is and, thereby, to
predict what will be. That is consistent with our common preoccupation:
witness "generally accepted" accounting principles and "generally accepted"
auditing standards. This orientation, however, tends to overlook any normative
aspects—what should be. Remember, to Judge Friendly in the Continental
Vending Case, as we noted yesterday, generally accepted accounting principles
did not necessarily result in "fair presentation."
In one sense, research into normative aspects could result from findings
regarding user behavior. Developments in this regard could conceivably be
tested as Mr. Carmichael has noted. In another sense, however, normative behavior enmeshes both the user and the auditor in questions of value. Questions
of this nature are almost impossible to test with the approach suggested above.
In his proposed topics for research, Carmichael has presented a rather farranging set of suggested challenges. Investigations into user needs and user
behavior are noticeably deemphasized, however. Though such investigations
may be implied by some of the topics listed, none explicitly calls for it. If the
auditor's work is to assist the user in evaluating the quality of the material presented, then the auditor's criteria must inevitably be drawn from the needs and
concerns of those users. Difficult and complex though the area may be, it must
be explored. Both auditors and accountants could profit from extensive research
into this area. I hope it will not be ignored, for to me it represents an ultimate
authority in guiding future decisions. It may require patience and humility as
well as wisdom and care. Perhaps it may even result in a new Journal of Unsuccessful Research in Accounting and Auditing, but we must start.
Abstract vs. Natural Research Methodology
I was pleased to see that the paper takes time to discuss research methodology, particularly research design, as a separate issue. An adequately planned
and executed research design is of considerable help both in making observations
and in making inferences therefrom. Research design establishes the framework
for the test. It is through its implementation that the researcher attempts to
answer the problem posed and to control variance. We have already alluded to
the importance of a properly formulated problem and how it may be approached.
Research design should help to answer the problem as validly, objectively, accurately, and economically as possible. We have not, however, said much about
control of variance—the major technical function of research design.
Control of variance usually refers to changes in the dependent variable. The
research endeavors to isolate, as much as possible, the effect of the independent
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variable in question. The researcher tries to minimize, nullify, or eliminate the
influence of all other variables that might play a role but which, for one reason
or another, are not of interest at the time. It is through the relative ability to
control variance that Carmichael arrives at the traditional classification scheme
of research design.
It should be made clear, however, that the researcher must be aware of
variables at work that might influence his dependent variable under any type
of research, if he is to be able to say anything about his results. In this sense,
theory must precede all forms of research. It is true that under abstract conditions, the researcher builds the experimental environment, while under field or
natural conditions, he must accept much of what already exists. It may, however, be a rather sweeping generalization to state, "in the natural setting, there
is less precision in the measurement of variables and less certainty that research
results are attributable to a particular variable."
Nevertheless, under either condition, the researcher is dealing with less
than the whole. Selective perception in the natural setting can be just as destructive of validity as can the failure to secure correspondence with reality in the
abstract setting. To say that "when abstract settings are used, the researcher
must incorporate theory in the situation before data are collected . . . [while]
. . . when using natural settings, the researcher collects data and then incorporates
theory as he interprets the data" is to me another distinction which could be
misleading. Under either condition, theory can provide guidance for identification
of variables and control of variance in advance of observation and should, to
enhance our confidence in our results. As Poincare noted,
It is often said that experiments should be made without preconceived
ideas. That is impossible. Not only would it make every experiment
fruitless, but even if we wished to do so, it could not be done.
18

Perhaps an alternative distinction might be between those conditions under
which the researcher can observe the action of the independent variables and the
dependent variables' response, and those under which the action has preceded
the observation and the researcher must impute the relationship by retrospection.
There is a significant difference between these two cases, as in the latter there
was no chance for the researcher to exercise control of the independent variables
and a hypothesized relationship can therefore be asserted with probably less
confidence than under the former conditions.
Control is crucial if we are to have confidence in research outcomes. Without it, as Professor David Green has said, "The results cannot be illuminating;
interesting perhaps, but not illuminating."
19

Conclusion
One of the ironies of research in auditing—to me—is that a group which
proclaims some interest in objectivity and which pretends some expertise in
evaluating control, analyzing evidence, and enhancing credibility should have
such a poor track record in research. Mautz and Sharaf showed us our potential.
Hopefully, Mr. Carmichael's program will lead to an era of joint cooperation
of academician and practitioner that will result in significant, new, and reliable
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knowledge about auditing, about those who practice it, and especially about
those whom it seeks to serve.
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8
The Problem with Auditing Is . . . .
(The Stuff Dreams Are Made of)
Marvin L. Stone
Stone, Gray and Company
Most of the other papers delivered at this symposium commence with the
word "toward," e.g., Toward Standards for Statistical Sampling, Toward Standards for Materiality, Toward a Philosophy of Auditing. Apparently our chairman had no wish to go "toward" further problems in auditing when he assigned
my topic. Consequently, my talk may be described as "untoward." I have
thought a great deal about my topic since I received the assignment—so much in
fact, that it has found its way into my dreams. Before addressing myself formally
to the topic, let me describe a few of those dreams. My dreams are seldom, if
ever, in technicolor. Everything is in sharply defined black and white—no gray
areas, as in real life.
Dream No. 1—Independence and Fees
The scene of dream number one is a courtroom in which Ralph Nader is
presiding judge. As my dream commenced, I was on the witness stand and
was being asked to describe the CPA's role. The questioner was a not-toofriendly banker who frequently questions the CPA's independence. In all
candor, his question was a little more pointed—something like, "What the hell
do you auditors do, anyway?"
Casting aside my well-known reticence to speak before an audience, I
delivered the following carefully prepared extemporaneous remarks:
The business community in which all of us live and work is very much
like a giant football game. Businessmen play the game. The SEC and
we CPAs are the officials—the only difference being that the SEC has a
whistle, but the CPAs don't.
The public, watching from the stands, relies on the officials to see that
everyone plays by the rules—the same rules. The rules are written to
permit a little deceptive ball-handling, designed to fool competitors on
the other team, but not to prevent the spectators from determining how
the game is going—who is gaining ground and who is losing.
Many of the onlookers don't even know what the game is all about. They
just came along to watch because that's what everyone else was doing.
Everyone watching the game is entitled to know that the gains and
losses of all the players are measured against the same yard markers.
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They are entitled to expect that first-down measurements are all made
with the same ten-yard chain, and that all players are battling over 36inch yards. Even the best binoculars don't provide an observer in the
stands with vision equal to that of a person on the playing field. That's
why officials are needed.
Its the very nature of things that occasional disagreements arise between
the players and the officials. Rule enforcers seldom win popularity contests. And, of course, a few shouts from the stands of "Kill the Ump"
are in the best American tradition. In our case, whenever anyone sees
an infraction which escapes the official's view, the shouts come out,
"Where was the Auditor?"
Like officials at other games, the officials in this game of business are
rarely accused of dishonesty, I am happy to say. One hears an occasional
derogatory comment about our eyesight or intelligence, but then the right
to call an Ump blind or stupid is also part of our American Heritage.
Once in a while a particularly incensed spectator may even question the
legitimacy of our birth. Unpleasant as it is to hear epithets such as these,
all of us—officials and players alike—must grin and bear it. For if the
public didn't buy tickets to the game—i.e., if they didn't buy stock in the
companies whose statements we audit—there would be no game.
While many of the spectators may just come along for the ride, the
majority have a vital stake in the outcome of the game. They have
placed heavy bets on one team or another. It's up to the CPA to give
those who have a stake in the game the best possible data with which
to evaluate the teams.
Naturally, I expected applause, or at least rapt attention interrupted periodically by chuckles of amusement at the cleverness of my analogy. Instead, the
judge and jurors exhibited an attitude of obvious skepticism as they shook their
heads in disbelief. When I looked closer, I noted that each of the jurors was also
a bank loan officer. In fact, it began to look like a Robert Morris Associates
meeting.
The examining counsel continued his questioning:
Q. In this football game of business, Mr. Stone, how does it happen that
each team hires its own referees?
A. Traditionally, every firm has always had the right to engage auditors
(and for that matter, all types of professional advisors) of its choice.
The right was questioned during Congressional hearings which preceded passage of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts. When a spokesman for the accounting profession was asked at that time who audits
the auditors, he replied, "Our consciences."
Q. You're supposed to be independent of your clients. Isn't that right,
Mr. Stone?
A. Yes, that is correct. Our code of ethics contains strong rules designed
to insure our independence, both in appearance and in fact.
Q. How can you be independent of the client who pays you? Doesn't
his right to discharge you in favor of another auditor impair your
supposed independence, both in appearance and in fact?
A. No, not at all. We are governed not only by our consciences, but also
by a growing body of official pronouncements which provide guidelines to eliminate at least part of the potential areas of disagreement.
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doubtedly acts as an additional safeguard against the auditor's succumbing to client pressure. As you probably know, no member of
the auditing firm may serve as an officer or director of the company
to be audited, nor may any member own any interest whatsoever,
either directly or indirectly.
My questioner obviously considered my answer somewhat lame and not altogether responsive. He continued by saying:
Your profession seems to have taken great pains to avoid minor infringements of actual or apparent independence. For example, you can't
audit a company if even a few of its shares are owned by the wife of
one of your partners in Seattle or Miami because that might make it
appear that you aren't independent. Yet you consider your independence
unsullied by the fact that your entire relationship with the client depends
completely on his willingness to re-engage you and to pay your fee.
Although these comments weren't framed as a question, I took the opportunity to comment on the growing feeling that the public is really the CPA's
client and to describe the AICPA's 1967 statement urging corporations to appoint
audit committees composed of outside directors to nominate auditors and to receive their reports. This led to the following additional questions:
Q. Is this AICPA statement binding on anyone?
A. No. It's merely an advisory statement.
Q. As a matter of fact, isn't it true that this advisory statement has had
very little effect on publicly held companies?
A. I believe some corporations have adopted the recommendation, but
I don't know how many.
Q. How would this recommendation affect the thousands of companies
that have no "outside" directors?
A. It would have no effect.
Taking a somewhat different tack, the questioner asked:
Q. Mr. Stone, a minute ago you commented that the CPA's real client
is the public. If that is so, why are auditors' reports addressed to the
company, its board of directors, or its stockholders? Why not "to
whom it may concern" or simply no salutation at all?
After pondering the question for a few moments, I was tempted to quote
Tevye, the impoverished dairyman in "Fiddler on the Roof," who when asked
to explain one of his people's traditions says, "You may ask, 'Why do we wear
our little round skullcaps?' Well, I'll tell you—I don't know."
However, since I had been billed as an expert, I felt obliged to burble a few
ill-chosen words to the effect that the apparent inconsistency was merely evidence of the dynamic nature of the accountant's world. I agreed that different
wording might well be more consistent with the auditor's present relationship
to the public.
At this point, my lawyer took advantage of the rather liberal procedural
rules which pervade my dreams and warned me in a stage whisper that eliminating the traditional salutation from the auditor's opinion could well lead to a
further deterioration of the Ultramares doctrine which requires a greater degree
of care by CPAs to their clients than to third parties who have no privity. Easing
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the seeming distinction between clients and third parties could serve to accelerate that trend.
Then, in a typical display of what for want of a better term I will call "lawyer other-handedness," he said: "But on the other hand, the Shatterproof Glass
decision may have already buried Ultramares." Once again, I yearned for a
one-armed lawyer.
Having been thus forewarned (if not forearmed) by my lawyer, I turned
my attention back to the examining counsel. He concluded his interrogation
with one more salvo:
Q. Mr. Stone, if, as you say, the public is your client, should not your
pay come from the public? After all, he who pays the piper calls
the tune.
Before I could respond, I was dismissed and James Needham, a member
of the Securities Exchange Commission, was called to the witness stand.
Q. Mr. Needham, would you describe your professional qualifications.
A. I am a Certified Public Accountant, and was engaged in the practice
of public accounting for a number of years before appointment to
the SEC.
Q. Is the SEC considering the issuance of a recommendation that outside directors nominate the corporate auditors?
A. Yes, the Commission is considering such a proposal. In its present
form, the recommendation would not have the force of law. If
adopted, it would amount to a strong nudge.
Q. Could you tell us why the SEC is considering this move?
A. We've become concerned about the quality of work performed by
many accounting firms. In fact, I've suggested that accounting firms
might find it beneficial to reevaluate their current large outlays on
professional development in light of the actual audit performance.
The SEC has found instances of problems relating to elementary
disclosure, succumbing to obvious pressure by clients, faulty judgments and decisions at the partnership level of the certifying accounting firms, and questions of independence bordering on commercial
fraud.
After James Needham stepped down, the examining counsel summed up
by saying:
When life insurance companies want to know whether they should bet
on my survival, they don't ask me to hire a doctor—they send me to
theirs. The same thing happens when I apply for a job and the employer
requires a physical examination. Perhaps its time for someone other
than the contestants to hire the referees in the game of business
described by Mr. Stone.
As my dream faded out, I kept hearing the song from the "King and I" in
which the King of Siam, musing on what to tell his son and heir about women,
and life in general, wonders aloud if he should educate him in all the ancient lies.
Then, frustrated at the indecision fostered by his new-found modern knowledge,
the King sings: "When my father was a king, he was a king who knew exactly
what he knew."
As the King says: "Is a puzzlement!"
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Dream No. 2—Audited Forecasts
The second dream I would like to tell you about again found me on the
witness stand. This time, however, the examining counsel was a well-known
financial analyst. His questions went something like this:
Q. I use financial statements to help predict the future. If you insist
on using historical costs, why don't you at least give me a projection
for the next year or two?
A. Management is hesitant to divulge its plans, since to do so might aid
competitors.
Q. Management must have prepared a budget and cash forecast. Why
can't we see them?
A. Management would rather not answer for differences between predicted and actual results. Not only that, unscrupulous managements
could adjust predictions to further their own aims. Over-optimistic
predictions could be used to generate short-range increases in stock
prices. Overly pessimistic predictions could be made public in order
to cause actual results to look good by comparison. From the data in
an annual report, readers can construct their own forecasts.
Q. What you are giving us then, is a kind of "do-it-yourself kit." That
arrangement doesn't seem very efficient. Management and its accountants have the best grasp of the pertinent facts and are most
knowledgeable about future plans. Yet they withhold the very data
we users need. What kind of full disclosure is that?
Even in my somnolent condition, I recognized this as a rhetorical question to
which no answer was expected. Counsel continued:
Q. Do CPAs audit budgets and other forecasts?
A. CPAs often assist clients in preparing budgets and forecasts; however,
we don't audit them. Our ethical rules prohibit the expression of
an opinion on forecasts.
Q. Why the prohibition?
A. CPAs traditionally report on data that is susceptible to objective tests.
Forecasts are based on opinions as to future events. An evaluation of
the likelihood of such events occurring and of their probable results
necessarily must rely largely on subjective evidence.
Q. You say CPAs aren't permitted to render opinions on future events.
Isn't a historical statement full of assumptions about the future? Isn't
your examination of receivables and the related provision for uncollectible accounts explicitly directed toward future collectibility?
Isn't your examination of inventories concerned primarily with future
saleability? Isn't it true, Mr. Stone, that future recoverability of
unamortized plant and equipment costs is one of your principal concerns when examining fixed assets? Similarly, isn't future recoverability of primary concern when you examine capitalized research
and development costs?
You say that CPAs render opinions only on objectively determined
historical costs. Frankly, it seems to me that the line between the
past and the future is hazy indeed. In fact, Mr. Stone, isn't it true
that the "going concern" concept which underlies thefinancialstatements of every business entity is, in effect, an implied opinion as
to the future?
125

Suppressing a mischievous desire to ask that the question be repeated, I again
assumed the question to be rhetorical. Mistaking my silence as a sign of tacit
agreement (or at least the absence of any objection) my interrogator continued:
Q. We only consult history to shed some light on the future. Since
auditing purports to be a utilitarian art not an academic exercise,
why do CPAs audit history but not budgets?
My recollection of how this dream ended is somewhat hazy. I recall examining counsel repeating the last question over and over with ever-increasing
insistence. I remember wondering why my lawyer failed to come to my aid by
objecting to the questioner's haranguing and argumentative line of inquiry, until
I noticed that the presiding judge was one Lewis Gilbert.
Should any of you wonder how this dream sequence ends, a midnight snack
consisting of a liverwurst and smoked oyster sandwich on rye and a bottle of
beer will produce an instant replay—at least, that's what induced the original.
Dream No. 3—Management Advisory Services and Independence
I seem to have tuned in late on the next Dream, so I didn't catch the questioner's name. As the dream opened, I was again on the witness stand and
questioning was already underway. This time, the questioner was speaking in
a pleasant, disarming way, with a hint of New York in his voice. He was humming a tune that I couldn't quite place. His questions began:
Q. Mr. Stone, you were saying that audits often result in recommendations to the client.
A. Yes. Most CPAs consider the suggestions for improvement of a
client's operations the most important result of an audit—certainly
the most tangible.
Q. Are CPAs often engaged to render management advisory services
as a result of the recommendations contained in the so-called management letter?
A. That depends somewhat on the nature of the CPA's expertise and
his ability to convince the client that consulting services are needed
and that the CPA is the most logical supplier of those services. In
many instances, CPAs are engaged to render the services recommended in a management letter.
Examining counsel continued in a friendly vein:
Q. Could you give us some examples of these services?
A. CPAs are often engaged to improve a client's accounting system or
even to install a completely new system. We advise clients how
taxes may be reduced by choosing the most beneficial accounting
methods for such items as depreciation and inventory valuation. We
occasionally assist clients in revising their financial structure to improve working capital or to facilitate expansion. Clients sometimes
need help in deciding to buy or lease needed equipment or real
estate. CPAs can be useful in that area as well.
Q. Aren't you being too modest, Mr. Stone? I've read that CPAs contribute to client profitability. I've heard them described as a vital
part of the management team. Don't CPAs often play an important
role in merger, sale and acquisition negotiations?
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I cast my eyes downward, blushing slightly, and kicked my foot to the side
diffidently as I uttered some modest phrase like, "Aw shucks." Then I proceeded
to describe in some detail a few of the more imaginative consulting services I
have performed during my professional career. I must confess that even the
retelling itself became somewhat imaginative as I warmed to the task. I was
feeling positively eloquent by the time I finished.
The euphoria into which I lapsed was interrupted by my questioner. With a
sardonic smile on his lips and a somewhat more insistent tone in his voice he
asked:
Q. After performing these many and varied services for your clients,
Mr. Stone, are you still independent to report to the public? Can you
look objectively at the outcome of a transaction you helped structure?
Can you judge the fairness of data accumulated by a system you
designed?
Jolted out of my blissful state, I started to collect my thoughts in order to
frame a response. The judge, Malcolm Devore, gave me a short respite as he
leaned down from the bench to remonstrate my questioner: "One question at
a time, Professor Briloff, one question at a time." As I heard my questioner's
name, I suddenly remembered the name of the tune he was humming. It came
from "The Mikado" by Gilbert and Sullivan and is called, "I Am the Lord
High Executioner."
Having regained my composure, I delivered the profession's traditional
response:
A. In consulting engagements, CPAs merely advise; decisions are made
by the client.
Judge Malcolm Devore listened with obvious sympathy to my reply, but
Professor Briloff was so busy conferring with his co-counsel, Professor Schulte,
that he didn't seem to be paying much attention to my answer. The moment I
finished, Professor Briloff was back on his feet asking:
Q. Shouldn't a CPA insure his independence, both in fact and in appearance, by refusing to perform consulting services for audit clients?
I responded with the "party line":
A. Any such policy would deprive the client of advice from the person
best qualified to give it. Forcing the client to engage a multitude of
advisors spreads responsibility and diminishes efficiency.
In rebuttal, Professor Briloff commented, "Mr. Stone, your response sounds
like an indictment of a separation-of-duties doctrine which is the very cornerstone of every system of internal control."
I was delighted that the judge relieved me of the obligation to reply by ruling
Briloff's comments out of order. As the dream ended, the jury foreman (who also
turned out to be Malcolm Devore) was applauding Judge Devore's decision.
Dream No. 4—General Acceptance vs. Fairness
I will recount just one more dream before getting to the subject of my talk.
This dream opened in a courtroom where the bailiff was intoning the familiar,
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"Hear ye, hear ye, this court is now in session in the case of General Acceptance
vs. Fairness, Judge Henry J. Friendly presiding." Again, I found myself on the
witness stand. After the usual preliminaries establishing my professional qualifications, the examining counsel, Wilma Soss, proceeded as follows:
Q. Mr. Stone, the standard opinion rendered by CPAs contains the
phrase, "generally accepted accounting principles." Could you tell
the court by whom these accounting principles have been generally
accepted?
A. By preparers, users and auditors of financial statements.
Q. How do CPAs learn of this "general acceptance"? Does some organization take a periodic poll?
A. The Accounting Principles Board, an arm of the American Institute
of CPAs, surveys accounting practices on a continuous basis. As a
result of this surveillance and an extensive program of research, the
APB issues opinions from time to time. Among other things, these
opinions delineate which accounting principles are acceptable and
which are not.
Q. Has the APB issued opinions on all or substantially all of the principles which underliefinancialstatements?
A. No, the body of principles is large and continues to grow as conditions change. Consequently, the APB, its predecessor, The Committee on Accounting Procedure, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board which will soon replace it could never hope to finish
the task. The APB and its predecessor have tried to devote their
resources to those areas most in need of attention.
Q. I understand that alternative means have evolved to portray various
segments of accounting data. When that occurs, Mr. Stone, which
alternative gets the APB's blessing—the method with the most
followers?
A. Not necessarily. While the APB has attempted to narrow and reduce
differences, you should understand that several alternative accounting methods may be considered generally accepted in a given situation, even though they may arrive at different results.
Q. When several acceptable accounting methods are available, which
method does the accountant use in a given situation?
A. Hopefully, the one which results in the fairest presentation of the
facts.
Q. Aha! You said "fairest presentation." That's the first time that you
have said anything about fairness.
A. Fairness is the ultimate aim of all the APB's efforts. General acceptance is merely a means to that end.
Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Stone, that some of the accounting methods in general use fall somewhat short of the fairness standard you describe?
A. I suppose so. However, the APB is trying to weed out the inferior
methods.
Q. A moment ago, Mr. Stone, you said that "hopefully" an accountant
will use the accounting method which results in the fairest presentation. Isn't the auditor required to insist on the fairest alternative
before he expresses an opinion?
A. No, there is no such requirement at present. However, CPAs often
exert their influence in favor of the superior method. Perhaps some
day the use not only of generally accepted accounting principles but
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also of the most desirable GAAP will be required before an auditor
renders an opinion on financial statements.
Q. On the subject of the auditor's opinion, Mr. Stone, the standard language somewhat confuses me. You CPAs say that statements "fairly
present . . . in conformity with GAAP." That phrase could have
several meanings. It could mean:
a. The statements are both fair and in conformity with GAAP.
b. The statements are fair because they are in conformity with GAAP.
c. The statements are fair only to the extent that GAAP are fair.
A. Your confusion is understandable. A special AICPA committee
Which of these meanings does the CPA intend?
urged some years ago that terms such as "present fairly" and "GAAP"
be defined. A survey by Professor Briloff of selected members of
the accounting profession and of the financial community showed
support for each of the interpretations you mentioned and a few
others as well. AICPA literature appears to take the second approach,
i.e., "present fairly" is modified by the "conformity" portion of the
full phrase.
A fair presentation is to be understood within the framework
of GAAP, much as the behavior of football players is to be understood as "fair" within the framework of the rules of football. Just as
what is fair in football may not be considered fair in other forms
of social activity, meeting tests of fairness within the framework of
GAAP does not guarantee meeting such tests from the standpoint
of users of financial statements. This interpretation of the phrase
might be called the "ground rules" theory.*
Q. Does the "ground rules" approach have the widest support among
the members of the accounting profession and the financial community?
A. No, the Briloff survey showed a preference for the first interpretation. This is an understandable reaction from the financial community, but a somewhat surprising reaction from CPAs since it is the
least favorable from the legal liability standpoint. Incidentally, for
some years, Arthur Andersen & Co. worded its opinions: "Present
fairly . . . and were prepared in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles," which also infers a meaning similar to the
first interpretation.
Q. With so much disagreement among CPAs themselves as to the
meaning of key words in the standard opinion, is it any wonder
that people outside the accounting profession don't know what an
auditor's opinion means?
A. The accounting profession has worked long and hard to improve
communication with the public. The profession unquestionably still
has a long way to go. Since fair presentation of data is clearly the accountant's major goal, it may well be that the term, GAAP, will
prove to be a mere way-station in the evolution of the auditor's
opinion. The term may well disappear in time, taking with it many
questions of semantics which now bedevil writers and readers of
CPA opinions. Should this come to pass, the issues raised in this
dispute between "general acceptance" and "fairness" will become
moot.
* See " 'Present Fairly' and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles," Geraldine F.
Dominiak and Joseph G. Louderback III, The CPA Journal, January, 1972, pp. 45-49.
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I quickly learned how the judge felt about the matter when he instructed
the jury that the critical test in determining if financial statements are false or
misleading is whether they fairly present financial position, not whether they
conform with GAAP. Before a decision was reached, the trial was interrupted
by the clarion call of my alarm clock, arousing me to another day of toil in the
vineyards of public enlightenment.
Unfortunately, problems with auditing don't stop when I awaken. Here
then are a few more of the problems with which auditors must wrestle, awake
or asleep.
Need for a Better Defined Philosophy of Auditing
Some years ago, Mautz and Sharaf published an excellent monograph on
the philosophy of auditing, a subject on which Bob Mautz will further expound
tomorrow. While this work is a good start, I am certain that the authors did not
intend their pioneering efforts as a final word on the subject.
Neither auditors nor their clients seem to have a clearcut understanding of
the auditor's role. In the area of fraud detection, for example, this uncertainty
is evidenced by the fact that many audit procedures seem designed almost entirely
to detect defalcations even though auditors continue to deny any responsibility
for fraud detection. For many years, the public ascribed occult powers to auditors.
Auditors were generally believed to possess near-magical powers to ferret out
misdeeds merely by passing their hands over a set of books. Although auditors
knew full well that no such magical powers existed, they somewhat enjoyed the
effects of these widely held misconceptions and did little to dispel the mystique.
Ony recently, have auditors—prompted by a rash of lawsuits—attempted to
bring their public image into better focus.
The trueblood Committee's findings (re: the objectives of financial statements) could be a prelude to a similar study of audit objectives. Such a study
might well provide a better exposition of just what an audit is, for whom it is
performed, etc.
Need to Recognize Auditing as a Discipline Separate from Accounting
Since CPAs have traditionally audited financial statements, the line between
accounting and auditing is not at all clear. This haziness is further enhanced
by the fact that our reports are traditionally expressed in accounting terms. The
need for a better delineation of auditing as a separate discipline is becoming more
apparent as CPAs are called upon with greater frequency to audit non-financial
data and management performance.
The fuzziness of the line between accounting and auditing has been particularly evident in the protracted attempts to re-word the short form auditor's
opinion. Part of the difficulty may, of course, be attributed to a natural reluctance
to change. However, the main problem lies in the lack of a theoretical underpinning for the entire field of auditing. Without basic theory, it's no surprise
that audit procedures are in a rudimentary stage of development. Drawing inferences from a sample has long been a major technique of auditors. Yet the
use of scientific sampling methods to insure validity and permit establishment
of confidence levels is only recently making headway among auditors. Many
CPAs still view statistical sampling as "organized superstition."
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For auditing to come into its own, it must be severed from accounting and
stand on its own theoretical feet. This move is particularly important if CPAs
expect to be acknowledged as auditors of non-financial data, an important development in my opinion.
By way of example, the decennial census provides data upon which a great
many people rely. The census, then, is an obvious candidate for independent
audit. Were a CPA to undertake such an engagement, he would quickly find
just how intertwined accounting and auditing really are. Few of his questions
concerning theory, procedure, or form of report would be answered by any of
the present auditing literature.
Need for Current Value Reporting
Without reiterating the current value arguments which were presented at
the 1970 Kansas University symposium, historical cost creates problems for
auditors, too. The auditor's function is to add credibility. No amount of auditing
can make incredible statements credible. To most readers, I fear that the implications of historical cost statements are just that—incredible (and unintelligible,
to boot).
My firm audits a company which made a sizable investment in two parcels
of land ten years ago. Last year, the value of one of these parcels dropped substantially below cost. The write-down converted the company's already meager
earnings to a loss, causing a stockholder to dispose of his stock.
The following year, the company sold its other parcel of ground at a gain
which exceeded earnings for the last ten years combined. What do I tell the
selling stockholder when he asks such questions as:
Did the company really make all that money in one year? If not, how
come the last nine years showed so little gain and even a loss last year
when the other parcel was written down to market value?
How credible did my audit make thosefinancialstatements?
Financial Statements Give Erroneous Impression of Precision
The language and dollar amounts which appear in financial statements convey a much greater degree of precision than can be justified. In many respects,
the accountant acts like the head linesman in a football game. After unpiling
fifteen or twenty players, the referee places the ball approximately where he feels
it belongs. Then the head linesman runs in with the chains to see whether the
ball is one inch short or two inches beyond the first down line. So it is with
accountants. After approximating the amount of receivables which will be collected, the resulting estimate is shown as $614,319.23. Nowhere is the reader
put on notice that the accountant is only 95% certain that the receivables total
10% more or less than $614,319.23. If that is the degree of the accountant's certainty, shouldn't thefinancialstatements say so?
By stating earnings per share as an absolute amount of dollars and cents,
that commonly used index is invested with a much greater degree of precision
than any knowledgeable insider intends. Might not this aura of precision be
laid to rest if earnings per share were stated as a range rather than as an
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absolute amount? The use of a range might also lessen the impression of absolute
accuracy which readers now obtain fromfinancialstatements.
Need for Audit Research
Until recently, there has been virtually no research as to the effectiveness of
audit procedures, reflecting auditing's general position as the accounting profession's poor relation. While vast sums have been committed to accounting
research and the work of the APB, only meager resources have been committed
to auditing. Except for statistical sampling, audit procedures have largely been
developed by doing rather than by empirical research.
It's time to subject generally used audit procedures to critical examination.
Just how effective are receivable confirmations, inventory observations, etc.?
The accounting profession might well take a hard look at what went wrong
when companies with robust statements, recently audited, suddenly go bankrupt.
For example, if receivables turn out to be non-existent, perhaps CPAs should
rethink the audit procedures which failed to uncover the problem. Perhaps
research might uncover better audit procedures.
None of these comments should be interpreted as criticism of the recent
revival of the Committee on Auditing Procedure. That committee's present
schedule could hardly be called "too little" even though it certainly came
much "too late."
Accountants' Financial Responsibility
There seems to be a growing interest in the CPA's financial resources. During a recent meeting, a banker put it quite succinctly. He asked: "You say that
CPAs are unlimitedly liable for their work. What assurance does that give a
financial statement user? Are CPAs bonded? Is there any place we can determine the extent of a CPA's assets or insurance?"
It is inevitable that the SEC will soon be asking similar questions. A suggestion, heard infrequently in the past, that CPAs publish their ownfinancialstatements, was recently repeated by John Burton, newly appointed Chief Accountant
of the SEC. The size of an audit fee vis-a-vis the CPA's total income or resources
could well bear on the question of the CPA's independence.
Shortly after World War 1, so the story goes, the King of England sought
advice concerning his country's perilous financial condition. A consultant supposedly advised him to put India in his wife's name. The uncertainties of public
accounting and the soaring cost of liability insurance have prompted many
CPAs to take a similar route. Acceleration of this trend could serve to accentuate
the public's concern over the CPA'sfinancialresponsibility.
Perhaps the public's new-found concern over the accounting profession is
a sign that we have arrived. At least now we are noticed. The CPA's increased
prominence brings to mind the old story of a man who, having been tarred
and feathered, was being ridden out of town on a rail. When he was asked
how he felt about his predicament, he replied: "If it weren't for the honor, I'd
rather walk."
Reporting Requirements Burdensome to Small Business
Although most reporting requirements are equally valid for both large and
small companies, a few rules are obviously geared to the needs of publicly held
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companies. At present, reporting requirements apply equally to companies of all
sizes. Complying with certain of the reporting requirements (e.g., reporting
earnings per share) can sometimes prove burdensome to a closely held company
—a burden which produces meaningless data. It's time that each accounting
and auditing pronouncement be scrutinized to determine whether or not it
should apply equally to public and non-public companies.
Promulgating Auditing Standards—A Problem of Coordination
Inherent in many APB announcements are a number of practical auditing
and reporting problems. Even though the Committee on Auditing Procedure
and the APB are both arms of the AICPA, there appear to be some coordination
problems. When the APB's functions are taken over by the new Financial Accounting Standards Board, a completely independent entity, the problems of
coordination are likely to increase.
Here are a few examples of the hot potatoes with which the Committee on
Auditing Procedure has dealt in recent months. At least in some cases, the problems have been magnified by the APB's unwillingness to expand its general
pronouncements by including more specifics.
1. APB Opinion 20 prevents a change to a less preferable accounting
method. This first raises the question as to what accounting method
is preferable in a given situation. Furthermore, it places the auditor
in a somewhat awkward posture when one client changes to a preferable method of accounting while another client, in identical circumstances, continues to use a less preferable method. The CPA
must give a clean opinion to both clients so long as consistency is
maintained by each. In effect, the CPA is expressing an opinion that
the second client is reporting in a manner which is "consistently
unpreferable."
2. APB Opinion 18 prescribes the equity method for subsidiaries in
which the parent owns 50% or less where the parent exercises "significant influence." Here the APB has attempted to suggest a reasonable guideline by stating that 20% or more ownership will normally be considered "significant." Auditors may expect considerable
client pressure against the equity method when a 25%-owned subsidiary loses money. On the other hand, contrary pressures may be
expected when an 18%-owned subsidiary shows excellent earnings.
3. Similar problems arise when consolidating financial statements.
Where the subsidiary reports on a different fiscal year than the parent,
which statements of the subsidiary should be consolidated with the
parent? The SEC permits consolidation with subsidiary statements
prepared within 93 days of the parent's closing date. The APB, however, has not been that specific. This leaves the auditor with a serious
problem. Should the parent consolidate with audited financial statements for the subsidiary (which statements could be as much as
eleven months old) or should more current unaudited financial
statements be used?
Comfort Letters
I had intended to report to you on an interview with an investment banker
concerning comfort letters. However, his teeth were chattering so from the "cold
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comfort" he's been receiving from auditors' comfort letters that I couldn't understand him. Consequently, let me close with a few unusual applications of
statistical sampling.
Statistical Sampling
I am told that a major life insurance company, seeking to speed up payment
of death claims, decided to use a computerized statistical model to forecast when
policyholders' claims would come due. In this way, the company hoped to
virtually eliminate the need for filing claims. Those policyholders who received
payments of "death" claims were somewhat startled and began to wonder
whether the insurance company knew something they didn't know. However,
few complaints were received from these policyholders. Major complaints came
from widows who upon filing claims on the death of their spouses received a
computer-produced form letter stating that their husbands were not "statistically
dead."
A large department store, seeking to speed up its monthly billing procedure,
devised a computerized model of its business. Feeding in historical data concerning the buying habits of each customer, the computer could then produce
monthly bills without becoming bogged down by the need for posting each individual charge slip. Customers were merely billed an amount equal to their
historical purchases for a given month. The store was finally forced to abandon
the system, not because it received many complaints, but primarily because
charge business tripled when details of the new system leaked out. Describing
the experiment to his superiors, the innovative controller who had devised the
new system said that he had good news and bad news. The good news: just as
predicted by the system designer, even a tripling of charge business put no
strain on the billing system. With no increase in office personnel whatsoever,
the same bills were mailed monthly to charge customers as before the volume
increase. The bad news: the department store was experiencing difficulty in
paying its suppliers. The controller suggested that even this deficiency could be
resolved if all suppliers would adopt the same billing system.
Despite the difficulties experienced by these two companies, my partners
and I decided to experiment with statistical sampling in our accounting practice.
Other practitioners assured us that statistical sampling prevented over-auditing
and provided, at the same time, an acceptable confidence level. We reasoned
that if statistical sampling can work on a client-by-client basis, why not for our
entire practice? Consequently, we now audit a meticulously selected random
sample of our clientele, before rendering an opinion on all of our clients. Naturally, we bill all clients—to avoid any charge of unethical conduct. Let me now
recall, as best I can, one final dream—really just a catnap—that occurred shortly
after we adopted this new modern approach to auditing.
As this dream opens, my six partners and I are standing before Judge Walter
Mansfield just before sentencing. I never did hear the charge, only the jury's
verdict. Oddly enough, the judge was dressed in the ceremonial robes normally
worn by the Emperor of Japan and was singing an excerpt from the Mikado,
one of my favorite Gilbert and Sullivan operettas. Translated into English, his
song went something like this:
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"My object all sublime,
I shall achieve in time,
To let the punishment fit the crime,
The punishment fit the crime."
With this brief preamble, the judge announced the sentence: the seven of
us were to be arranged in random number order (using the last three digits of
our respective social security numbers) before a firing squad of 21 guns. [I
remember thinking what a shame that my first 21-gun salute was also to be my
last.] Each gun, though equipped with six chambers, would contain but one
bullet. In this way, the judge stated that he was "95% sure that 82% of us
would survive—give or take 10%."
As we were remanded to the sheriff's custody, the judge said that he would
have acquitted us had the case been tried before him without a jury—a statement
which relieved all seven of us greatly.
In closing, I say to our chairman, the arranger of this excellent symposium,
that I am delighted that he asked me to talk about problems, not solutions. And
to all of you . . . pleasant dreams!
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